

## IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND ACCURACY OF BIAS CRIME STATISTICS NATIONALLY An Assessment of the First Ten Years of Bias Crime Data Collection

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research Northeastern University Boston, MA

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and
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Funded by: The Bureau of Justice Statistics Washington D.C.

**JULY 2000** 

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#### INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING BIAS CRIME STATISTICS

Bias<sup>1</sup> crimes are by no means a new phenomenon to the United States; accounts of our nation's history are replete with violent manifestations of hate and prejudice. Over the past fifteen years, increased awareness and discussion about the legacy and impact of such crimes has prompted legislation that identifies bias crimes as distinct from similar non-bias crimes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines these crimes:

A hate crime, also known as a bias crime, is a criminal offense committed against a person, property, or society which is motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin (Crime in the United States, 1999).

Bias crimes are therefore not separate offenses, but acknowledge a specific motivation for a criminal event. This motivation is considered more pernicious and disruptive to communities, imposing "..distinct emotional harm on victims" (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 1993, Levin and McDevitt, 1993). Because of this, both local and national legislation has been passed which attempts to penalize those crimes that are motivated by bias.

Along with the movement to distinguish bias crimes from non-bias offenses a concurrent initiative developed to obtain a better understanding of the scope of the bias crime problem nationally. The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-275) required that a means of understanding the nature and prevalence of "crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity" across the nation be created. In accordance with this mandate, the Attorney General delegated the responsibility of collecting this information to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program.

This Executive Summary will describe the project "Improving the Quality and Accuracy of Bias Crime Statistics Nationally," funded through the Bureau of Justice Statistics, including a review of the national hate crime trends, a summary of results from a national law enforcement survey regarding officer attitudes about hate crime, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The terms 'hate' and 'bias' are used interchangeably in this report.

several other sources of data. The compilation of these data sources gives key insight into how to both improve hate crime reporting and how to better interpret the data we currently have.


#### BIAS CRIME DATA AND REPORTING PROCESSES

The following section provides a brief synopsis of sources of data about hate crime, as well as what our national statistics reveal about the prevalence of hate crime in our society. In addition, this report explores the incremental process of hate crime reporting, from incident to documentation at the FBI.

- Our best source of national hate crime data continues to be the Uniform Crime Reports. Although incident based systems (including NIBRS) provide more comprehensive data, these systems exist in very few jurisdictions, precluding any cross-jurisdictional comparisons or national estimates. Several advocacy and human rights agencies across the country collect information on hate crime, however, this data is often not systematically collected. Despite this, advocacy group and human rights groups data is extremely valuable in providing insight into the victim experience, and why so many hate crime victims fail to reach out to law enforcement.
- The FBI began collecting national data about hate crimes in 1991, post the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. Since 1991, the number of agencies which submit information to the FBI has increased steadily through 1996, then plateaued and declined slightly in 1997 and 1998.
- Nearly 12,000 agencies now 'participate' with the UCR Hate Crime Reporting Program. Participation, however, is a somewhat misleading term, as the vast majority (83%, in 1998) of agencies 'participate' by submitting that their jurisdiction had 'zero' hate crimes during the year. Therefore, that 12,000 agencies now participate with the UCR Hate Crime Reporting Program is an improvement more technical than substantive; the full picture of hate crime reporting nationally has not yet been captured through official data (see chart #1).
- In the most recent Hate Crime Report issued by the FBI (1998), fifteen states had ten or fewer agencies submitting incidents of bias crime. Additionally, one other state did not participate entirely. Almost one third (37.3%, n=19) of all the states reported fifty or fewer incidents for the entire state. While we do not know what a realistic level of hate crimes in a particular jurisdiction would be, these figures seem to most observers as rather low.

- Comparing the number of agencies which submit one or more incidents of bias crime to the actual number which participate with UCR (not just the Hate Crime Reporting Portion of UCR) reduces the number of agencies which report at least one hate crime to approximately 10%.
- The amount of hate crime incidents submitted nationally has remained remarkably stable throughout this time frame. In 1992, there were 7,466 incidents reported; and in 1998, 7,755 were reported. In 1994, the number of reported hate crime incidents hit a low of 5,932, with the highest number of reported incidents occurring in 1996, 8,759.
- In addition to those departments which submit zeros, still a significant percentage (about a third) do not participate in the UCR Hate Crime Reporting Program (zero or otherwise).

Chart #1



- Although there are some common factors that affect crime reporting overall, several caveats exist for hate crime reporting specifically. Barriers to accurate hate crime reporting generally fall into one of two broad categories: individual (victim) inhibitors and police dis/incentives. The process of hate crime reporting (from the incident to the documentation in the UCR statistics) can be conceptualized as a series of seven key decision points:
- 1. Victim understands that a crime has been committed
- 2. Victim recognizes that hate (of the victim's real or perceived minority status or attribute) may be a motivating factor
- 3. Victim or another party solicits law enforcement intervention
- 4. Victim or another party *communicates with law enforcement* about motivation of the crime
- 5. Law enforcement recognizes the element of hate
- 6. Law Enforcement documents the element of hate and, as appropriate, charges suspect with civil rights or hate/bias offense
- 7. Law enforcement records the incident and submits the information to the Uniform Crime Reports, Hate Crime Reporting Unit<sup>2</sup>

These events generally occur in sequence, and if there is a breakdown at any one of these decision points, the likelihood of accurate reporting diminishes substantially.

- When considering these steps, one should consider the centrality of the relationship of these victim groups to the police. The level of trust between the victim and the police can directly inhibit or encourage communication between the victim and the police at the time of the original incident.
- The infrastructure to support submissions to UCR is another step where bias crime reporting can break down (Nolan and Akiyama, 1999). Formal and informal interviews with officers around the country indicated that many perceived a divergence between the official statistics and actual investigations of bias crimes in their communities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> It is possible that this step could be broken out into two smaller components. The agency may compile their statistics and submit them to an intermediary agency, such as the State Police or the Statistical Analysis Center (SAC), who then forward the numbers to the FBI.

#### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Given the history of bias crime reporting in this country and the problems that have developed during the first few years of data collection, this project sought to gain information from several different sources in an effort to understand what impedes or supports hate crime reporting. Additionally, we hoped to identify areas where criminal justice professionals could augment or enhance their participation in this process to not only improve the data, but to improve police/victim relations overall. To do this, the research team used data from several different sources. These sources include a mail survey sent to a stratified probability sample of law enforcement agencies across the country, telephone surveys of training academies, telephone surveys of representatives from advocacy groups and other additional interviews with law enforcement representatives. The following briefly summarizes the compilation of data from each source<sup>3</sup>.

#### National Law Enforcement Survey

In March 1998, a stratified sample of 2,657 law enforcement agencies received a survey questionnaire via regular mail. The survey was developed to document impressions from law enforcement departments about the factors which impede or encourage accurate hate crime reporting. In addition to pre-testing the survey with a random group of agencies and obtaining feedback, our surveys built on prior research by Nolan and Akiyama (1999) on factors which affect police decision making, as well as other research in the general area of crime reporting. Included in our strategy to distribute the surveys were persistent contact points (utilizing many of the Dillman, Total Research Design, 1978, strategies), including follow up post cards and multiple phone calls to encourage responses. Overall, each agency received two distinct surveys, one for the Chief to fill out and one for a hate crime investigator (or person likely to investigate such a crime within the department). Further, agencies were separated by reporting history (using UCR data): those who reported one or more incidents of hate crime in 1997, those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A more detailed description of the methodology is included in the <u>Final Report</u>, submitted to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, March 15, 2000.

who reported zero hate crimes in 1997, and those agencies which did not submit any reports in 1997 (zero or otherwise)<sup>4</sup>.

The overall response rate from the agencies was 30%, with better response rates from larger agencies. Response rates for the largest agencies were over 60%, while the smallest agencies were considerably lower. However, due to differential response rates, this sample is more representative of larger agencies.

#### Surveys of Advocacy Groups

Additionally, the research team completed telephone interviews with advocacy groups and national hate crime experts around the country to gain the perspective of hate crime professionals who have worked closely with victims<sup>5</sup>. Because a large number of victims never seek intervention from law enforcement, the research team wanted to be able to understand more about victims who may never interact with the police. Many of these organizations provided to the research team their annual reports or literature which their agency has compiled about hate crimes. This qualitative research has helped us understand some of the barriers hate crime victims face in deciding to report a crime to the police.

#### Hate Crime Training Review Around the Country

In order to obtain information on training provided to law enforcement officers regarding reporting and responding to hate crimes, JRSA contacted state law enforcement training facilities. In states with a large number of facilities, a subset of facilities was contacted. In some states, police departments were also contacted for information on inservice training and obstacles to reporting. State Statistical Analysis Centers were also called for information on published reports and information on advocacy groups involved

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The survey was divided into reporting process information, training information and demographic information. For agencies that had reported at least one incident of hate crime, the chief survey asked more detailed questions about the departmental factors that discourage or encourage reporting. This instrument also contained more detailed questions about victim concerns because their agency had at least a minimal amount of information about these concerns.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> There were approximately 15 interviews with representatives of individual advocacy organizations or national experts.

in the state. Over 300 agencies were surveyed. The results from this inquiry allow for comparisons from the investigator mail surveys.

#### Additional Interviews

During the course of the research project, members of the research team had the opportunity to meet with a series of experts around the country concerning their attitudes about the current state of hate crime reporting practices. Sometimes these interviews were very formal, other times they were more informal and occurred after a presentation or conference meeting.

#### DATA ANALYSIS

The following observations came from analysis of the aforementioned sources.

#### Perceived vs. Official Reporting History

Recognizing the various steps in hate crime reporting listed earlier in this report, one section of the survey asked police respondents about how many bias crimes their agency had encountered *and* reported to the UCR in the last three years. The question allows us to understand what the hate crime investigators believe has been reported to the FBI and compare it to the official statistics.

The survey data, collected for this project, indicate serious disparities between what officers believed about the prevalence of bias crime and their agencies' official statistics. These data indicate that 37.1% (n=36) of the respondents from those agencies which did not submit to UCR in 1997 believed that their department had investigated and reported one or more incidents of hate crime. Surprisingly, of those agencies which reported zero hate crimes to UCR, 31% (n=58) indicated that their department had investigated and reported one or more incidents of hate crime. These data are substantial because they indicate a disconnect between what line officers believe and what is reported to the UCR. Extrapolating these percentages to the universe of law enforcement agencies suggests that between 5,000 and 6,000

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The question of whether these discrepancies are a statistical artifact or represent a true gap in information should be addressed. There is reason to believe that our survey data may approach a more accurate number of jurisdictions where hate crime occurs for several reasons. Included in these reasons is the clear articulation of a definition of hate crime included in the survey, and that a majority of the respondents were line level or mid-level manager police representatives. For a more detailed discussion of the threats to validity in these findings, please reference the <u>Final</u> <u>Report</u> submitted to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, March 15, 2000.

- additional agencies may have encountered bias crimes that were not reported to the national program.
- Through follow up interviews with survey respondents, researchers explored the reasons why such disparities occurred. One of the major reasons cited for the disparity involves a break down in the two-step process of a local agency reporting to a state agency, which then compiles the hate crime reports. The second reason mentioned involved situations where the investigating officers may note the element of bias within the narrative of the incident report, but that report never gets to the person within their agency responsible for completing the UCR reports. Many respondents felt that the indication of bias was occasionally lost in the within the departmental bureaucracy.

#### Infrastructure Extent and Prevalence

The mail survey also asked police representatives about various departmental components which have been established through prior literature (Nolan and Akiyama 1999) to have some relationship to encourage or discourage hate crime reporting. These infrastructure components include the presence of a hate crime policy, the extent of supervision for hate crime incidents, and the presence of a specialized officer or unit to deal with hate crime.

- Although it has been recommended by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as well as advocacy groups (such as the Anti-Defamation League) that police agencies develop and approve a formal policy for dealing with hate crime incidents, still only a minority of police agencies from across the country (37.5%) stated that they had an official policy regarding hate crime (excluding 44 missing responses, total n=661). In general, the smaller the agency, the less likely they are to have a hate crime policy. In particular, the Southern and Mid-Western areas of the country are significantly less likely to have implemented a policy.
- More than three quarters of officers responding to the survey indicated that officers will "support departmental policy" regarding hate crimes. This majority indicates that maintaining a policy could positively affect an officer's decision whether or not to investigate bias.
- While it appears most departments do provide some supervisory review of hate crimes (72.1%, total n=691), in general, only about one third (32.9%) of the time is this review outside of the normal supervision process. The level of supervisory review is important because it offers line officers additional support in identifying potential hate crimes. Both the FBI and IACP endorse a level of supervisory review for hate crime incidents. Not surprisingly, whether this supervision is outside the normal supervision is related to the size of the department, with larger departments more likely to require additional supervision in bias crime incidents. As in the case of

hate crime policies, the Midwest seems to be the area least likely to require additional supervision in hate crime cases (19.4%, compared to 44.4% in the Northeast).

- Nationally, approximately one quarter of the police agencies (24.8%) stated that their department had a specialized officer or unit to deal with hate crimes. Similar to other infrastructure variables, the Mid-West (10.7%) and Southern (19.4%) states were least likely to maintain a specialized officer, compared to the Northeast (43.4%) and the West (27.5%).
- Of those who reported having a specialized officer, nearly 87% reported that they have between one and five officers; and most of these have only one or two officers (66%). Moreover, of those who have a specialized officer(s), only very few, approximately 2%, of these officers work full time on hate crime offenses. It is likely that most of the 'specialized officers' are detectives or lieutenants. In general, the larger the size of the department, the greater the chance that they will have a specialized officer. Slightly more than one-half, 58.5% (n=24) of the largest departments had a specialized officer.

#### **Training**

The mail survey also asked for detailed information about training provisions in individual departments. The length of the training, which officers it is offered to, and its strengths and weaknesses were asked about in the survey.

- The mail survey respondents indicated that more than two thirds of the departments presently do provide some training on hate crimes (67%). In general, the larger the agency, the more likely they are to provide hate crime training. However, most respondents indicated that this training is rather limited, generally under two hours in duration. Advocacy group representatives further indicated that both the quantity and quality of these trainings should be improved. Specifically, training in cultural differences and empathy for victims should be themes addressed in hate crime training.
- Both chief and investigator respondents indicated that if they had additional funds for hate crime training, they would use these funds to train responding officers. Ranked next in importance for training were the detectives. Most police officials did not rank hate crime training for community members as a high priority.
- Results from the telephone survey of training academies indicate that smaller agencies with small budgets seem to be unaware of the training opportunities that exist at both federal and state levels These agencies have a limited knowledge of outside resources that could be used to assist them in training their officers on hate crimes.

#### Police Perceptions of Hate Crime

One of the most salient questions about hate crime currently is whether officers believe there is something 'different' about these crimes. Do officers believe that hate crimes, by their very nature, suggest a more serious phenomena than similar non-bias offenses? Further, officers were asked what they believed contributed to the lack of hate crime reporting.

- The majority of investigators from the mail survey affirmatively responded to the statements, "Given similar assault/vandalism cases, bias assault/vandalism is generally more serious than non-bias assault/vandalism." Only a minority (between 10-15%) disagreed or strongly disagreed. Therefore, it is important to note that across America a majority of those who deal with crime victims most frequently—the police—generally believe that hate motivated crimes are more serious than similar crimes that are not motivated by bias.
- Hate crime investigators noted that they believe a lack of understanding about hate crimes contributes more to underreporting than more external issues such as extra work or fear of media reactions.
- Respondents to the mail survey of law enforcement officers indicated that the factors most likely to discourage victims from reporting were: victims' fear of the police (65.6% rated this moderately to very important) and embarrassment (63.5%), followed by the fear that the police would not take their concerns seriously (62.4%). We see from these data that the police believe that the most salient factor in discouraging victims from reporting is the police/victim interaction. Further, this sentiment is expressed regardless of agency size. Therefore, it appears that by improving the community/law enforcement relationship police will also improve the hate crime reporting processes.
- Officers were asked how important certain factors were in determining whether bias played a role in a criminal incident. Overall, when bias symbols are present at the scene, there is little ambiguity for the officers that bias is involved; most unilaterally indicated that such a cue would be very important in an investigation. However, more variance occurs when discussing some of the less overt signs of bias.
- In general, when determining whether bias was involved an investigation, the Northeast and the West were more likely to place more emphasis on bias charged language and victim claims overall. Additionally, respondents from the Northeast and West were more likely to feel that the victim could accurately identify the element of bias in incidents (74.7% and 71.4%, respectively, compared to 67.6% in the Midwest and 58.7% in the Southern respondents).

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following set of recommendations are based on an analysis of national hate crime reporting patterns, surveys of law enforcement agencies across the country, and qualitative information from advocacy groups about hate crime reporting. Improving the national documentation of bias crimes requires a broad-based strategy that addresses four overarching areas: 1) building trust between members of the minority community and their local police, 2) improving law enforcement's ability to respond to victims who do come forward to report bias crimes, 3) making the national data more "user friendly" for local law enforcement purposes, and 4) using supplemental data to both shed light on the level of unreported hate crime and promote community collaborations.

#### I. Police-Community Relationships

- Enhancing victim- police relations is vital to the improvement of hate crime statistics. If law enforcement officers build relationships with members of such groups, this will begin to bridge the gap between minority members and the police. Advocacy organizations and local human rights agencies can be particularly helpful in this regard.
- Raising public awareness about bias crimes and the services that are available at local law enforcement agencies is a critical component of outreach to the community. This awareness can be attained through face to face interaction with officers, or through public service announcements. Publicizing the name and number of an officer/ unit designated to address hate crime in the community spreads the message that the police agency is committed to addressing hate crimes.
- The Office of Community Orientated Policing Services (COPS) should add a hate crimes emphasis to its community policing initiatives. Since the results of the national survey indicated that police chiefs believe that increased outreach into minority communities could increase the reporting of hate crimes and reduce the incidence of this crime, efforts to increase outreach should be intensified. As community outreach is a major goal of the current community policing program advocated by COPS, incorporating support to hate crime victims in this outreach effort will provide additional legitimacy to law enforcement efforts and will serve as a vehicle to notify hate crime victims that their victimization will be taken seriously.

New Haven employed a model of building community awareness about hate crime reporting. This model includes public service announcements, massive advertising about police resources for hate crime and various other outreach vehicles.

#### II. Infrastructure and Support

#### A. Departmental Policy

- The FBI should continue to encourage the development of agency infrastructures that support the identification, investigation and the reporting of hate crimes. The Federal Government should support the efforts of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to encourage local law enforcement agencies to develop hate crime polices (which includes the reporting of these incidents), to attend available training, to designate an officer who is responsible for hate crime issues (including reporting) in the department, and to outline a second tier review procedure that provides for supervision of hate crime investigation and reporting.
- □ Local police agencies should set forth formal, step by step procedures for the investigation, recording, and reporting of bias crimes, the verification of the bias motivation, effective strategies for dealing with victim and affected communities, and the reporting of hate crimes to the FBI, UCR Program.
- In jurisdictions where no systematic hate crime training is offered, or no hate crimes are reported the FBI, the Federal Government should offer such training. Either regional training workshops or 'train-the-trainer' programs (or both) should be offered in areas where existing hate crime training is limited or non-existent.

#### B. Specialization

- The FBI should encourage each law enforcement agency to designate a hate crime specialist. These specialists will be encouraged to attend additional hate crime training sessions, to initiate outreach efforts to various groups in the community, and to serve as a departmental liaison on hate crime issues. In most agencies, this person will not be involved in the investigation of hate crime activities full time, but he/she will provide agencies with an officer who is better prepared to deal with aspects of hate crimes when one does occur.
- The FBI should publish a national list of the hate crime specialists annually so that agencies that have a hate crime in their jurisdiction can reach out to specialists from their area for assistance with identification, investigation, and reporting. This list should also be made available to advocacy groups and community groups for the same reasons.

#### C. Supervision

In many communities, bias crime investigations are infrequent; for this reason, it may be difficult for an officer to identify the element of bias because he/she simply does not have a great deal of experience with these kinds of cases. Additionally, even in police agencies that have specialized officers, it is generally the line officer who arrives first to the scene. For this reason, shift supervisors should be trained to

identify potential bias crimes, thus increasing the possibility that when the supervisor reviews an incident report, he/she may identify the element of bias even if the responding officer does not.

#### III. Training

- As we reach the ten year anniversary of the Hate Crime Statistics Act, a renewed national effort should be undertaken to make local law enforcement aware of the advantages of hate crime reporting. This effort should include working with States where hate crime training is already underway to assist the transition to increased use of the national curriculum, or segments of the curriculum that could supplement the curriculum already in use in the State.
- □ The FBI should identify a set of target jurisdictions for intensive follow-up and training. Many large jurisdictions with a diverse population have failed to report to the hate crime reporting program or have reported that they have had "0" hate crimes. A target list of these agencies should be developed and intensive efforts should be targeted toward these jurisdictions.
- Research should be conducted into the most effective hate crime training curricula and techniques. At present we have a broad range of training techniques and curricula being utilized across the country, so efforts to identify those approaches which offer the most promise would be welcome by law enforcement.
- Police agencies should invite advocacy groups to take part in their hate crime training, either as consultants or trainers. Training provides another avenue where police and the community can communicate on the issue of hate crime.

#### IV. Improving Data and Reporting

- The data indicate that in some number of cases an *information disconnect* occurs between the investigating officer and UCR reporting. Many officers stated that they knew of hate crimes that occurred in their jurisdiction but were not reflected in the official report. It is possible that officers note bias motivation in incident report narratives, but the information from such narrative is never documented into the UCR records. A more detailed analysis of the breakdown between hate crimes that are investigated locally and those that are reported nationally should be undertaken.
- To insure that hate crime information is appropriately submitted to the FBI, local agencies should consider methods of 'quality control' to improve accuracy. These quality control methods may include having the chief investigator in the unit review hate crime statistics before they are submitted to the FBI to insure that the officer has translated the official statistics accurately. Next, when municipal agencies report through a consolidated state reporting center (state police), quality control steps should be taken to insure consistency between state and local agencies.

- Several modifications could be made to the FBI Hate Crime Reporting Annual Report. This report, while an important element in the overall hate crime reporting process, can become a more useful tool for local departments by providing a small amount of additional information to local law enforcement. The following are suggestions about how to improve this report:
  - The report should include some prior hate crime data (the previous three years) for each jurisdiction. Additionally, the Report is dominated by zeros from jurisdictions; our proposal involves abridging information from those agencies which have reported zero for three or more years. For example, under each state, those agencies which have participated but not submitted any incidents should be collapsed and listed alphabetically. For those departments that have reported at least one incident of hate crime within the last three years, all the current information is appropriate. Further, all agencies from a particular State should be reported together. Presently agencies are grouped by size and type of agency but all agencies from a particular state are not reported together.
  - To make the report more accessible, a brief description of notable cases could be included, helping to "put a face" on the data from the report. This could involve a brief description of all hate motivated homicides, for example. The annual report should also include the total number of law enforcement agencies in each state. Finally, the annual Hate Crime Statistics Report should contain a list of contact agencies that could provide support to local jurisdictions as well as the contact information if an agency wishes to request training from the FBI.
- The increased use of NIBRS reporting will result in an increase in hate crime reporting. The federal government (through funding and technical assistance) should continue to encourage states and agencies to convert to incident-based reporting; hate crime reporting will be a by-product of this effort. This data set will also give us a better understanding of hate crime incidents with respect to victim injury, property damage, time, location and other variables.
- The FBI should convene a working group to discuss the inclusion of gender in the national report. Since the FBI will soon begin to receive gender information from states that include this category in their hate crime reporting, it is important to convene a group to discuss issues of definition and training.
- In an effort to supplement the official reports produced by the FBI, local law enforcement should be encouraged to partner with local advocacy groups and human right agencies who may be able to help bring more victims forward to the police. These partnerships should include proactive efforts to reach out to various communities and reduce barriers to reporting.

In areas where systematic data could be collected by advocacy groups, this data should be analyzed to determine if it could serve as an early warning system for local law enforcement. It has been suggested that a series of incidents reported from a particular neighborhood might be an indicator of rising racial or ethnic tension and might allow local police agencies to intervene in ways that could prevent an escalation of tensions and ultimately prevent hate crimes.

#### V. Additional Research

- The study has identified several problem areas in the reporting process where bias crime information may be overlooked or misclassified. Further research should look in more depth at the areas of disconnect to better improve the quality of the data.
- Additional research should be undertaken to identify the correlates of hate crime at the jurisdictional level, as well as the individual level. Studies could identify the role of community diversity, immigration patterns, economic changes, and criminal justice policies have on the incidence of hate crimes.
- Research should be done to identify the patterns of hate crime prosecutions nationally, as well as the sentencing of hate crime offenders. These studies could identify the number of hate crime prosecutions, additional difficulties faced by prosecutors in hate crime cases, and the types of sentences that are employed in hate crime cases.
- Research should be developed to understand the actions of hate crime offenders within the broader context of youth violence. For example, a study could compare hate crime offenders to other youthful offenders to determine the extent to which they are similar.
- □ As more NIBRS data become available, a comparison should be undertaken to examine the level and character of hate crimes in NIBRS jurisdictions. A simple comparison of hate crime data from agencies before and after switching to NIBRS would be very useful.
- Research should be conducted on the role of the internet in promoting hate violence. This study should look at the role the internet as an information source as well as a source of companionship, for hate crime offenders.

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Finally, we thank the nearly one thousand law enforcement agencies which took the time to complete our survey and tell us about how they feel about hate crime in general. It is their insight that has truly made this project possible.

To obtain a copy of the Final Report submitted to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, please visit our website: http://www.dac.neu.edu/cj/open2.htm

# Improving the Quality and Accuracy of Bias Crime Statistics Nationally

An Assessment of the First Ten Years of Bias Crime Data Collection

## FINAL REPORT

Submitted to
The Bureau of Justice Statistics
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March 15, 2000

B

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#### **ABSTRACT**

This project analyzes the factors that affect bias crime reporting nationally on several different levels. Barriers to hate crime reporting generally fall into one of two broad categories: individual (victim) inhibitors and police disincentives. Individual inhibitors affect a person's willingness an likelihood of contacting law enforcement to report a bias crime, while police disincentives are factors, either departmental or personal, which interfere with accurate law enforcement identification or recording of bias crimes. In this project, we surveyed a national sample of law enforcement agencies, a national sample of individuals involved in law enforcement training, as well as a smaller purposive sample of advocacy and human rights agencies, about these factors. Additionally, we have completed a review of hate crime curricula from a sample of states. Quantitative and qualitative information is presented in the analysis and recommendations are explored.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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We are indebted to the Statistical Analysis Centers for assistance in identifying appropriate resources for hate crime training in their states, and to instructors in state police training academies and law enforcement officials who took the time to provide information regarding the nature of training in their state and local facilities. We also gratefully acknowledge the valuable resources provided by many organizations involved in hate crime training for law enforcement: American Correctional Association and the Police Executive Research Forum; Anti-Defamation League; Educational Development Center; International Association of Chiefs of Police; International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training; National Coalition Building Institute; National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives; "Not in Our Town" Educational Resources; Southwestern Legal Foundation; and the Southern Policing Institute.

Finally, we would also like to thank the nearly one thousand law enforcement agencies which took the time to complete our survey and tell us about how they feel about hate crime in general. It is their insight which has truly made this project possible.

#### INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIME STATISTICS

Hate crimes are by no means a new phenomenon to the United States; accounts of our nation's history are replete with violent manifestations of hate and prejudice.

Understanding and appreciating that such crimes are distinct from other, non-bias offenses, however, is a relatively new legislative phenomenon beginning within the past fifteen years. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines these crimes:

A hate crime, also known as a bias crime, is a criminal offense committed against a person, property, or society which is motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin (Crime in the United States, 1999).

Bias crimes are therefore not separate offenses, but note a specific motivation by the offender. This motivation is considered more pernicious and disruptive to communities, imposing "..distinct emotional harm on victims" (508. U.S. 476, 1993, Levin and McDevitt, 1993). Because of this, a great deal of local and national legislation has been passed which attempts to penalize those crime that are motivated by bias.

Along with the movement to distinguish bias crimes from non-bias offenses, a concurrent push came to get a better understanding of the scope of the bias crime problem nationally. The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-275) was instituted as a means to understand the nature and prevalence of "crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity" across the nation. In accordance with this mandate, the Attorney General delegated the responsibility of collecting this information to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. As an initial step in this process, hate crime and data collection experts were invited to participate in meetings to discuss effective data collection strategies and to identify

incentives for law enforcement agencies to participate in the program (U.S. Department of Justice, Hate Crimes Resource Book, 1990). The group came to a positive agreement regarding the basic data collection model and identified training and demonstrating the merits of participating as the key incentives for local law enforcement agencies as keys to developing an effective system.

Over the past 10 years, the ability of law enforcement agencies to identify and investigate hate crimes has significantly improved, as has their response to hate crime victims. Many agencies have hate crime policies in place, designated hate crime investigators or units, and specialized training. Most of these improvements would not have taken place without the work of the Department of Justice and specifically, the FBI. The FBI has assumed the responsibility for data collection and has taken this responsibility very seriously. In addition, the FBI has trained thousands of law enforcement officers in the proper investigation and reporting practices in hate crime cases. It is true that hate crime victims today are more likely to receive professional response from law enforcement when they come forward to report a hate crime, and this is due in large part from the efforts of the FBI and the Department of Justice.

Despite these areas of improvement and the enactment of the Hate Crime

Statistics Act a decade ago, the state of hate crime reporting still has several limitations
which prevent accurate assessment of the true prevalence of bias crime in this country.

Although the number of agencies nominally participating in the UCR Hate Crime

Reporting Program increased through 1996, the number of agencies who submit at least
one or more incidents of hate crime has remained fairly constant over the past five years.

Nearly 83% of those agencies which participate in the UCR Hate Crime Reporting

Program submit zeros. Although some of the zeros reflect jurisdictions where there were truly no bias crimes occurring, evidence compiled by advocacy and human rights organizations- as well as accounts in the media- indicate that many more bias crimes occur than are reflected in official reports. Therefore, that nearly 12,000 agencies now 'participate' with the UCR Hate Crime Reporting Program is an improvement more technical than substantive; the full picture of hate crime reporting nationally has not yet been captured through official data. Although we may have improved bureaucratic compliance to this reform, systemic change involving treating hate crimes as unique and different has not been adequately realized on a national level.


Understanding national hate crime statistics requires an understanding of how this new category of crime is perceived and handled by law enforcement and communities. It has been ten years since the implementation of the Hate Crime Statistics Act and it seems an ideal time for an assessment of the effort to collect national information on the extent and character of hate crimes.

## Trends in UCR Hate Crime Data Agency Participation and Incidents Reported

Law enforcement participation in the hate crime reporting program gained steady momentum from 1991 to 1996, when participation peaked. The peak in 1996 signified a 67% level of participation from the 17,000 law enforcement agencies involved in the UCR program. The level of participation then decreased just slightly in 1997 (66%), and again in 1998 (63%) (see figure 1.)

The continuous increase in participation observed from 1991 through 1996, while somewhat encouraging, was not unexpected. The passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act assigned new expectations to local law enforcement agencies regarding their Figure 1.

Year	Number of States	Number of Agencies		
1991	33	2215		
1992	42	6181		
1993	47	6865		
1994	44	7293		
1995	46	9584		
1996	50	11354		
1997	49	11211		
1998	46	10730		



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Some charts in this section were provided by and compiled with the assistance of James Nolan of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Hate Crimes Reporting Unit.

investigative and reporting practices—that of investigating for bias motivation and recording offenses and incidents as such. As departments began to adjust to this expectation, participation was expected to increase.

Until the passage of this Act, the vast majority of departments had not investigated and recorded criminal offenses and incidents in terms of bias motivation, much less maintained the information to be submitted to the Uniform Crime Reports. Since the goals of the Act encourage comprehensive and consistent participation, increased participation should be considered positive, however, an examination of the content of the reports submitted to the program indicates less advancement than mere participation may suggest.

There was the expectation that the program would iron out many of the data collection difficulties within the first few years of the process. The Department of Justice's 1990 Hate Crime Resource Book states, "experience in other data collection programs has shown that data reliability increases after agencies and their personnel have time to learn the special definitions and procedures and after information about the program circulates at the local level." There remains, however, considerable doubt regarding the reliability and validity of national hate crime statistics.

Initial collection efforts were based on the work of eleven states that had developed individual collection strategies and instruments prior to the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (U.S.DOJ, 1990). Each of these states had enacted some state level hate crimes

legislation at the time of, or prior to, the passage of the national Act. These states included Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia. In the hate crime resource guide of 1990, making comparisons of hate crimes between states was warned against as there was no systematic collection strategy, instrument, or definition. An examination of the efforts of the original participating states indicates that they have remained remarkably consistent from the initiation of the Act in 1990 throughout the decade. In fact, some of the original states submitted more hate crime incidents in 1990 than observed in the last four years of collection (see table 1.). This is opposite from the direction we would expect to observe. Given the notion that as definitions, strategies, and procedures became more pervasive, so should the number of investigations and incidents identified and reported as bias motivated. On the other hand, these states (and their respective local agencies) may have been reacting to the initial figures and working towards measures to bring the number of incidents down.

Table 1.

Number of Participating Agencies and Incidents Reported for the 11 Original States

States Year		Participating Agencies	<b>Incidents Reported</b>		
Connecticut	1990	100	69		
	1995	94	87		
	1996	98	114		
	1997	59	113		
	1998	94	109		
19 19	1990	378	258		
	1995	411	164		
	1996	394	187		
	1997	580	93		
	1998	464	179		

Maryland	1990	131	792
	1995	148	353
	1996	148	387
	1997	148	321
	1998	147	282
Massachusetts	1990	250	348
	1995	202	333
	1996	405	454
	1997	359	441
	1998	177	431
Minnesota	1990	115	309
	1995	66	285
	1996	307	268
	1997	312	214
	1998	72	248
New Jersey	1990	562	824
	1995	568	768
	1996	568	839
	1997	567	694
	1998	565	757
New York	1990	110	1100
	1995	520	845
	1996	499	903
	1997	502	853
	1998	500	776
Oregon	990	185	343
	1995	243	152
	1996	174	172
	1997	171	105
	1998	167	93
Pennsylvania	1990	1000	194
	1995	1,134	282
	1996	1137	205
	1997	1108	168
	1998	1127	168
Rhode Island	1990	45	43
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	15
	1995	45	46

States	Year	<b>Participating Agencies</b>	<b>Incidents Reported</b>
Rhode Island	1998	46	29
Virginia	1990	?	91
	1995	175	51
	1996	409	100
	1997	409	105
	1998	414	160

Since its inception, a number of enhancements have been made to the Act which provides further complexity for agencies collecting and submitting reports—and consequently for researchers interpreting hate crime statistics. In 1994, the federal definition of hate crime was expanded to include bias against persons with disabilities. Information regarding bias crimes motivated by disability has only been summarized since January 1997 (see table 2.). Proportionally, the number of known offender(s) tends to outweigh the number of victims. This pattern is similar (though actual proportions differ) to patterns observed for all other bias motivation except religion. This variation in bias crimes motivated by religion may be explained by the frequency with which a bias religious attack would be carried out on a place of worship, which would logically possess more victims than known offenders. In 1996, the category of church arson was included. As of this writing, information regarding church arson has not yet been summarized.

Table 2.

National Figures for Bias Crimes Motivated by Disability

	Incidents	Offenses	Victims	Known Offenders
1997	12	12	12	14
1998	25	27	27	42


In addition to these inclusions, some states have recently undertaken modifications to their bias crime statutes to further augment the minimum parameters set at the federal level.

At present, approximately 20 states include gender as a category of bias motivations, and about 10 of these states report the number of gender motivated hate crimes as part of their state reporting system. While these numbers continue to be quite small, it may be an appropriate time to begin a discussion at the national level about the procedures for including gender. This initiation is also supported by the presence of pending federal legislation which would include gender as part of the national hate crime collection effort. The inclusion of gender poses challenges (similar to those faced by other categories of bias motivation), involving the definition of which crime should be included as gender hate crimes and how that would fit with state and federal law. While it is not yet mandated that gender be included in the national hate crime reporting system, the FBI may already be receiving some gender motivated hate crime reports as part of NIBRS submissions from states who include this as part of their state statute. A discussion of the appropriate definition of gender motivated hate crimes and the procedures for collecting this information would position the FBI to be able to respond quickly when legislation is passed.

Again, the distinction between 'participation' in the program, and 'reporting hate crime incidents' to the program is important to keep in mind. The number of agencies who

participate in the program remains quite disproportionate to the actual number of agencies who report that a hate crime occurred in their jurisdiction (see figure 2).


Figure 2.



In 1998, eighty- three percent of the 10,730 agencies that participated in the hate crime reporting program reported that 'zero' hate crimes occurred in their jurisdiction. During the original collection efforts of 1990 jurisdictions were given the option to report 'zero' hate crime incidents. While this did encourage participation, a number of agencies report 'zero' incidents when this may not be accurate. Thus, participation rates have had very little impact on the actual number of incidents reported. For example, while the level of agency participation continued to rise from approximately 2,000 in 1991 to over 11,000 in 1996 and to drop just slightly overall through 1998, the amount of hate crime incidents submitted nationally has remained remarkably stable throughout this time frame (see figure 3.).

Figure 3.

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
# of Incidents	7466	7587	5932	7947	8759	8049	7755



In 1992, there were 7,466 incidents reported; and in 1998, 7,755 were reported. In 1994, the number of reported hate crime incidents hit a low of 5,932 with the highest number of reported incidents occurring in 1996 (8,759). Although the overall level of agency participation has declined just slightly since 1996, and the number of reported incidents has dropped in relation, the percentage of participating agencies who actually report that at least one hate crime has occurred in their jurisdiction has risen slightly. In 1998, 17% of the agencies who participated in the program reported at least one hate crime; up from 15% in 1997. The optimistic trend here may be that participating agencies who consistently report zero incidents may be dropping out and that the agencies who continue to participate are providing more accurate reports.

### Cross State Comparisons

Although examining trends or patterns by jurisdiction is helpful to understand hate crime reporting practices, making direct comparisons between these jurisdictions regarding the nature and/or prevalence of hate crime remains unfeasible. To demonstrate the tenuous nature of such a comparison, an attempt can be made to examine hate crimes between two states. To increase the likelihood of comparability, we will select two states within the same region, adjacent to one another, both with a history of consistent reporting. New Jersey and Pennsylvania are two states that meet these qualifications. Both of these states had also enacted hate crime legislation prior to the inception of the hate crime reporting program in 1990 and both were involved in the development of the original collection model. Each of these states has been collecting information regarding hate crime incidents for over 10 years. In 1998, 5% of the nations participating law enforcement agencies were located in New Jersey, covering 3.7% of the population (216 million) and submitting nearly 10% of the hate crimes reported. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, comprised 10.5% of the participating agencies, covered 5% of the population, and submitted 2% of all the hate crime incidents. Clearly it would be negligent to assume from this information that New Jersey has five times more hate crime than Pennsylvania. It is important to examine all other factors that may contribute to this disparity. For instance, in February of 1992, New Jersey was recognized as the first state in the nation to establish a bias crime unit with the State's Attorney Generals Office. Prior to this, New Jersey's legislature had enacted the Ethnic Terrorism Act (1981) which provided criminal penalties for actions designed to incite fear among racial, religious, or ethnic groups,

followed by the Ethnic Intimidation Act (1990) which provided enhanced penalties for bias motivated harassment or simple assault.<sup>2</sup> New Jersey was also the first state to introduce legislation to treat hate crime as a separate category with enhanced penalties in 1978. The state's attorney general has intensely scrutinized the state's hate crime figures and has taken the issue of bias crime very seriously with a vow to prosecute all bias crimes to the fullest extent of the law. In 1992, an additional trooper was assigned to the five person unit responsible for examining patterns in bias crimes. In 1993, New Jersey governor Jim Florio signed a bill whereby offenders of bias crime could be sued by their victims. The state's definition of bias crime was then expanded to include gender and disability in 1995. Quite clearly, the state has prided itself on being at the forefront of the national hate crime issue.

A review of local news reports convey a concern among New Jersey media and residents that the bias crime problem was increasing and becoming more vicious. This conclusion was drawn by the media via the increase in the state's official hate crime statistics; in 1990, 824 hate crimes were reported, in 1991 976, by 1992, there were 1,303 hate crimes were reported. While the increase may reflect an actual increase in hate crimes, there are other explanations that are equally plausible. For instance, the collective intolerance of hate crime in New Jersey most likely provided a heightened priority for local law enforcement. This would enable officers to readily investigate and identify bias intent, as well as to react to the crime and the victim accordingly. Additionally, this environment may have encouraged more and more hate crime victims to first, identify their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> These Acts have subsequently been overturned by the New Jersey Supreme Court.

victimization as bias motivated and second, to report the incident to the police (this issue will be discussed in more detail later in this report).

Therefore variances in number of incidents of hate crimes between these states may stem from the increased interest of New Jersey's state leaders, representatives, and community to uncover offenses of bias. The ratio of media articles printed on hate crime between New Jersey and Pennsylvania in a three year period is 5:1 (150:30) with New Jersey maintaining a much broader public discussion. This may also serve to heighten the community's awareness of the issue. Most recently, in 1999, New Jersey became the first state to prosecute a bias crime involving a victim with a mental disability. These variations between jurisdictions, as well as a host of others, have a demonstrable effect in hate crime statistics on a multitude of levels from local jurisdictions, to state levels and further regionally.


### Regional Differences

To further illustrate the limits in our ability to make comparisons and generalizations based on the national data, we'll take a look at regional trends and averages. Since the inception of the hate crime reporting program, participants from the northeast, central states, and western states have demonstrated relatively similar patterns in participation (see figure 4.).

Figure 4.

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
NORTHEAST	2252	2354	2531	2914	3088	2994	2736
CENTRAL	1529	1492	1509	1870	2432	2222	1975
WEST	1782	1985	2018	2848	2824	2830	1872
SOUTH	618	1034	1298	1952	3010	3165	4147

# **Number of Participating Agencies by Region**



Participation levels climbed steadily from 1991, peaking for all regions, except the South, in 1996 and then trailing off for all regions, except the South, through 1998. In 1998, participation by the Southern agencies dramatically surpassed all other regions.

While the southern agencies demonstrated the lowest level of participation in the early stages of the program (just over 500 in 1992 compared to approximately 2,000 for the rest of the country), their level of participation surpassed all other regions in 1997 and continued to climb even further in 1998. The current level of participation for the southern U.S. has jumped to the highest level of participation observed since the inception of the Hate Crimes Reporting program. Although the south increased its

participation by 982 agencies from 1997 to 1998,<sup>3</sup> they have consistently reported 6% of the nations hate crime incidents both years. The southern region maintains the highest level of 'zero' reporting agencies for the nation.


Comparing<sup>4</sup> the amount of hate crime incidents to index crime reveals that 29% of the nation's index crimes were reported in the southern region (1997), while 6% of the nation's hate crime incidents were reported there. The northeast reported 17% of the nations index crimes and 34% of the nation's crime incidents. The western and central regions of the United States showed similar proportions of hate and index crimes (west, 39% hate crime, 32% index crime—central 21% hate crime, 22% index crime).

The number of incidents submitted regionally has remained quite stable throughout the duration of the program, even from 1995 through 1998 where the greatest amount of variation in participation patterns has been observed (see figure 5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The state of Alabama did not participate in 1998, the state had 282 participating departments in 1997.

Figure 5

	1995	1996	1997	1998
Northeast	2356	2372	2618	2470
Midwest	1376	1697	1644	1329
South	1306	1216	1450	1233
West	2717	2764	3047	2889



The Western region of the United States declined in participation by 958 agencies. However, the number of incidents submitted to the program by the Western agencies demonstrated only a slight decline. It is worth noting that, although the level of participation for the Western states has remained lower than the South and Northeast since 1996, the number of incidents submitted by the Western states has consistently surpassed all other regions. One explanation for this disparity is that the state of California submits an inordinate number of incidents. In fact, the city of Los Angeles was responsible for 23% of all the hate crimes incidents reported nationally in 1998. Los

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The researchers do not claim that there is any relationship between levels of hate crime and index crime.

Angeles has been quite dedicated to detecting and reporting incidents of bias crime. A number of local advocacy groups and the Los Angeles Human Rights Committee have helped to ensure that this goal is being actualized.

Often it is the case that exceptional factors erroneously affect reporting trends. For example, if a state (or local jurisdiction) does not report to the program for a particular year (perhaps due to computer problems), the observed pattern for an entire region may shift. In 1998, the state of Wisconsin had difficulties that precluded participation from the entire UCR program.<sup>5</sup> This loss affected observed participation rates regionally and nationally. The overabundance of 'zeros' reported by the majority (83%) of local law enforcement agencies regarding hate crime incidents also has a damaging effect on the validity of the national hate crime statistics.

### **Trends in Motivating Factors**

While there are obvious limitations in the quality of hate crime data nationally, there does seem to be some consistent patterns that can be detected from the national data. As indicated above the percent of total agencies submitting 'zero' reports has remained relatively consistent over time. In addition, the number of total hate crimes reported has remained similar over time and that is also true if we look at the number of hate crimes by region. With the data limitations in mind, we will next review the identifiable patterns based on the national hate crime data.

This point of reference is used only for discussion purposes.

### Race

Hate crimes perpetrated on the basis of the victim's race continue to outnumber all other motivating factors. During the initial assessment of hate crime reporting practices (of the eleven original states by the FBI's Crime Reporting Unit), where no systematic collection strategy or definition was yet in place, race was cited by all states as the most frequent motivating factor, followed by religion (U.S. D.O.J. Hate Crime Resource Book, 1990). Like trends in overall participation and incidents, the number of racially motivated bias crimes peaked in 1996 with approximately 6,700 race-related incidents reported nationally, representing 76% of all hate crime incidents reported that year (see figure 6.). The number of incidents dropped to less than 6,000 in 1997 (approximately 73%), and further still to less than 5,400 in 1998—making up 70% of the hate crimes reported nationally.

Figure 6.

Motivation	1995	1996	1997	1998
Race	6170	6767	5898	5360


The number of anti-black related incidents consistently outnumbers anti-white related incidents and demonstrates a nearly identical pattern to race overall, peaking in 1996 at 51% (of all hate crimes reported that year), with a slight decline through 1998—46% (see figure 7.). Anti-white incidents, while considerably lower, demonstrate far less variation than anti-black hate crimes (although there is little variation in anti-black bias crimes).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Wisconsin is expected to participate again in 1999.

The pattern of anti-white hate crimes has been decreasing just slightly each year since 1995.

Figure 7.

Bias Motivation	1995	1996	1997	1998
Anti-Black	3805	4469	3838	3573
Anti-White	1511	1384	1267	989



Anti-white incidents made up 19% of all hate crimes reported in 1995 and slowly decreased to comprise 12.7% of the nation's hate crimes in 1998.

## Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Ethnicity


In addition to race, other motivating factors include, anti-religion, anti-sexual orientation, anti-ethnicity and anti-disability. Both anti-religion and anti-ethnicity bias attacks demonstrate less pattern activity than observed for anti-race hate crimes (see figure 8). In fact the number of incidents has remained consistent over the past four

reporting periods (1995-1998). Anti-religious incidents comprised 18% of the total number of bias crimes in 1995 and 19% in 1998. The average since 1995 is  $\bar{x}$ =1468 (minimum=1414, maximum=1500). Similarly, anti-ethnicity has remained at approximately 13% of the total incidents since 1995 with an average of  $\bar{x}$ =1046 (minimum=919, maximum=1163). Anti-sexual orientation incidents have demonstrated a bit more fluctuation, making up 16% in 1995, 14% in 1996, and peaking at 19% in 1998. The percentage of hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation is currently (1998) at the same level as anti-religious bias crimes with an average of  $\bar{x}$ =1334 (minimum=1256, maximum=1469).

Figure 8

	1995	1996	1997	1998
Religion	1414	1500	1483	1475
	(17.8%)	(17%)	(18.4%)	(19%)
Sexual	1266	1256	1375	1439
Orientation	(15.9%)	(14.3%)	(17%)	(18.5%)
Ethnicity	1022	1163	1083	919
Ethnicity	(12.8%)	(13%)	(13.4%)	(11.8%)






### American Indian, Asian, Multi-Cultural

Anti-American Indian, Anti-Asian, and Anti-Multi-Racial hate crimes make up the remaining bias crime motivations and have remained at a total of approximately 10% since 1995 (see figure 9).. The percentage of reported Anti-American Indian hate crimes continue to represent less than 1% of all reported hate crimes. The average number of Anti-American Indian bias incidents over the past four reporting periods is x=59.5 (minimum=49, maximum=66).

Figure 9.

	1995	1996	1997	1998
Anti-American	59	69	44	66
Indian	<1%	<1%	.05%	.08%
A - 4: A -:	484	527	437	359
Anti-Asian	6%	6%	5%	5%
Anti-Multi-	311	318	312	373
Cultural	4%	4%	4%	5%

### Anti-American Indian, Anti-Asian, & Anti-Multi Racial Hate Crimes



Anti-Asian hate crimes have also remained quite stable at 5-6% from 1995 to 1998, with an average of x=451.75 (minimum=359, maximum=527). Similarly, the percentage of reported anti-multiracial attacks has represented between 4 and 5% of all hate crimes reported since 1995 with an average of x=328.5 (minimum=311, maximum=373).

## Criminal Offenses

The Hate Crime Resource Guide of 1990 identified; assault,

threats/harassment/intimidation, property damage and criminal mischief as the most common offenses associated with hate crime. These categories have continued to be the most frequently reported offenses associated with bias crime (with the exception of criminal mischief, which is undefined). The number of offense categories has also remained quite stable (see table 3.), with most offenses categorized as crimes against person. The offense category of "intimidation" has been reported as the most common bias offense consistently since 1995. The average number of offenses categorized as "intimidation" is x=3870, (minimum=3488, maximum=4130) representing approximately 40% of the bias offenses perpetrated. Combined assaults (simple and aggravated) follow intimidation as the most frequently occurring bias offense with an average of x=3024 (minimum=2790, maximum=3206), approximately 30% of the total.

Table 3

Number of Bias Crime Offenses

	1995	1996	1997	1998
Destruction/Damage/Vandalism	2315	2874	2549	2549
Intimidation	4048	4130	3814	3488
Simple Assault	1796	1762	1800	1706
Aggravated Assault	1268	1444	1237	1084
Robbery	194	155	144	118
Burglary	96	140	111	99
All others	178	201	191	166
TOTAL	9895	10706	9861	9235

Destruction/Damage/Vandalism followed intimidation and assault as the most commonly reported bias crime offense and is classified by the UCR as "crimes against property."

This offense type has also demonstrated remarkable consistency throughout the duration of the program with an average of x=2571 (minimum=2315, maximum 2549) reported since 1995, representing approximately 25% of the bias offenses reported.

### Location

In the 1990 assessment of the five states that collected information on location, the most commonly sited location for a bias crime to occur was at a residence (frequently that of the victim) followed by public highways (US DOJ, Hate Crime Resource Guide, 1990). These two sites continue to be reported as the most frequent locations of bias crime (see table 4).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Crimes against person includes; murder & nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, simple assault, and intimidation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Crimes against property include; robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, arson, and destruction/damage/vandalism.

Table 4.

**Location of Incidents** 

	1996	1997	1998
Residence/home	2734	2394	2377
Highway/road/alley/street	1832	1685	1519
School/college	799	848	699
Parking lot/garage	445	464	446
Church/synagogue/temple	321	231	278
Commercial office building	232	240	179
Bar/night club	141	137	151
Restaurant	190	140	145
Specialty store	164	120	126
All others	1901	1790	1835
TOTAL	8759	8049	7755

Residences accounted for 30% of the locations where bias crimes were reported in the United States. The average number of incidents in which the location was the residence, over the past three reporting periods is  $\approx 2501$  (minimum=2377, maximum=2734).

Highway/road/alley/street followed residence as the most common location for a bias crime to be reported. Bias crimes occur in these locations approximately 21% of the time, with an average of x=1678 incidents (minimum=1519, maximum=1832) reported.

The next most common place for a bias crime to occur is school/college, followed by a parking lot or garage, followed by church/synagogue/temple. Bias incidents are reported as occurring at school/college in approximately 10% of the incidents perpetrated nationally. The average number of incidents which occur at schools was x=782 (minimum=699, maximum=848) over the last three years of reporting.

Parking lot/garage was the location associated with bias crime incidents approximately 6% of the time, with an average of x=451 incidents reported in these areas.

Although bias crimes were only reported as occurring at church/synagogue/temple in approximately 3% of all bias crime incidents, average x=276 (minimum=231, maximum=321), the number of victims that are generally associated with each of these incidents is much greater than for other locations.

Based on the 1998 hate crimes data, the Anti-Defamation League compiled lists of the most populated cities that both top the incident reporting charts and that are consistently deficient in reporting incidents of bias for their jurisdiction.

The following information is taken directly from those lists which were based on the UCR data.

TABLE 5: Most Populated US cities NOT Participating
In the Hate Crimes Reporting Program in 10088

In the flate Crimes Reporting Program in 1998					
Detroit, MI	10 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Memphis, TN	18 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Milwaukee, WI <sup>9</sup>	19 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Nashville, TN	25 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Honolulu, HI	35 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Birmingham, AL	63 <sup>rd</sup> largest				
Anchorage, AK	66 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Baton Rouge, LA	75 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Mobile, AL	79 <sup>th</sup> largest				
Montgomery, AL	82 <sup>nd</sup> largest				
Columbus, GA	99 <sup>th</sup> largest				

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Information taken from the ADL's "Highlights From the 1998 FBI Hate Crimes Statistics Act Report."

The entire of state of Wisconsin did not participate in the UCR in 1998, but are expected to participate in 1999.

Table 6.

Participating Cities Reporting Low Numbers of Incidents<sup>10</sup>

			ents <sup>10</sup>	<del></del>
		1996	1997	1998
Indianapolis, IN	12 <sup>th</sup> largest	DNR	DNR	0
Charlotte, NC	32 <sup>nd</sup> largest	DNR	DNR	0
Miami, FL	44 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	0	0
Toledo, OH	53 <sup>rd</sup> largest	0	DNR	0
Buffalo, NY	54 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	0	0
Santa Ana, CA	55 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	0	0
Hialeah, FL	78 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	0	0
Des Moines, IA	85 <sup>th</sup> largest	4	11	0
Jackson, MS	86 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	0	0
Shreveport, LA	89 <sup>th</sup> largest	DNR	0	0
Louisville, KY	61 <sup>st</sup> largest	1	4	1
Norfolk, VA	70 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	1	1
Richmond, VA	80 <sup>th</sup> largest	5	1	1
Garland, TX	92 <sup>nd</sup> largest	2	10	1
Washington, DC	21 <sup>st</sup> largest	16	6	2
New Orleans, LA	29 <sup>th</sup> largest	1	1	2
Anaheim, CA	57 <sup>th</sup> largest	6	2	2
Raleigh, NC	67 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	0	2
Jersey City, NJ	72 <sup>nd</sup> largest	3	7	2
Akron, OH	74 <sup>th</sup> largest	DNR	DNR	2
Grand Rapids, MI	93 <sup>rd</sup> largest	0	0	3
Tampa, FL	58 <sup>th</sup> largest	5	0	4
Rochester, NY	73 <sup>rd</sup> largest	9	6	4
Lubbock, TX	84 <sup>th</sup> largest	1	0	4
San Antonio, TX	8 <sup>th</sup> largest	0	4	5
Huntington Beach, CA	90 <sup>th</sup> largest	2	5	5
San Bernardino, CA	98 <sup>th</sup> largest	11	9	5
Denver, CO	26 <sup>th</sup> largest	8	4	6
Omaha, NE	45 <sup>th</sup> largest	DNR	DNR	6
Jacksonville, FL	14 <sup>th</sup> largest	19	0	7
Tulsa, OK	40 <sup>th</sup> largest	12	1	8
Tucson, AZ	31 <sup>st</sup> largest	4	6	11
Oklahoma City, OK	30 <sup>th</sup> largest	6	5	12
El Paso, TX	17 <sup>th</sup> largest	7	12	13
Dallas, TX	9 <sup>th</sup> largest	70	40	19
Houston, TX	4 <sup>th</sup> largest	34	30	39

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Information taken from the ADL's "Highlights From the 1998 FBI Hate Crimes Statistics Act Report."

# General Considerations about Crime Reporting

Although official statistics are often the best indicator of crime nationally, they also are compromised by several factors, what eminent criminologist Robert Merton termed the "successive layers of error (Merton, 1957)" involved in the collection and documentation of law enforcement crime records. Interpretation of official crime statistics should be cognizant of points where error and inaccuracy enter into the process (BJS, 1999). We break these areas into four broad categories; they are: (1) factors which discourage victims from reporting, (2) factors which affect police decision making, (3) political influences which affect agency crime reporting, and (4) legislative differences in determining type of offense. This section will briefly touch upon each of these points.

As is widely noted in the literature, victims decline to report a crime for a multitude of reasons (Gove et al., 1985, Hindelang, 1974, Block, 1974). At the most basic level, the victim must be aware that a crime has been committed before anything can be reported (Block, 1974). As in Gove et. al.'s seminal study assessing the validity of the Uniform Crime Reports (1985), the two most frequent responses to why victims did not report their victimization involved either that they did not believe the incident "was serious enough" to merit law enforcement notification, or that they did not believe the police could do anything about the incident. Whether a person has confidence that the police will be able to 'do something' is related to the victim characteristics. Social class and offender race can be intervening variables in whether the victim feels they should contact the police (Shah and Pease, 1992, Block, 1974). In a study of older Hispanic persons, Starret et al. (1988) found that informal social networks were an intervening variable in the decision-making process for victims. Further, many studies have looked at

the victims' relationship to the offender, and how that affects the decision of whether to report or not.

Police decision making has been looked at extensively. Gove et al. (1985) define four critical factors in whether police report a crime. These include whether or not the officer has sufficient evidence to indicate a crime has been committed, whether the victim wishes to proceed formally with charges, how serious the crime is, and finally, the level of professionalism in the department. Most notably, Black (1970) noted that police were much more likely to report serious incidents, as opposed to petty crimes.

Past the responding officer's decision of whether to take a report for the incident or not, departmental influences will structure how a particular agency will submit their official crime reports (McClearly et al., 1982, Kitsuse and Ciciourel, 1963). Whether or not the top echelon of supervisors in a particular agency give a message that certain crimes are a priority will affect how an officer responds to a situation, and whether he ultimately takes an official report (Akiyama and Nolan, 1998, McCleary et al., 1982).

Next, a substantial amount of literature (Seidman and Couzens, 1974, Baer and Chambliss, 1997, Haider-Markel, 1998, Fallon, 1997, Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994) have explored the role of factors exogenous to the line officers and crime reporting. Political hierarchies and public opinion weigh in when considering how to 'spin' certain statistics. Baer and Chambliss (1997) discuss the political motivations to exaggerate or diminish crime statistics in an effort to increase federal funding or inflate certain politician's images. Moreover, crime statistics are often related to funding opportunities. The reauthorization of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1994 marked the first time that Uniform Crime Reports (from a particular jurisdiction) were

associated with federal funding. According to this Act, funding should be based on the most recent three years of crime data from the UCR (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999). This change could provide incentives to frame crime statistics in a certain light.

Another point of error is in legislative differences. Here, differences between municipal, state, and federal guidelines cause differences in reporting. Whereas one jurisdiction may define 'larceny over \$500' as a felony, another jurisdiction could maintain a lower threshold of \$250. In sum, all of these factors will interrupt or affect accurate recording of crime by law enforcement agencies.

Finally, the last caveat to the Uniform Crime Reports is that it is a *voluntary* system. Although it may behoove agencies to report for funding reasons, there is no obligation to report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and each year, and many agencies do not report for a variety of reasons (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999). Many times, agencies may fail to submit data for a few months of the year, while submitting the remaining months. Often, imputations are made by the FBI to estimate trends without data from many law enforcement agencies (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999).

# The Hate Crime Reporting Process and Barriers to Accurate Data

Although there are some common factors that affect crime reporting overall, hate crime reporting has several out of the ordinary obstacles to accurate data. Barriers to accurate hate crime reporting generally fall into one of two broad categories: individual (victim) inhibitors and police disincentives. Individual inhibitors affect a person's willingness and likelihood of contacting law enforcement, while police disincentives are factors, either departmental or personal, which interfere with accurate law enforcement identification or recording of bias crimes. Nolan and Akiyama have empirically looked at the police disincentives extensively (1999), and broken down this category into several salient components which this study will explore. In this section, we will itemize the requisite steps in hate crime reporting and discuss the caveats of each.

The process of hate crime reporting (from the incident to the documentation in the UCR statistics) can be conceptualized as a series decision points:

- 1. Victim understanding that a crime has been committed
- 2. Victim recognition that hate (of the victim's real or perceived minority status or attribute) may be a motivating factor
- 3. Victim or another party solicits law enforcement intervention
- 4. Victim or another party communicates with law enforcement about motivation of the crime
- 5. Law enforcement recognizes the element of hate
- 6. Law Enforcement documents the element of hate and, as appropriate, charges suspect with civil rights or hate/bias offense
- 7. Law enforcement records the incident and submits the information to the Uniform Crime Reports, Hate Crime Reporting Unit<sup>11</sup>

These events generally occur in sequence, and if there is a breakdown at any one of these decision points, the likelihood of accurate reporting diminishes substantially.

Hate crime victims face barriers to reporting in addition to the common difficulties faced by all crime victims. The most important issue involves the relationship of these victim groups to the police. Specifically, many members of following communities: African Americans, Hispanics/ Latinos, gays/lesbians, Asians, have shared a longstanding distrustful and often antagonistic relationship with the police. Consequently, many members of these groups are reluctant to go to the police with allegations of bias motivated harassment and violence.

Victims may also not understand that the act against them was bias motivated. For instance, an African American family may not interpret a rock thrown through their home window as an act of vandalism that is motivated by anti-black bias. In such case, they may contact the police, but never mention any suspicion about the bias motivation. In other cases, the victim may suspect bias motivation, but may not feel comfortable enough to share his/her suspicions with the police. This can occur because victims do not believe that the police will believe them, because the victims do not believe the police have any power to do anything about the incident, or because the victim may be afraid of retaliation by the offender(s).

Bias victims also often encounter *cultural and language barriers* which other victim groups do not. In some cases, victims may not even recognize that the act perpetrated against them was a criminal offense. Foreign nationals and first generation immigrants

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> It is possible that this step could be broken out into two smaller components. The agency may compile their statistics and submit them to an intermediary agency, such as the State Police or the Statistical Analysis Center (SAC), who then forward the numbers to the FBI.

may anticipate that American law enforcement is as corrupt and abusive as their native communities. People from such countries may not even think to contact the police if they were victimized because police in their native country are seen as corrupt or not interested in such crimes. Even in those cases where law enforcement is contacted by an outside source, such victims are still often hesitant to discuss the incident with police because of these cultural differences. Other considerations which impact whether a victim contacts law enforcement include:

- concern that the police or other criminal justice officials are racist and sympathetic with the perpetrators
- concern on the part of illegal immigrants that they would be imprisoned or sent back to their native country
- fear of reprisals from family friends, or the broader community if certain characteristics are made public
- a desire to avoid bringing attention to themselves, to assimilate with the majority.
- fear of secondary victimization due to a lack of sympathy or empathy on the part of the cultural majority

Most importantly, the level of distrust between the victim and the police can directly inhibit communication between the victim and the police at the time of the original incident. If victims and officers are not communicating openly, vital details about the incident may be omitted from the report, and the investigation is hampered from the start.

Once police begin their investigation, they must take note of the cues which indicate bias. These cues may take the form of language, prior harassment, graffiti, tattoos, symbols, etc. If an officer has not been *trained* to identify these cues, no bias motivation will be identified and consequently, no hate crime reported. Even if the responding officer suspects bias, he or she must know how to conduct an investigation that will identify if any bias indicators are present. If there is no *departmental policy regarding* 

hate crimes or supervisory review of potentially bias motivated incidents, the hate crime investigator will employ traditional investigation techniques. Other limitations on an officers ability to recognize, record and report hate crimes include:

- lack of commitment on the part of supervisors and/or commanding officers (Nolan and Akiyama, 1999)
- officer concern with political ramifications
- belief that the problem isn't important (Nolan and Akiyama, 1999)
- belief that the separate classification of bias crimes is not legitimate
- overt or covert message from government officials (mayor, county executive, etc.) not to report or to keep figures low

For these and other reasons, police often do not accurately identify or do not record crimes as hate-motivated.

The infrastructure to support submissions to UCR is another step where bias crime reporting can break down (Nolan and Akiyama, 1999). Formal and informal interviews with officers around the country indicated that many perceived a divergence between the official statistics and actual investigations of bias crimes in their communities. Several of these officers from 'zero-reporting agencies' reported that they had been directly involved in bias crime investigations and had recorded them as such. For this reason, attention should be paid to not only training and supervisory factors, but also to the infrastructure which supports submission to the Uniform Crime Reports each year.

Of all the factors enumerated, the most critical appears to be the interaction between police and victim communities. The longstanding relationship that police have with a particular victim community will have a direct impact on whether a member of that community will report or not. Also, verbal interactions between the two parties when a victim comes to the police with a problem may reduce the likelihood of a report. If a

victim suspects, through an officer's demeanor, that the officer does not believe that the report is credible or important, the victim may close up and withdraw from active participation in the investigation.

All of the impediments that traditionally contribute to the 'dark figure of crime' apply within the genre of hate crime; however, as is described above, additional considerations about reporting are relevant for hate crime victims. With these considerations in mind, we will present a brief history of official sources of hate crime data.

#### Official Sources of Hate Crime Data

By 1980, a few police departments (notably, Boston, New York City, and Baltimore and Montgomery Counties in MD) had begun collecting information on incidents motivated by race, religion and ethnicity. The community relations or bias crime units recognized the importance of non-criminal incidents and their potential impact on communities, as well as the potential of such information to serve as an early warning that a neighborhood was on the verge of more serious violence.

At the same time, human rights agencies expanded their missions beyond compliance with nondiscrimination laws to encompass community relations measures to address the problem of hate violence. Many county and state human rights commissions began collecting information on incidents directly from victims; providing support to victims; working with advocacy and community groups on data collection, providing prevention and intervention efforts, educating citizens; providing mediation services between victims and offenders; and providing training to school personnel and police departments.

Training for police focused on appropriate identification and the mechanics of recording hate-motivated crimes, as well as the impact of incidents on victims as well as and the broader community. Some human rights agencies developed Memoranda of Understanding with police departments and began sharing data on incidents.

Throughout the decade of the 80s, law enforcement increased attention on hate crimes, and the FBI developed training materials to address the problem. With the Hate Crime Statistics Act in 1990, many officials assumed that most departments would join the reporting process within the next few years. Although the FBI began producing annual reports on hate crime statistics, the initial expectations of widespread reporting did not materialize; it became clear that many departments were not accurately reflecting the incidence of hate crime in their communities.

Definitional differences between jurisdictions contribute to the lack of consistency within bias crime statistics; for instance, in some areas, gender is included as a minority category, in others it is not. Legislation has developed both on the state and national level, creating sometimes dissimilar legislation. Moreover, definitions of what constitutes enough evidence to label something a hate crime also vary. Some departments use the label to indicate that an incident might be a hate crime, but change it if an investigation determines otherwise; others attach the label but do not revise the designation, so the original statistics stand.

As a result of the Hate Crime Statistics Act, the FBI created a new incident-based reporting form, the Hate Crime Incident Report, that was added to the existing Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) summary reporting system. The Hate Crime Incident Report form allows the FBI to obtain the required data on each hate crime incident, including the

offense, location, bias motivation, type of victim, number of offenders, and offenders' race. This information is completed for each incident and submitted by each reporting agency on a quarterly basis.

## **National Incident Based Reporting System**

Over the past several years, the FBI's UCR program has been moving toward implementation of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Unlike the current UCR reporting program, which collects summary information on arrests and crimes reported to the police, NIBRS focuses on each individual crime incident, allowing for the collection of detailed information on crime victims, offenders, relationships and circumstances of the crime.

Under NIBRS, hate crime reporting is handled by the inclusion of a mandatory "bias motivation" field associated with each offense in an incident. Since NIBRS includes all of the information contained in the Hate Crime Incident Report form used in the summary UCR, no supplemental reporting of hate crimes is required for those agencies which report under NIBRS.

Incident-based reporting has significant advantages over a summary system because of the increased amount of information that is available (Akiyama and Nolan, 1999). For hate crimes this is particularly important, because capturing the crimes under UCR has been so problematic. In addition to the fact that these have been designated as separate crimes relatively recently, coupled with a wide range of inhibiting factors addressed elsewhere in this report, there is also the issue that the designation of a hate

crime depends either on the occurrence of a very specific act (e.g., cross burning), or on the determination of motivation for a range of criminal acts. The implementation of NIBRS holds the promise of providing much greater insight into the incidence and nature of hate crimes, for a number of reasons:

- NIBRS has the potential for increasing the number of hate crimes being reported. Since no separate reporting for hate crimes is required under NIBRS, it is easier for agencies to report hate crimes. Thus, to the degree that law enforcement officers and agencies are reluctant to report hate crimes because the reporting itself involves additional effort, NIBRS should increase hate crime reporting.
- NIBRS will provide much more information on each hate crime incident than is available under the summary UCR reporting system. For example, the current hate crime reporting form collects hate crime data on 11 offenses, while NIBRS captures data on 46 offenses in 22 crime categories. The current reporting form collects no information on the characteristics of the victim (such as age, sex, and ethnicity), and only one characteristic (race) of the offender. Thus much more detailed information regarding the nature of hate crimes will be available under NIBRS. For example, UCR data on bias-motivated crimes committed by juvenile offenders, or against juvenile victims, will be available for the first time as a result of the implementation of NIBRS.
- NIBRS may also result in more accurate data regarding the nature of hate crimes than have been available under the summary reporting system. For example, using the current hate crime incident reporting form, the assumption is made that if the bias motivation for a crime is "anti-black," this means that the victim was black. However, the victim may have been a white person who was assaulted for being with a black person. Since NIBRS includes both bias motivation and victim race and ethnicity, it will be possible under NIBRS to code this situation more accurately (and to analyze the data to determine how often this type of situation occurs).

Although NIBRS may result in more and more detailed hate crime data, NIBRS implementation has been moving slowly. Only a small proportion of the country's crime is reported under NIBRS, and few large police departments are included in NIBRS. A few

states still have no plans for implementing NIBRS. Therefore, comprehensive data on hate crimes will not be available from NIBRS in the near future.

Hate crime reporting under NIBRS has changed in the last year. The "bias motivation" indicator in NIBRS is associated with each offense within an incident; that is, there can be multiple offenses within a single incident, some of which are bias-motivated, and some of which are not. This requirement was changed, however, to allow law enforcement agencies to identify an entire incident as being bias-motivated, in which case every offense included as part of that incident would also be considered bias-motivated. It is not clear how many agencies will choose to report this way, nor is it clear what impact this will have on the quality of hate crime data under NIBRS.

Several analyses of NIBRS data have yielded preliminary, yet promising, results indicating the usefulness of this data for law enforcement. Faggiani and McLaughlin (1999) explored the advantages of NIBRS data in examining contextual factors in neighborhood level crime rates. Thompson et. al (1999) also explored intimate partner violence in Massachusetts, isolating risk factors for injury. Both of these studies explore the difficulties of this relatively new system, yet outline the richness of the data and potentialities which such data holds for strategic crime analysis.

In summary, NIBRS will provide more detailed information regarding hate crimes, and has the potential to increase the likelihood that law enforcement agencies will report hate crimes. The relatively slow implementation of NIBRS means that this detailed data on bias-motivated crimes will not be available nationally for some time to come.

### **Human Rights Agency Data**

Very few human rights agencies (HRA) across the country maintain statistics on hate crimes. Some never took on that mission. Most HRA that have done so over the years had no systematic way of acquiring data, and relied on victims to report to them or obtained information through media accounts. Others did during the 1980s, but have deemphasized that function while still working actively on prevention and intervention efforts<sup>12</sup>. Even when many human rights agencies collected information, there was tremendous variability among them. There has been no standard protocol for collection practices, whether they collected information on crimes exclusively or a broader range of acts; what protected groups were included, making it difficult if not impossible to compare data across jurisdictions.

#### **Advocacy Group Data**

The information maintained by advocacy groups is a valuable to supplement police data due to the limitations in law enforcement statistics. Though their original primary function has been to track anti-Semitism incidents, the Anti Defamation League keeps statistics on all incidents it is aware of based on race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, and, more recently, sexual orientation.

A limitation with advocacy group data stems from the groups' mission to focus generally on a singular group. Obviously, each advocacy group has the most credibility

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> One can only speculate about the reasons: passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act and active collection of data by the FBI gave rise to the belief that data collection at the local level was less important; other pressing issues without commensurate additional resources (e.g., the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act); a period in the 1990s when hate crimes were less in the news and, hence, less part of the public consciousness; a belief that, in fact, the problem had diminished. Any one of these or, more likely, a combination, may have contributed to the diminution of attention on the part of official human rights agencies.

among the group for whom they advocate. This creates the probability that any advocacy agency will receive a disproportionate level of information from its members or those most sympathetic to the group. Also, since each of these organizations has limited funding and must justify expenditures to a Board of Directors, the incentive will generally be to collect information that will be most useful to members of its group. These two factors, taken together, make it likely that advocacy organizations will have limited ability to collect information from a broad range of bias crime victims. The following outlines several of the larger advocacy groups involved in hate crime data collection.

The ADL has been collecting more information, on a more systematic basis, and including a broader rage of bias incidents than any other group in the United States. But even here, the identity of the ADL as a Jewish group reduces the credibility of the group's data in the eyes of some non-Jewish individuals. Additionally, the incidents reported to the ADL and included in their Annual Audit include predominately anti-Semitic incidents.

The National Council of LaRaza is currently undertaking an endeavor to improve reporting by both victims and community advocacy agencies. LaRaza is currently affiliated with nearly 220 advocacy agencies across the country and has encouraged them to submit incidents of bias crime to them for compilation in an annual report.

The National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, a coalition of Asian American advocacy groups, has compiled an annual "Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans" since 1993. This coalition includes reports from several agencies including the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California, and the Asian Law Caucus.

The National Gay Lesbian Task Force has also been collecting data for more than ten years. Historically, their numbers are much higher than those noted in official statistics, because of crimes perpetrated against individuals who do not want their sexual identity known. One limitation of this data involves the large number of individuals who report crimes to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force but do not want to come forward to law enforcement for fear of additional harassment.

Although African Americans have been the target of a large portion of hate crimes in general, including many of the most brutal physical attacks, there is no organization which has systematically collected data on incidents directed against African Americans. The NAACP certainly has an interest in the problem, and becomes involved with particularly public and egregious acts, but does not have an infrastructure that allows local chapters to systematically collect data.

There are other similar organizations that have documented incidents against Hispanics (e.g., LaRaza, MALDEF) and Islamic Americans (e.g. Council of American Islamic Relations). In addition, there are also numerous smaller agencies which collect local data from smaller, local jurisdictions.

Hence, though information from advocacy groups helps provide a fuller picture of the scope of hate crimes, the data in each instance are somewhat limited. Further, any effort utilizing those data would present political as well as statistical problems.

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This project uses data from several different sources. We used data from the official UCR statistics from 1996, 1997, and 1998, a mail survey to law enforcement agencies and a telephone survey of training academies as well as a series of personal interviews with individuals most experienced with hate crime data collection nationally. We will begin with the mail survey from a sample of law enforcement agencies across the country.

In March 1998, a stratified sample of 2,657 law enforcement agencies were sent a survey questionnaire via regular mail<sup>13</sup>. Our survey was developed to document impressions from law enforcement departments about the factors which impede or encourage accurate hate crime reporting. The following sections will describe how the sample was constructed, how the survey was drawn, and the methodology for contacting agencies.

#### The Sample

The sampling frame was obtained using the Federal Bureau of Investigation records. From the outset, the research team did not feel that random selection would be an appropriate methodology for the sampling design. First, a small minority of agencies actually report one or more incidents of hate crime in their jurisdiction. Random selection could easily stifle the voice of those agencies from which the study could benefit the most. Next, a completely random design would also almost inevitably result in a large majority of smaller agencies, a majority of which report have reported no incidents

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Copies of all three surveys and cover letters are included in this report as an appendix.

of hate crime. For these reasons, the research team elected draw a stratified random sample, using differential probability, as the survey methodology.

From these nearly 18,918 agencies, we stratified using two separate criteria: size of agency (determined by population size) and reporting history for the reporting year 1997. The hate crime reporting history divides agencies into those which did not submit or participate at all in the hate crime reporting program, those which participated by submitting a 'zero' report, and those which reported an actual hate crime in the jurisdiction. The research team felt that these categories were separate and distinct; although more than half of the agencies participating with the overall UCR program technically 'participate' with the Hate Crime Reporting Program, less than 10% of agencies actually submit that a hate crime occurred in their jurisdiction some time over the twelve month period. Using this stratification procedure allowed us to over-sample those agencies which had actually submitted a report.

Regarding agency size, the research team used the eight UCR Population Group categories, ranging from populations over 250,000 to less than 10,000, and msa and non-msa counties. Because a disproportionate amount of agencies are small (serving less than 10k people), we stratified our sample to maximize voice from every size agency. Specifically, there are nearly three times the amount of law enforcement agencies which serve populations of less than 10k people (n= 9,805) compared to all other population sizes combined (n= 3,215), excluding msa and non-msa counties. Simply, we oversampled the three largest population groups (250k+, 100-250k, and 50-99k) for two reasons: (1) These agencies are more likely to have had at least one incident of hate crime, and (2) There are fewer of these agencies, so random sampling would likely result

in not enough responses from the category to be able to make statistical and theoretical inferences. For these large agencies, we used the universe as our sample (100%). All smaller agencies have been stratified in an effort to maximize responses from all reporting history types (See Table 7).

For the next largest agency category, we sampled fully 50% of those serving between 49,999 and 25k people. For the agencies serving between 10k and 24k, we sampled 25% of the non-submitting and zero-reporting agencies, and 50% of the 1+ reporting agencies. Because an overwhelming number of agencies serve populations of less than 10k people, we used only 5% of the non-submitting and zero-reporting agencies, and 50% of those agencies which had submitted at least one incident of hate crime. The same sample stratification technique was used for msa and non-msa categories.

TABLE 7: STRATIFIED SAMPLING PROCEDURES

POPULATION	SAMPLING	Non-	ZERO	Non-Zero	TOTAL
Size	PERCENTAGE	SUBMITTERS	REPORTERS	REPORTERS	SAMPLED
250,000+	100%	9	7	52	68
100,000-249,999	100%	23	46	89	158
50,000-99,999	100%	46	141	204	391
25,000-49,999	50%	50% of 114= 57	50% of 338= <b>169</b>	50% of 302=151	377
10,000- 24,999	25%, 25% and 50%	25% of 375= <b>94</b>	25% of 1100= <b>275</b>	50% of 369= <b>185</b>	554
Less than 10,000	5%, 5% and 50%	5% of 4042= <b>202</b>	5% of 5297 <b>= 265</b>	50% of 466= <b>233</b>	700
Non msa counties	5%, 5% and 50%	5% of 1954= <b>98</b>	5% of 1675= <b>84</b>	50% of 91= <b>46</b>	228
msa counties	5%, 5% and 50%	5% of 1148= <b>57</b>	5% of 870= <b>44</b>	50% of 160 <b>=80</b>	181
Totals		586	1031	1040	2657

### **Contact Strategies**

Agencies in our sample received two surveys (one for the investigator and one for the chief), a cover letter which explained the goals of the study and gave explicit directions on how to complete the survey, and a stamped self addressed return envelope. Two separate versions of the cover letter were constructed, one was constructed for agencies which had reported at least one incident of hate crime, another for agencies which had not submitted or had submitted zero. The latter group received a letter stating that "The information you provide is essential regardless of whether your department has ever reported a hate crime (italics included in original)." This sentence was strategically placed to encourage those agencies which received the letter, but who might otherwise believe that their response was not needed, considering that they had not ever reported a hate crime. All cover letters were signed with ballpoint blue pen to personalize the mailing (Dillman, 1978). Of course, a phone number and contact person was designated in the letter if agencies had questions or concerns about the survey.

Because we used FBI information regarding addresses for the agencies, we did not have a large proportion of the sample requiring additional information for the mailing address. Approximately one hundred surveys were returned for inadequate address, the majority of which we were able to obtain correct addresses via directory assistance. The research team speculated that the biggest obstacle would not be in locating the agency, but in the survey being funneled to the appropriate personnel within the agency. For this reason, we used a number of methods to increase the likelihood that the appropriate person received the instrument.

Approximately two weeks after the initial mailing, the research team sent out yellow post cards which reminded agencies about the completion of the survey, and offered the respondents a number to call if they lost, misplaced, or never received the original survey. The reminder cards were a bright yellow in color to be somewhat eyecatching if received in a batch of mail.

Following the reminder cards, phone calls were made to encourage some of the larger agencies to respond. Graduate assistants were given a loosely constructed script for the phone calls to remind the person of the survey, offer any assistance necessary, and encourage agency participation. Phone calls were attempted to all agencies which serviced populations of over 50,000. Phone calls were also placed to agencies serving populations between 25 and 50k which had reported at least one incident of hate crime. Many agencies reported that they either a) never received the survey b) did not remember the survey at all, c) were still working on the survey. A small minority stated that they did not wish to participate in the survey. In general, agencies were contacted at least twice in an effort to speak with an agency representative, rather than leaving a message; however, messages and/or voicemail were left at more than half of the agencies. Approximately one hundred and fifty (150) police agencies requested another copy, either via fax or regular mail. In those cases, representatives often said that they did not remember receiving the survey or that the survey was probably filtered out as not important by whoever sorted the mail. Many of these representatives stated they would be happy to participate, but to send another copy addressed directly to them.

In a final effort to increase the responses from agencies, a targeted group of nonresponding agencies was selected from the agencies which serve populations over 100k. Statistical Analysis Center Directors were contacted by JRSA in these states in an effort to intervene with individual agencies which had not already responded in their respective states. The effectiveness of this approach was a function of the relationship which SAC directors had with the non-responding agencies. In some states, SAC Directors work very closely with individual agencies, in others, they may not have developed a relationship due to personnel changes, etc. This tactic also led to several (approximately 25) additional surveys to be returned.

Overall, each agency received two distinct surveys, one for the Chief to fill out and one for a hate crime investigator (or person likely to investigate such a crime within the department). Further, agencies were separated by reporting history: those who have reported one or more incidents of hate crime in 1997, those who have reported zero hate crimes in 1997, and those agencies which did not submit any reports in 1997 (zero or otherwise). The overall response rate from the agencies was thirty percent.

#### Construction of the Survey

Prior to this mailing, the research team completed a pre-test of 43 agencies with an earlier draft of the survey. These agencies were contacted by telephone regardless of whether the survey was returned or not, and contact persons were asked questions about why they had or had not completed the survey, how the survey reached the appropriate person, and whether the questions were clear, etc. From these responses, the survey was amended to include more concise terminology and more clear directions. The overarching response from our pre-test respondents was that their departments had been inundated with surveys. During our post-survey administration telephone interviews, many times

the agency contact person would request very specific information about the type of survey we were inquiring about because they had received so many surveys, including other hate crime surveys.

Three separate survey instruments were constructed to maximize the amount of information obtained from the departments. Two separate surveys for the chiefs (depending on the reporting history of the department) and one investigator survey were constructed. All three of the survey instruments were guided by the existing literature on hate crime and factors which affect crime reporting statistics. In particular, we expanded the scales used by Akiyama and Nolan (1998) in their study of factors that impact crime statistics.

The survey was divided into reporting process information, training information and demographic information. For agencies that had reported at least one incident of hate crime, the chief survey asked more detailed questions about the departmental factors that discourage or encourage reporting. This instrument also contained more detailed questions about victim concerns because their agency had at least a minimal amount of information about these concerns.

#### Surveys of Advocacy Groups

Additionally, the research team completed telephone interviews with advocacy groups and national hate crime experts around the country to gain the perspective of hate crime professionals who have worked closely with hate crime victims (n=15). Many of these organizations provided to the research team their annual reports or literature which their agency has compiled about hate crimes. Because a large number of victims never seek

intervention from law enforcement, the research team wanted to be able to understand more about victims who may never interact with the police. This qualitative research has helped us understand some of the barriers hate crime victims face in deciding to report a crime to the police.

#### Additional Interviews

During the course of the research project, members of the research team had the opportunity to meet and discuss with a series of experts around the country concerning their attitudes about the current state of hate crime reporting practices. Sometimes these interviews were very formal, other times they were more informal and occurred after a presentation or conference meeting.

#### Hate Crime Training Review Around the Country

In order to obtain information on training provided to law enforcement officers regarding reporting and responding to hate crimes, JRSA contacted state law enforcement training facilities. The initial contact information for these training facilities was taken from the National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators, Correctional

Institutions and Related Agencies, 1998, published by the National Public Safety

Information Bureau. However, contact information was also obtained from state

Statistical Analysis Centers, police departments, and training facilities. In states with a large number of facilities, a subset of facilities was contacted. In some states, police departments were also contacted for information on in-service training and obstacles to reporting. State Statistical Analysis Centers were also called for information on

published reports and information on advocacy groups involved in the state. Over 300 agencies were surveyed. Most respondents were training officers directly involved with hate crime training where it was provided. The results from this inquiry allow for comparisons from the investigator surveys. A complete, detailed chart of the results of these telephone surveys is included as an Appendix D.

#### **DEMOGRAPHICS**

#### The Investigator Survey

We received 705 investigator surveys, covering forty-nine states<sup>14</sup>. Using the FBI data, we were able to determine the official reporting history for the respondents of the investigator surveys (shown below). We received nearly equal percentages of surveys from the four areas of the country: Northeast (23.5%), South (29.2%), Midwest (25.4%), and West (21.8%).

Figure 10

#### **UCR Official Reporting History**




Table 8

# of Population **Total Number Sent Percentage Responding** Size Responding By Size of Agency to the Agencies **Investigator Survey** 250+k 41 68 60.2% 100-249k 80 158 50.6% 50-99k 140 391 35.8% 25-49k 113 377 30% 10-24k 165 554 29.8% less than 10k 105 700 15% 29 228 Nonmsa 12.7% Msaco 32 181 17.7% Total 705 2589

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Vermont is the exception to this.

Table 8 outlines the response rates by size of agency. From this chart, we see that there is a linear relationship between size of the agency and willingness to respond to the survey: the larger the department, the more likely they were to respond to the survey. The research team speculates that this is due to larger agencies having more capacity to process surveys, due to more specialization of tasks in larger organizations. Much of the qualitative information we received verified this; we received several letters and phone calls from agencies stating that they had too few (often less than five) officers working at the agency to be able to complete a survey. Whatever the reason, the relationship between size of agency and response rates is not surprising; it is quite similar to the distribution of agencies which report one or more incidents of hate crime to the UCR (see table 9). Excluding the msa and non-msa counties, our overall response rate was 41.3%.

Other agencies called the research team to inform us that the design of their jurisdiction would preclude any investigation or reporting of hate crimes. For instance, we received one call from 'Beverage Control' in South Carolina who had received the survey. These agencies basically self-selected themselves out of the sample, by either calling to let us know they were not going to participate, or by simply not filling out the survey. Although these agencies technically participate in the Uniform Crime Reports, they are not likely to investigate any hate crimes in the near future.

Due to differential response rates by the size of agency, our sample is more representative of larger agencies (See Table 9).

Table 9

Population Size	Frequency of Agencies which Report 1+	Total Number in Size Category	Percentage Responding
250+k	52	68	76%
100-249k	89	158	56%
50-99k	204	391	52%
25-49k	302	754	40%
10-24k	369	1844	20%
Less than 10k	466	9805	4.7%%
Nonmsa	91	3720	2.4%
Msaco	160	2178	7.3%
Total		18,918	

Table 10

Respor and Re	nse Rates b	y States		
Region	State	Returned	Sent	Response Rate
Northeast	Total	166	616	27%
	Connecticut	14	46	30.4%
	Maine	7	21	33.3%
	Massachusetts	37	83	44.6%
	New Hampshire	3	20	15%
	New Jersey	49	176	27.8%
	New York	25	97	25.8%
	Pennsylvania	27	151	17.9%
	Rhode Island	4	14	28.6%
	Vermont	0	8	0%
Midwest	Total	179	643	27.8%
	Illinois	41	125	32.8%
	Indiana	17	46	37%
	lowa	10	35	28.6%
	Kansas	7	31	22.6%
,	Michigan	38	154	24.7%
	Minnesota	17	42	40.4%
	Missouri	16	50	32%
	Nebraska	6	23	26.1%
	North Dakota	1	10	10%
	Ohio	11	83	13.2%
	South Dakota	2	12	16.7%
	Wisconsin	13	32	40.6%
South	Total	206	744	27.6%
	Alabama	6	37	16.2%

	Arkansas	4	19	21%
	Delaware	2	8	25%
	District of Columbia	1	1	100%
	Florida	32	98	32.6%
	Georgia	13	73	17.8%
	Kentucky	7	37	19%
	Louisiana	6	23	26%
	Maryland	7	19	36.8%
	Mississippi	1	13	7.7%
	North Carolina	13	64	20.3%
	Oklahoma	9	35	25.8%
	South Carolina	9	46	19.6%
	Tennessee	11	46	24%
	Texas	59	145	40.7%
	Virginia	20	47	43%
	West Virginia	6	33	18.1%
West	Total	154	493	31.2%
	Alaska	3	4	75%
	Arizona	17	25	68%
	California	75	254	29.5%
<del></del>	Colorado	11	41	27%
	Hawaii	1	3	33.3%
	Idaho	9	20	45%
	Montana	4	14	28.6%
	Nevada	2	9	22.2%
	New Mexico	2	12	16.7%
	Oregon	11	38	28.9%
	Utah	6	26	23%
	Washington	12	43	28%
	Wyoming	1	4	25%

#### Agency Representatives

We asked the respondents what their rank is. Categories for this include

Chief/Commissioner, Top level Administrator (not chief, but including captain), midlevel manager (including sergeant), line officer, hate crime investigator and other. When

officers described their rank as 'detective-sergeant', we re-coded this into the mid-level

manager. The 2.4% are assorted personnel: administrative assistants, civilian service

officers, etc. From these results, we see that the mid level managers make up nearly half

of our sample at 42%, while investigators (hate crime or not specified) make up 21%.


From these data, we see that the investigator surveys tapped into the targeted group with
this survey: the mid-level manager and investigators (mostly sergeant and detectives).

The questions in this survey were designed to elicit responses from agency
representatives who were most likely to have experience in dealing with hate crimes.

Only 24.3% of our sample respondents are chiefs or top level administrators.

Figure 11

What is your position?




We also asked respondents how long they had been in their current position. From this, we see that wide range of officers participated in the survey. More than half of the respondents have been in this position for less than five years.

Figure 12

## Respondent's Experience

# "How long have you been in your current position?"



#### Perceived vs. Official Reporting History

Before we proceed with the demographic descriptions of the chief surveys, we wish to highlight one finding regarding the differences between the results of our investigator 15 survey and official UCR hate crime reporting history. Our investigator survey asked respondents to 'self report' how many hate crimes their department had reported over the years 1997, 1996, 1995. We intentionally constructed this question to ask not how many hate crimes there were, but how many occurred and were reported to UCR. Because our original sample was drawn from UCR data, this would enable us to detect if there were discrepancies between the official statistics and what officers perceived the actual level of hate crime activity in their community.

Our data indicate that 37.1% (n=36) of the respondents from those agencies which did not submit to UCR in 1997 believed that their department had investigated and reported one or more incidents of hate crime. Surprisingly, of those agencies which reported zero hate crimes to UCR, 31% (n=58) indicated that their department had investigated and reported one or more incidents of hate crime. These data are substantial because they indicate a disconnect between what line officers believe and what is reported to the UCR.

The question of whether these discrepancies are a statistical artifact or represent a true gap in information should be addressed at this time. There is reason to believe that our survey data may approach a more accurate number of jurisdictions where hate crime occurs for several reasons. First, the surveys in this study were distributed to "the person

most likely to investigate a hate crime" in their department. Survey data indicate that more than half of the respondents were hate crime investigators, line officers, or midlevel managers. Nearly one fifth were filled out by a top administrator or chief, and another fifth were filled out by various other ranks. By design, we hoped to solicit responses on this survey from those officers who deal most intensely with the issue of hate crime. Rather than being lost in bureaucracy, these are the people within the department who would be most likely to know whether or not a hate crime investigation had occurred in the department. In contrast, official statistics are often generated through departmental bureaucracies, or an administrative employee. For this reason, we believe our data may assist in understanding procedural pitfalls that contribute to underreporting by the police <sup>16</sup>. Additionally, on our survey, we provided a detailed definition of what a bias crime is, "Any crime motivated in whole or in part, by the offenders bias toward a particular race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion gender, or disability." We did this in an attempt to limit the amount of false positives due to a misinterpretation of how to define a hate crime.

Anecdotal evidence compiled from individual interviews and presentations around the country confirms the inconsistencies we found in the survey data between official data and the actual number of hate crime incidents. As mentioned earlier in this report, on several occasions (i.e. during presentations at conferences or during a set interviews) members of the research team met with practitioners from law enforcement agencies.

<sup>15</sup> These results were from the investigator survey only; the chief surveys did not both contain this question about self reporting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> We qualify this by emphasizing that these incidents do not represent the true prevalence of hate crime nationally, but those which are known to the police. Factors which impede victim reporting will be discussed in a later section.

Very often, these representatives were disturbed to find out that their jurisdiction was listed as not having reported or reported zero, information about hate crime to the Uniform Crime Reports because they personally had been involved in the investigation of one or more incidents of bias crime. Such anecdotal evidence seems to support the reliability of our survey data.

Despite these advantages, several limitations also exist regarding making estimations from this data. First, because the survey response rate is fairly low for the smaller agencies, one could speculate that those agencies which responded self selected themselves into the sample because they actually had encountered a hate crime. Considering the rates of response in our survey, our data could be influenced by these biases.

Next, it is possible that some of the self report measures on our survey are imprecise; officers may not have been completely diligent filling out a survey. However, if we look at simple dichotomous measures: whether the department self reported a bias crime or not on the survey, and whether the department has an official record to the Federal Government of a hate crime or not, we see that a substantial number of agencies who report zero (or do not report) to the Federal Government have experienced some hate crime. The variability between these two sets of numbers can not be easily accounted for through approximations or miscalculations.

In an effort to reconcile the differences between self report and official data, we attempted to contact every agency in our sample where there was a discrepancy. Research assistants phoned representatives of each agency as a follow up to the survey. CCJPR representatives did not report to the agencies what their individual surveys responded,

rather, the calls were presented as a general follow up call to understand the overall data patterns. Therefore, no confidentiality was broken. The research assistants informed the agency representatives that there were general discrepancies throughout our data and official data regarding reporting patterns and were asked if they had any idea how such a discrepancy could have occurred. In total, nearly sixty departments were called and we were able to speak with an investigator in about 25% of these departments.

Notably, none of the representatives were particularly surprised that this phenomenon occurred; in fact, most had very clear reasons about how and why this happens. Two general themes emerged from these follow up telephone interviews. First, many representatives stated that their jurisdiction's definition of bias crime differed in some way from the federal definition. Indeed, the variation between jurisdictions is notable and these laws are shaped by the political forces involved (Grattet et al., 1998). However, in general, the federal definition is more inclusive (for instance, gender, sexual orientation and disability are all included). These responses indicate that there may be some confusion between differing definitions.

Next, several representatives stated that there was a two step process in delivering these statistics to UCR. Even though the department may accurately identify and code a particular incident and forward it on to the appropriate state agency, the distinction of hate motivation may be lost at that step. In other words, the corresponding department accurately identified and coded the crime, but the state agency responsible for delivering the crime statistics for the state did not accurately code the crime as such<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Regarding state level intrusions to data collection, only three of the agencies in our sample were from the non-reporting or zero reporting states, therefore we can not explain the data by pointing to already existing gaps in official data.

Finally, several other departments disclosed that police department crime data, in general, was highly susceptible to political influences. Specifically, one representative stated that police officials "..could fix the data if they want to.." in order to make their jurisdiction appear more safe. On the opposite end, another officer stated that "fudging" the numbers occurred to build a case to solicit federal funding.

Given the extent of triangulation of our data through follow up telephone interviews and in person interviews with agency representatives, there is credible evidence to suggest that our data sheds light on a major information gap. Extrapolating our data to the national data allows us to move closer to a more accurate picture of the prevalence of hate crimes known to law enforcement. Assuming that our survey data present a more accurate description of the number of hate crime investigations which took place in a particular agency, we can estimate how many additional agencies could report a hate crime nationally using the 1997 UCR data. Because 37.1% of those agencies which did not submit a report to the UCR indicated that they had one or more incidents of hate crime, we can estimate the additional number of agencies which could report if certain obstacles were overcome (see next section on barriers to reporting). We can use the same procedure to estimate how many of the zero reporting agencies could participate if our survey data represents a closer estimate of the true prevalence of hate crime in these jurisdictions. Table 11 demonstrates that up to 6,000 additional agencies-- nearly one third of the total amount of agencies which participate in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program-- could be candidates to submit one or more incidents of hate crime.

65

Table 11

Non Submitting Agencies 1997	7,707	X 37.1%  (estimated from survey data)	=2,859 additional agencies submitting incidents of hate crime reports
Zero Reporting Agencies 1997	9,478	X 31% (estimated from survey data)	=2,938 additional agencies submitting incidents of hate crime reports
			Total Estimate of Agencies who could submit one or more incidents to the UCR =5,797

While it is beyond the scope of this study to ascertain the magnitude of the differences, it is clear that officers are aware of more hate crimes being investigated by their department than are being reported to the UCR. For instance, one capital city in the South reported on our survey that they had (and reported) twenty hate crimes; the official UCR reports indicate this city had zero incidents. Many other departments reported to our survey that there had been a few hate crimes (two or three), while UCR indicated that they had none. The obvious conclusion here is that someone within the department believes there were appropriately labeled hate crimes; however, those numbers are not getting communicated accurately through the department channels to the Federal Government.

Quite simply, these findings point to the need to 'tighten up' information processing through the agency. In other words, in more than a few cases the reporting ball may be being dropped at the very last step: submitting accurate information to the FBI. It is possible that the investigator is making a note of the element of bias in the narrative of a police report, but the crime reporting office only sees the notation of the underlying charge (i.e. assault or vandalism). Some of this can be avoided if the Investigations Supervisor is asked to review the statistics before being submitted to the FBI. The investigating supervisor or commander is more likely to have had firsthand knowledge about a case that came through the bureau than someone in an administrative position.

For many of the following analyses, we have used the 'self report' measure, as opposed to the official UCR 1997 reporting history, as a more accurate independent variable. For instance, in those questions which we ask about officer opinions about the nature of hate crime, it is more precise to use the self report measure of whether the department has had any hate crime experience.

#### **Demographics: The Chief Surveys**

Two separate chief surveys were distributed, one for the agencies which had officially reported one or more hate crimes, another for agencies which had either reported zero or not submitted any reports. These surveys were designed to maximize the amount of relevant information from each department, including many of the same questions.

Table 12: Response Rates, One Plus Agency- Chief

Size of Agency	# of Responding Agencies (n)	Total Number Sent	Response Rate by Size of Agency	Percent of Survey Sample
250k+	33	52	63%	8.4
100-249k	42	89	47%	10.7
50-99k	85	204	42%	21.7
25-49k	62	151	41%	15.9
10-24k	69	185	37%	17.6
Lessthan10k	67	233	29%	17.1
Nonmsa	9	46	20%	2.3
Msaco	24	80	30%	6.1
Total	391	1040	38%	100.0

# Response Rates by Region One + Agencies: Chief Responses





Table 13: Response Rates, Non-Submitting/Zero Reporting Agencies- Chief

Size	Number of Responses	Total # Sent	Responses Rate by Size of Agency	Percent of Sample
250k+	9	16	56%	2.2
100-249k	37	69	54%	9.2
50-99k	62	187	33%	15.4
25-49k	54	226	24%	13.4
10-24k	119	369	32%	29.5
Lessthan10k	86	467	18%	21.3
Nonmsa	24	182	13%	6.0
Msaco	12	101	12%	3.0
Total	403	1617	25%	100.0


Official Reporting History

Zero- Non Submitting Agencies: Chief

Figure 14







#### DATA ANALYSIS: Hate Crime Reporting Infrastructure

#### Descriptive and Bivariate Relationships

We have identified influential departmental factors using prior literature and consultation with our Advisory Board. McCleary, Nienstedt and Erven (1982) and Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) have explored the organizational structures of police organizations and its relationship to crime reporting. Gove et al. (1985) also note that the level of department professionalism will impact whether officers will report an incident. In this study, we tap into departmental factors by operationalizing infrastructure through four variables; training availability, presence of an official hate crime policy, supervision of hate crime incidents, and the presence of a specialized hate crime officer. These variables are further organized by the length of training, whether the supervision is outside regular department supervision, whether the specialized officer is full time, etc. This section will describe both the prevalence of these infrastructure variables and their relationship with the reporting history and size of the department. Additionally, this analysis will look at the association between the infrastructure variables and region of the country in which the department is located.

#### Official Policy

While it has been recommended by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as well as advocacy groups (such as the Anti-Defamation League) that police agencies develop and approve a formal policy for dealing with hate crime incidents, still only a minority of police agencies from across the country (37.5%) stated that they had an

official policy regarding hate crime (excluding 44 missing responses, total n=661). A statistically significant relationship exists between whether an agency has an official policy and the agency size, region, and reporting history. A majority of agencies with populations over 250k had a policy (82.1%). The next largest population size, 100 – 250k, drops by nearly half; only 44% of these departments have policies. Beyond this, the relationship is descending in linear fashion: the smaller the agency, the less likely they are to have a hate crime policy.

Table 14

			Do you have an official policy regarding hate crimes?		Total
			No	Yes	
Size	250+k	Count	7	32	39
		% within Size	17.9%	82.1%	100.0%
	100-249k	Count	42	33	75
		% within Size	56.0%	44.0%	100.0%
	50-99k	Count	71	55	126
		% within Size	56.3%	43.7%	100.0%
	25-49k	Count	69	39	108
		% within Size	63.9%	36.1%	100.0%
	10-24k	Count	116	40	156
		% within Size	74.4%	25.6%	100.0%
	less than 10k	Count	71	29	100
		% within Size	71.0%	29.0%	100.0%
	nonmsa	Count	22	5	27
		% within Size	81.5%	18.5%	100.0%
	msaco	Count	15	15	30
		% within Size	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	413	248	661
		% within Size	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%

<sup>\*</sup>Pearson chi square value .000

Significant differences also appear between the four regions of the country with nearly one-half of the agencies in the Northeast and the West reporting that they have a policy in place and only about one-quarter of the agencies in the South and Midwest have similar

policies. Specifically, 53.8% of the Northeast responding agencies maintained an official policy, compared to 47.3% in the West, 29.5% in the South, and 22.9% in the Midwest.

Table 15:State Code \* Official policy regarding hate crimes

				Do you have an official policy regarding hate crimes?	
		·	No	Yes	<del></del>
State Northea Code Total	Northeast	Count	72	84	156
		% within State Code	46.2%	53.8%	100.0%
	Midwest	Count	128	38	166
,		% within State Code	77.1%	22.9%	100.0%
	Southern	Count	136	57	193
		% within State Code	70.5%	29.5%	100.0%
	West	Count	77	69	146
		% within State Code	52.7%	47.3%	100.0%
		Count	413	248	661
		% within State Code	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%

<sup>\*</sup>Pearson chi square value .000

Next we looked at the (self report) reporting history, using two measures: first from 1997 only, then for 1995, 1996, and 1997 collectively. For those agencies that self reported that they had at least one incident of hate crime in 1997, 48% had an official policy. Of those agencies which had reported one or more incidents of hate crime over the past three years, 47.3% had an official hate crime policy. This can be compared to agencies that have reported zero hate crimes, were only one-half as many 22.3% report

having a hate crime policy. It appears that police departments with a hate crime policy in place are twice as likely to have reported a hate crime in their jurisdiction than those agencies that do not have a policy. However any interpretation of this data must be limited by the design of this research project. The cross-sectional nature of our study does not allow for causal inferences such as concluding that having a hate crime policy in place will increase the identification and reporting of hate crimes. It could just as likely be the case that agencies that have had hate crimes in their jurisdiction were more likely to implement a hate crime policy. One clear finding of this research is that ten years after the passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act (1990), a large majority of local law enforcement agencies still do not have a hate crime policy in place.

Table 16

			Do you have an official policy regarding hate crimes?		Total
			No	Yes	
Number of Hate Crime Incidents self Reported	0	Count	160	46	206
		% within dichotomous 1997	77.7%	22.3%	100.0%
	1 or more	Count	193	178	371
		% within dichotomous 1997	52.0%	48.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	353	224	577
		% within dichotomous 1997	61.2%	38.8%	100.0%

<sup>\*</sup>Pearson chi square value .000

Table 17

				Do you have an official policy regarding hate crimes?		
			No	Yes		
Number of self reported hate crime incidents 97,96,95	0	Count	142	31	173	
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	82.1%	17.9%	100.0%	
	1 or more	Count	215	193	408	
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	52.7%	47.3%	100.0%	
Total		Count	357	224	581	
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	61.4%	38.6%	100.0%	

<sup>\*</sup>Pearson chi square value .000

#### Supervisory Review

Next, we asked investigators whether their department provided any supervisory review for hate crime incidents. The level of supervisory review is important because it offers line officers additional support in identifying potential hate crimes. In most departments, bias crimes are infrequent occurrences and therefore, responding officers may not be very experienced in identifying such crimes. Supervisory review offers management the opportunity to assist a responding officer in conducting an investigation that could indicate whether bias may have been a motivating factor.

In addition, a review of incidents has been recommended by the FBI in their two tier review process and this process has been endorsed by the IACP. The FBI believes that a responding officer may not always be in a position to determine if an incident is bias motivated. Often additional questions need to be asked and frequently further investigation may be necessary to determine the motivation for an incident.

While it appears most departments do provide some supervisory review of hate crimes (72.1%, total n=691), in general, only about one third (32.9%) of the time is this review outside of the normal supervision process. In most departments, it would be expected that every arrest and most incident reports must be reviewed by the officer in charge, either a sergeant or lieutenant. This question allows us to understand whether hate crime is treated differently through the hierarchy of police command. *Not* surprisingly, whether this supervision is outside the normal supervision is related to the size of the department, with larger departments more likely to require additional supervision in bias crime incidents. There also appear to be regional differences in the supervision patterns of police agencies. The Northeast area more often recommends supervision (44%) that is outside the normal requirements, compared to the three other areas of the country. As in the case of hate crime policies, the Midwest seems to be the area least likely to require additional supervision in hate crime cases.

Table 18

			Does your department provide supervisory review in incidents where bias is suspected?		Total
			No	Yes	
State Code	Northeast	Count	23	137	160
		% within State Code	14.4%	85.6%	100.0%
	Midwest	Count	53	121	174
		% within State Code	30.5%	69.5%	100.0%
	Southern	Count	74	131	205
		% within State Code	36.1%	63.9%	100.0%
	West	Count	43	109	152
		% within State Code	28.3%	71.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	193	498	691
		% within State Code	27.9%	72.1%	100.0%

<sup>\*</sup>Pearson chi square .000

Table 19

			Is this supervision outside of routine review that occurs for non-bias incidents?		Total
			No	Yes	
State Code	Northeast	Count	74	59	133
		% within State Code	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%
	Midwest	Count	100	24	124
		% within State Code	80.6%	19.4%	100.0%
	Southern	Count	86	46	132
		% within State Code	65.2%	34.8%	100.0%
	West	Count	76	36	112
		% within State Code	67.9%	32.1%	100.0%
Total		Count	336	165	501
		% within State Code	67.1%	32.9%	100.0%

<sup>\*</sup>Pearson value .000

#### Specialized Officers

Nationally, approximately one quarter of the police agencies (24.8%) stated that their department had a specialized officer or unit to deal with hate crimes. Of those who reported having a specialized officer, nearly 87% reported that they have between one and five officers; and most of these have only one or two officers (66%). Only 8% of the law enforcement agencies responding to our survey have between six and ten officers; approximately 5% have more than eleven officers. Moreover, of those who have a specialized officer(s), only very few, approximately 2%, of these officers work full time on hate crime offenses. It is likely that most of the 'specialized officers' are detectives or lieutenants.

In general, the larger the size of the department, the greater the chance that they will have a specialized officer. Slightly more than one-half, 58.5% (n=24) of the largest departments had a specialized officer, 38% (n=28) of the departments serving populations between 100-249k had specialized officers. This relationship is also descending in linear fashion, with the exception of msa counties. Only 18.1% (n=19) of the smallest departments (less than 10k population) had a specialized officer. It is interesting to note that even in small departments approximately nearly one-in-five have seen the benefit of designating a specific officer as the department's hate crime investigator. This may provide additional expertise within the department that is available if a hate crime occurs or may allow additional outreach to various groups in the community in efforts to increase reporting. However, even in departments where there are very few hate crimes annually many chiefs have found it useful to designate a specific hate crime investigator.


Table 20

Crosstab			Do you currently have a specialized officer/unit formally designed to investigate hate/bias crimes?		Total
State Code			No	Yes	
	Northeast	Count	94	72	166
		% within State Code	56.6%	43.4%	100.0%
	Midwest	Count	158	19	177
		% within State Code	89.3%	10.7%	100.0%
	Southern	Count	166	40	206
		% within State Code	80.6%	19.4%	100.0%
	West	Count	111	42	153
		% within State Code	72.5%	27.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	529	173	702
		% within State Code	75.4%	24.6%	100.0%

<sup>\*</sup>Pearson value .000

Figure 16

# If you have a specialized officer, how many do you have?



If yes, how many

n=169

Table 21

Crosstab			specialized of formally de	Do you currently have a specialized officer/unit formally designed to investigate hate/bias crimes?		
			No	Yes		
Size	250+k	Count	17	24	41	
		% within Size	41.5%	58.5%	100.0%	
	100-249k	Count	52	28	80	
		% within Size	65.0%	35.0%	100.0%	
	50-99k	Count	99	39	138	
		% within Size	71.7%	28.3%	100.0%	
	25-49k	Count	90	22	112	
		% within Size	80.4%	19.6%	100.0%	
	10-24k	Count	135	30	165	
		% within Size	81.8%	18.2%	100.0%	
	less than 10k	Count	86	19	105	
		% within Size	81.9%	18.1%	100.0%	
	nonmsa	Count	26	3	29	
		% within Size	89.7%	10.3%	100.0%	
	msaco	Count	24	8	32	
		% within Size	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%	
Total		Count	529	173	702	
		% within Size	75.4%	24.6%	100.0%	

Pearson value .000

#### **Training**

We have two sources of data regarding hate crime training around the country; these include the responses from our national law enforcement survey and the telephone survey of training staff across the country. These two sources of information provide us with a way to triangulate the survey results. In both the telephone and mail surveys, similar questions were covered. The questions include:

- whether training on hate crimes is provided by the responding agency,
- what type of training is provided (new recruits or in-service),

- how many hours of hate crime training are provided,
- whether there is an organization that oversees training in the state,
- whether the curriculum used in hate crime training is developed in-house or is provided by an outside agency,
- what obstacles officers face in reporting hate crimes,
- what local agencies provide training,
- whether there is an advantage in using either UCR or NIBRS reporting, and what other organizations and agencies in the state collect data on hate crimes.

First, in the mail survey, we asked the investigators to indicate whether or not their department provided any training in hate crimes for officers. More than two thirds of the departments report that they presently do provide some training on hate crimes (67%).

Of those who provide training, it appears from the responses to our mail survey that most of this training is rather limited; almost one-half of the respondents (46.8%) reported that their agencies provided two hours or less of hate crime training. There were no significant differences between region, agency size on the and length of training provided. There were, however, significant differences between size of agency and whether or not the agency provided training in general.

### How long is the training on hate crimes?




Figure 17


The interactions between size of agency, region, and reporting history are highly correlated. In general, the larger the agency, the more likely they are to provide hate crime training <sup>18</sup>. Analysis on the type of reporting history and whether the agency provides training yields significant results (below the .000 level); unsurprisingly, three quarters of the agencies who have reported at least one hate crime in 1997 provide training compared to only 57.3% and 59.3% of the non submitting and zero reporting agencies, respectively. The research team believes that those agencies which have trained officers about hate crime issues are more likely to understand the complexity of hate/bias crimes, and more likely to identify these crimes in the course of their work.

Table 22

			Training provided		
Self Report			No	Yes	Total
Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	0	Count	86	93	179
		% within Training Provided	48%	52%	100%
	1 or more	Count	101	316	417
		% within Training Provided	24.2%	75.8%	100%
Total		Count	187	409	596
		% within Training Provided			100%

Chi Square .000

Is hate/bias crime training provided to officers in your department?



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The exception to this linear relationship is the nonmsa counties, which do not actually reflect size of department, but are a variety of types of agencies.

			Training Provided		
			No	Yes	Total
Reporting History	non submitting investigator	Count	47	63	110
		% within Training Provided	42.7%	57.3%	100%
	reports zero investigator	Count	90	131	221
		% within Training Provided	40.7%	59.3%	100%
	1+ investigator	Count	86	259	345
		% within Training Provided	24.9%	75.1%	100%
Total		Count	223	453	676
		% within Training Provided	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square .000

Both chiefs and investigators were asked in the mail survey if they had additional resources to expand training on hate crimes, which groups would be most important to train. We listed five groups to whom the training might be directed: specialized officers, command staff, responding officers, detectives, and the community. Both chiefs and investigators stated that they placed training of the responding officers as most important (overall mean 4.44 on a five point scale). Responses about the need for training for responding officers also had considerably lower variability than the other variables. Next in overall importance were the detectives, with an overall score of 4.28. Respondents indicated that in their opinion the least important group would be the community, with a mean of 3.35. However, this mean is still fairly high, indicating that some officers would value this type of training. This information might be useful if in the future additional training is offered to local police agencies. It appears from our data that police officials

might be most receptive to training programs targeted towards the members of their agencies most likely to encounter a hate crime: responding officers and detectives. The following chart provides a breakdown by respondent and official reporting history.

Table 24: If you had additional resources to expand your training on hate crime, which groups would be a priority to attend a bias crime training? 1(lowest)-5(highest) Likert Scale

Reporting History, including respondent type		Add training: Spec. Officer	Add training: Command staff	Add training: Responding officers	Add training: Detectives	Add training: Community
Non submitter Chief	Mean	3.21	3.82	4.37	4.32	3.47
	N	102	116	128	116	111
	Std. Deviation	1.51	1.12	1.01	1.07	1.26
Reports zero chief	Mean	3.34	3.77	4.46	4.29	3.42
	N	222	250	265	247	242
	Std. Deviation	1.42	1.15	0.77	0.96	1.26
1+ reporter chief	Mean	3.46	3.58	4.45	4.25	3.39
	N	323	353	375	360	351
	Std. Deviation	1.38	1.11	0.82	0.93	1.2
Non submitting investigator	Mean	3.07	3.65	4.38	4.11	3.29
	N	94	102	108	103	97
* 11-2	Std. Deviation	1.50	1.19	0.85	1.01	1.27
Reports zero investigator	Mean	3.35	3.70	4.42	4.35	3.19
•	N	195	211	222	212	199
	Std. Deviation	1.44	1.18	0.85	0.89	1.34
1+ investigator	Mean	3.58	3.55	4.46	4.28	3.32
	N	297	321	338	332	312
	Std. Deviation	1.41	1.19	0.83	0.92	1.26
Total	Mean	3.4	3.65	4.44	4.28	3.35

Table 25 Overall Means for Hate Crime Training Priorities: Chiefs and Investigators Responses

If you had additional resources to expand your training on hate crime, which groups would be a priority to attend a bias crime training?

		Specialized Officer	Command Staff	Patrol/ Responding officers	Detectives
N	Valid	1233	1353	1436	1370
	Missing	266	146	63	129
Mean		3.4	3.65	4.44	4.28

Table 26
If you had additional resources to expand your training on hate crime, which groups be a priority to attend a bias crime training?

			Northeast	Midwest	Southern	West	Total
Add Training: Responding Officers	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	9	11	8	12	40
		% within Add training: community	2.6%	3%	1.9%	3.8%	
	Medium Priority	Count	36	49	34	30	149
		% within Add training: community	10.5%	13.4%	8.1%	9.5%	
	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	299	306	376	273	1254
		% within Add training: community	86.9%	83.6%	90%	86.7%	
Total		Count	344	366	418	315	1443
		Community	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%

Table 27:If you had additional resources to expand your training on hate crime, which groups be a priority to attend a bias crime training?

F			Northeast	Midwest	Southern	West	Total
Add Training: Specialized Officers	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	63	103	81	76	323
		% within Add training: community	21.4%	33.7%	22.2%	27.7%	
	Medium Priority	Count	56	72	74	59	261
		% within Add training: community	19%	23.5%	20.3%	21.5%	
	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	176	131	210	139	656
		% within Add training: community	59.7%	42.8%	57.5%	50.7%	
Total		Count	295	306	365	274	1240
		% within Add training: community	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%

.001 chi square

Table 28:If you had additional resources to expand your training on hate crime, which groups be a priority to attend a bias crime training?

·			Northeast	Midwest	Southern	West	Total
Add Training: Detectives	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	14	21	15	16	66
		% within Add training: community	4.3%	6%	3.7%	5.3%	
	Medium Priority	Count	36	39	26	41	142

		% within Add training: community	11.1	11.2%	6.5%	13.6%	
	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	275	289	361	244	1169
		% within Add training: community	84.6%	82.8%	89.8%	81.1%	·
Total		Count	325	349	402	301	1377
		% within Add training: community	100%	100%	100%	100%	·

.034 chi square

Table 29:If you had additional resources to expand your training on hate crime, which groups be a priority to attend a bias crime training?

			Northeast	Midwest	Southern	West	Total
Add Training: Command Staff	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	38	40	58	66	202
		community	11.7%	11.7%	14.8%	21.9%	
	Medium Priority	Count	75	95	110	91	37
		community	23.1%	27.7%	28.1%	30.2%	
	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	211	208	224	144	787
		community	65.1%	60.6%	57.1%	47.8%	
Total		Count	324	343	392	301	1360
	·	community	100%	100%	100%	100%	

.000 chi square sig.

Table 30
If you had additional resources to expand your training on hate crime, which groups be a priority to attend a bias crime training?

			Northeast	Midwest	Southern	West	Total
Add Training: Community	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	72	90	92	60	314
		% within Add training: community	23%	27.3%	24.1%	20.3%	
-	Medium Priority	Count	86	99	110	85	380
		% within Add training: community	27.5%	30%	28.9%	28.8%	
	Slightly/Very low priority	Count	155	141	179	150	625
		% within Add training: community	49.5%	42.7%	47%	50.8%	
Total		Count	313	330	381	295	1319
		% within Add training: community	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%

Telephone survey respondents also indicated who completed the training. The most frequently cited response was the training academy staff (237 responses), followed

by an officer from a different agency (122) and a hate crime specialist (118). The least frequent response was an outside consultant (82) or a member of an advocacy group (85).

### **Training Boards**

According to our telephone survery, a vast majority of the states have a training board that oversees municipal police training in the state. A few states, such as Rhode Island, have training boards that cover most of the state, but major cities, such as Providence, oversee their own training. In most states, the State Police tend to have their own academies, but many of these follow the same requirements as municipal academies. Hawaii is the only state that does not have a centralized training board.

### Required Training

Only 18 of the 42 training boards contacted via telephone require basic training on hate crimes. However, 12 other states include hate crimes as a topic within other training, such as cultural diversity or legal training. One state provides training on hate crimes on a voluntary basis. This indicates that even after the development and distribution of National Hate Crime Training materials expressly for this purpose, approximately onethird of the States do not provide hate crime training to recruits in their state academies.

While many, but not all states, offer some hate crime training in their recruit academy, very few offer any additional training to the officers presently on the job as part of required in-service training. None of the states responding to our survey require hate crime in-service training on an annual basis, but two states require training every other year. Four states provide in-service training on hate crimes regularly on a voluntary basis, and several provide training upon request. For a full description of each state's training standards, see Appendix D

According to state level training staff, hate crime training for law enforcement recruits (basic training) is a state requirement in eighteen states and an in-service requirement in only two states (Kentucky and Texas). Twenty-seven of the state training representatives responded that their state has no standard curriculum, while fourteen of the representatives indicated that their state does have a standard curriculum. Forty-three states responded that they use an outside agency to conduct hate crimes training (this is not necessarily in exclusion of their own).

#### **National Bias Crime Curriculum**

The National Bias Crimes Curriculum was designed by the Education Development

Center, Inc., the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council, and the Massachusetts

Office of Victims Assistance in 1995. The curriculum was developed to provide training
to both law enforcement and victim's assistance professionals regarding appropriate and
effective ways to deal with victims of bias crime and to build relationships between these
groups of professionals. The key concepts of the curriculum, as described by the authors

(1995), are to:

- "provide law enforcement officials with up-to-date information and strategies to use in identifying bias crimes and in taking appropriate action to deter and investigate these crimes
- to provide victim assistance professionals with up-to-date information and strategies to use in assisting the victims of these crimes
- strengthen the capacity of professionals in both fields to contribute to successful investigations and prosecutions of bias crimes and contribute to changing the community norms that presently foster a tolerance and indifference for bias crimes

provide professionals in both fields with the perspectives and strategies that will
enable them to work more effectively within their own departments and agencies and
with each other and with their broader community (McLauglin et. al, 1995)"

The curriculum is presented in three modules, designed to allow flexibility depending on the specific needs of individual departments. In its most comprehensive format, the curriculum is designed as a 2-and-1-half day training. To provide a full range of perspectives regarding the issue of bias crime, the curriculum encourages an integrated audience and utilizes adult learning principles—comprehensive multi-media, interactive approach.

#### Outside Resources

Telephone survey respondents were asked if resources outside of their agency were used either to develop curricula or to deliver the hate crime training. It appears that most states use outside agencies to assist in the delivery of hate crime training to the officers in their recruit academy. Most states report seeking training support from the Department of Justice, most often the FBI, the state's Attorney's General office, the state's Department of Public Safety, and often the local office of the Anti-Defamation League. It appears that most often these agencies supply trainers who come in to the local academies to present information on the identification and investigation of hate crimes as well as issues of dealing with cultural diversity.

As with most data collections efforts focused at various agencies at the state level, the responses varied depending upon which facility was contacted or who was responding to the survey. In some cases, the responses received from one agency contradicted those supplied by another. For example, several state training facilities reported that no training was done at the local level. However, most states have large departments that provide their own training, and several of these departments have their own hate crime units. As a result, it seems clear that better coordination or communication is needed between state and local agencies.

### Summary

From the data, it is clear that hate crime training is offered in a very limited way across the country. Many (but not all) recruits receive some training during their time in the academy but this training is frequently narrowly focused and brief, often 2 hours or less. Hate crime training for officers once they are on the job or as they proceed in their career is extremely rare. Consequently, there appears to be some substantial training needs within the law enforcement community that should be addressed as we approach the 10 year anniversary of the passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act.

Up until now, we have discussed training in terms of its presence or absence in a department, as well as the training duration. We caution, however, that hate crime trainings are not all alike and equal in effectiveness. In fact, responses from our telephone surveys of training academies and advocacy groups stress the need for hate crime training to move beyond legal and documentation procedures. These respondents strongly noted that hate crime training should work to build empathy and improve communication between officers and victims. Figure 19 outlines some of the salient components which should be included in comprehensive hate crime training. The components of hate crime

training need to be more comprehensive, including addressing officer attitudes.

Telephone responses and interviews with advocacy agency representatives discussed the need to address deficits in officer empathy due to personal prejudices or lack of knowledge.

Figure 19

### HATE CRIME TRAINING COMPONENTS

Empathy
Minority Relations
Victim Relations
Identification of Bias
Relevant Legal Procedures
Departmental Procedures

### Officer Attitudes about Hate Crime

One of the common themes that thread through much of the scholarly debate on hate crimes is the idea that 'a crime is a crime'; there is no difference between bias crime and other crimes (Jacobs, 1993). Indeed, some academics and officers perceive the difference between bias and non-bias crimes as solely political; and hate crime, for some, represents the popular culture *cause celeb* of the nineties<sup>19</sup>. The skepticism is captured in the survey in one officer's quip in the mail survey, "Since I have yet to see a 'love' crime, every crime I investigate is a hate crime."

This skepticism is explored in the current study. The majority of investigators and chiefs agreed or strongly agreed that bias motivated assaults or bias motivated vandalism were generally more serious than non-bias assault or vandalism. These findings indicate that a majority of officers feel that hate crime amounts to more than political rhetoric.

Despite this, there is a minority who do not concur. Between 10% and 15% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, indicating that they do not perceive any differences between bias and non-bias offenses. About one-third of all three samples were neutral. It is important to note that across America those who deal with crime victims most frequently, the police, believe that hate motivated crimes are more serious than similar crimes that are not motivated by bias.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The sometimes symbolic interaction between politics, pop culture, and law enforcement is by no means new; this fusion has sometimes resulted in honest policing reform (i.e. from military to community policing), other times in fleeting magic bullet solutions which pass as quickly as the ribbon cutting ceremony.

Table 31 Given similar assault cases, bias assault is generally more serious than non-bias assault.

		Investigator*	Zero or Non Submitting Chief**	1+ Chief***
Compare bias/non assault	Strongly disagree	5.3%	5.5%	2.1%
	Disagree	8.9%	7.0%	8.1%
	Neutral	32.8%	25.4%	24.8%
	Agree	34.8%	38.4%	38.4%
	Strongly agree	18.2%	23.6%	26.6%


Table 32 Given similar vandalism cases, bias vandalism is generally more serious than nonbias vandalism.

Compare bias/non vandalism	Strongly disagree	4.9%	5.3%	2.4%
	Disagree	9.7%	6.3%	7.3%
	Neutral	30.2%	23.6%	23.6%
	Agree	36.8%	39.6%	40.1%
	Strongly agree	18.4%	25.3%	26.7%

\*n= 696, n=692 \*\*n=398, n=399

# Given similar assault cases, bias assault is generally more serious than non-bias assault

Official Reporting History: Zero Reporting Agency



n=226

\*\*\*n= 383, n=382

# Given similar assault cases, bias assault is generally more serious than non-bias assault

Official Reporting History: Non Submitting Agency





Fig. 2

Figure 22

# Given similar assault cases, bias assault is generally more serious than non-bias assault



n=358

Next, we asked investigators what they felt the majority of officer's attitudes in their department were toward bias crime. We asked investigators if they believed that most officers in their department believed that hate crimes were "just a political issue" and if these officers felt that hate crimes were an important issue facing their community. Overall, the feeling among investigators was that most officers in their departments disagree that hate crime was just a political issue. Fully 68.3% of the investigators reported that most officers in their department would disagree that hate crimes are just a political issue. When asked if hate crimes were an important issue facing the community, again nearly one-half of the investigators agreed with this statement while only one-in five hate rime investigators disagreed. This results of this question should be viewed

with caution, however, because we are asking officers their perceptions about other officers attitudes.

Next we reviewed these responses by the type of (self) responding agency the respondent is from (whether they have or have not reported a hate crime in 95, 96, or 97). Here we find significant differences between those agencies, which have and have not reported a bias crime on our survey. Those investigators which have reported at least one or more incidents are more likely to disagree that bias crimes are just another political issue. 68.4% of officers from reporting agencies disagree with the statement that bias crimes are just another political issue, compared to 53% of non-reporting investigators. It is important to note that very few respondents agreed with the statement that hate crimes are just another political issue, only 10.5% of the reporters and 13.8% of the non-reporters agreed with this statement. Again this may be an indicator that among those in law enforcement there is agreement that hate crimes are real and that they do represent an important crime issue. Similarly, 54.3% of investigators from agencies that had experienced a hate crime felt that bias crimes are an important issue facing the community, compared to only 37.3% of non-reporting agencies (See tables 33 and 34).

Table 33

		Departments with no self reported incidents during 95, 96, 97	1 or more incidents in 95, 96, 97	Total
Just another political issue	Strongly disagree	42	134	176
		23.2%	31.4%	28.9%
	Disagree	54	158	212
		29.8%	37.0%	34.9%
	Neutral	60	90	150
		33.1%	21.1%	24.7%
	Agree	20	33	53
		11.0%	7.7%	8.7%
	Strongly agree	5	12	17
		2.8%	2.8%	2.8%
Total		181	427	608
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

.008 chi square

Table 34

·		Departments with no self reported incidents in 97,96,95	Departments with one or more incidents in 95, 96, 97	Total
Important issue facing community	Strongly disagree	22	19	41
		12.1%	4.4%	6.7%
	Disagree	35	49	84
		19.2%	11.4%	13.7%
	Neutral	57	129	186
		31.3%	30.0%	30.4%
	Agree	45	156	201
		24.7%	36.3%	32.8%
	Strongly agree	23	77	100
		12.6%	17.9%	16.3%
Total		182	430	612
000 :		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

.000 sig

Despite these differences, officers spoke with one voice when discussing departmental policy. Overwhelmingly (more than three-quarters), officers responded that the majority of officers 'support departmental policy.' 75.4% of investigators from non-reporting agencies and 78.6% of investigators from reporting agencies indicated that they support departmental policy in general, whatever the topic. This indicates that although individual officers may have differing opinions about the nature of hate crime, if there is a policy about how to proceed with a hate crime investigation, a majority of officers will follow that policy. Such responses indicate that changes to department infrastructure, such as adopting a hater crime response policy, could have some effect on the investigation and reporting of hate crimes.

#### Bias Indicators

We also asked investigators for their professional thoughts about what factors are important in identifying whether a particular crime is bias motivated. We did not ask the chiefs this question, as the research team felt that this question required more direct contact and recent experience with crime scenes and investigations. We asked how important: bias charged language, a victims claims of bias, a prior relationship between the offender and victim, graffiti or bias symbols at the crime scene, offender membership in a hate group, and the claims of local advocacy groups were in determining whether a crime is bias related. Regarding these elements, there is less variation by reporting type, agency size, and region of the country. Membership in a hate group and bias symbols at the scene were nearly unanimously described as either very important or moderately

important. The least important factor, although still somewhat strong with a mean of 2.5 on an ascending four point scale, were claims by advocacy groups.

Table 35

			Dichotomous Self Report total: 97,96,95		Total
			0	1 or more	
Bias Charged language	Not important	Count	4	4	8
		% within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	2.2%	0.9%	1.3%
	Slightly Important	Count	25	29	54
		% within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	13.7%	6.8%	8.9%
	Moderately important	Count	81	180	261
		% within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	44.3%	42.2%	42.8%
	Very Important	Count	73	214	287
		% within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	39.9%	50.1%	47.0%
Total		Count	183	427	610
		% within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 36

How important are victims claims of bias in determining whether a crime is bias related?

			Dichotomous self report total:97,96, 95		Total
		·	0	1 or more	
Victim claims bias	Not important	Count	8	8	16
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96,95	4.3%	1.9%	2.6%
	Slightly important	Count	59	104	163
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96,95	31.9%	24.1%	26.5%
	Moderately important	Count	85	215	300
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96,95	45.9%	49.9%	48.7%
-	Very important	Count	33	104	137
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96,95	17.8%	24.1%	22.2%
Total		Count	185	431	616
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96,95	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

a. 1 cells (12.5) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.81.

Table 37

How important is the relationship between offender/victim?

	. 1.			mous total: ,96,95	Total
			0	1 or more	
Relationship between offender/victim	Not important	Count	18	39	57
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	9.7%	9.1%	9.3%
	Slightly important	Count	32	118	150
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	17.3%	27.5%	24.4%
	Moderately important	Count	73	159	232
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	39.5%	37.1%	37.8%
	Very important	Count	62	113	175
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	33.5%	26.3%	28.5%
Total		Count	185	429	614
		% within Dichotomous total: 97, 96, 95	100%	100%	100%
	L			L	

Table 38

How important are bias symbols at crime scene in determining whether a crime is bias related?

			Dichotomous self report total: 97,96,95		Total
			0	1 or more	
Bias symbols at crime scene	Not important	Count	1	3	4
		% Within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	0.5%	0.7%	0.7%
	Slightly important	Count	15	17	32
		% Within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	8.2%	3.9%	5.2%
·	Moderately important	Count	65	125	190
		% Within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	35.3%	29.0%	30.9%
	Very important	Count	103	286	389
		% Within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	56.0%	66.4%	63.3%
Total		Count	184	431	615
		% Within Dichotomous total: 97,96,95	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.20.

Table 39

How important is membership in a Hate Group in determining whether a crime is bias related?

			Dichotomous Self Report total: 97,96,95		Total
			0	1 or more	
Membership is Hate Group	Not important	Count	1	1	2
		% within dichotomous total: 97,96,95	0.5%	0.2%	0.3%
	Slightly important	Count	5	7	12
		% within dichotomous total: 97,96,95	2.7%	1.6%	2.0%
	Moderately important	Count	28	79	107
		% within dichotomous total: 97,96,95	15.2%	18.3%	17.4%
	Very important	Count	150	344	494
		% within dichotomous total: 97,96,95	81.5%	79.8%	80.3%
Total		Count	184	431	615
		% within dichotomous total: 97,96,95	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

a.3 (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .60.

When we reviewed this information by reporting history we found that those agencies with more experience in dealing with hate crimes identified additional factors as important in determining whether a crime was bias motivated. For this analysis we used the self-report measure of reporting, as opposed to the official UCR reports. Because a large number of investigators indicated that they had experienced hate crime in their departments which were not officially reported, the research team felt that this would be a more precise indicator for this analysis. In other words, for this analysis we have dichotomized the variable into those agencies which had (self) reported one or more incidents of bias crime during 95, 96, or 97, or those who had not reported anything. Those agencies which had reported one or more over the past three years felt that bias charged language was very important (50.1%), whereas only 39.9% of the non-reporters felt this was very important (significant at the .01 level). Agencies which have reported also place more emphasis on input from the victim; 74% of those agencies which have self reported believe this is very to moderately important, compared to only 63.7% of the non-reporting agencies (sig. at .03). A similar relationship exists for the element of bias symbols at the scene. Those agencies which have reported one or more hate crimes within the last three years place more importance on this attribute than do non-reporting agencies.

The pattern reverses, however, when looking at the relationship of the victim to the offender. Non reporting agencies are more likely to place emphasis on this element (73%), compared to reporting agencies (63.4%). This may indicate that those agencies that have not experienced a hate crime may be less aware of the characteristics of hate


incidents and may be more likely to look for indicators that an incident is not bias motivated than indicators that it is. For example, in some departments with little experience in hate crime investigation, if the victim has a prior relationship with the offender, the police may see that as an indicator that the incident was not bias related. A review of the literature on bias incidents indicates that while many incidents do involve strangers, a large number also involve victims and offenders that know each other such as neighbors or co-workers (Garcia et al. 1999).

We also ran the bias indicator variables by the agency size, to detect any relationships between these two variables. For the most part, these relationships are not statistically significant, with one exception. Our data indicate that the larger the department is, the more importance they will place on bias charged language at the crime scene in determining the element of bias.

Regarding region of the country, the general trend was that the Northeast and West were more likely to place more emphasis on bias charged language and victim claims of bias (statistically significant at the .001 and .005 level, respectively).

In summary, our data indicate that greater importance is placed on victim assertions in the Northeast and West; and more emphasis is placed on bias charged language in larger agencies. All agencies, regardless of region, size, or reporting history, place great importance on bias symbols and membership in a hate group. Therefore, it appears that the more overt bias crimes (i.e. swastikas on synagogues, cross burnings, etc.) are unambiguous in nature to different types of agencies. Beyond this, officers and agencies differ in how to classify some of the less overt hate crimes.


Figure 23



Victim claims bias

n=164

Figure 24



Victim claims bias

n=176





Figure 25

Figure 26



Next, we asked investigators how often they felt that the victim in a bias crime correctly identified the element of bias.

Once again, differences between regions are statistically significant. Midwest and Southern states are more likely to feel that victims do not appropriately identify the element of bias. Nearly one quarter of the investigator respondents from Southern states felt that less than 25% of victims were able to identify bias. In contrast, only 9.6% and 7.8% of the Northeast and Western agency respondents felt that less than 25% of victims identified bias in the crime.

Also, when we looked at the relationship between self-report and victim accuracy in identifying hate crime, we notice that one quarter (25.2%) of those departments who did not report a hate crime stated that less than one quarter of victims can appropriately identify bias. Here we see a dimunition of victim concerns or assertions. It may be possible that victims claim bias, but the police (due to lack of training or departmental support) misclassify some of these incidents (See Table 40).

Table 40: Of the bias crimes your department has reported over the past three years, approximately how often did the victim originally identify the crime as higs motivated?

% accurately identified by the	Dichotomous Se 1995, 1	Total	
Victim	0 1 or more		
0-24%	47	48	95
	25.3%	11.1%	15.3%
25-49%	1	26	27
	.5%	6%	4.4%
50-74%	2	79	81
	1.1%	18.2%	13.1%
75-100%	136	281	417
	73.1%	64.7%	67.3%
	100%	100%	100%

.000 chi square

Table 41: Of the bias crimes your department has reported over the past three years, approximately how often did the victim originally identify the crime as bias motivated?

% accurately identified by the Victim	Northeast	Midwest	Southern	West	Total
0-24%	16	30	52	12	110
	9.6%	16.8%	25.2%	7.8%	15.6%
25-49%	7	9	10	5	31
	4.2%	5%	4.9%	3.2%	4.4%
50-74%	19	19	23	27	88
	11.4%	10.6%	11.2%	17.5%	12.5%
75-100%	124	121	121	110	476
	74.7%	67.6%	58.7%	71.4%	67.5%
	166	179	206	154	705
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

.000 chi square

### Agency Encouragers/ Discouragers

In both the mail survey of law enforcement officers and the telephone survey (by JRSA) of training academy professionals, we solicited information about the factors which influence accurate hate crime reporting. These two sources of information point to the same issues in the forces which impact this process. We will start by describing the mail survey and supplement this information with the qualitative information gained from the telephone interviews.

Several questions in the mail (investigator) survey directly address factors which discourage or encourage officers in identifying or recording bias motivation in a particular incident. We replicate the model used by Nolan and Aykiama (1999) to identify factors which impact the reporting process. Using their model as our base, we included several additional variables, totaling twelve variables in this index. A simple comparison of the means for these variables indicates that respondents believe that either a "failure to identify bias" or "lack of training" are the greatest discouraging factors (see table 42), with a means of 2.63 and 2.43. This finding is consistent with the qualitative information obtained from the telephone interviews, where training needs ranked first as the major obstacle in law enforcement officers properly identifying bias crimes. However, as pointed out in the telephone surveys, training on hate crimes can take many forms; these include documentation, legal precedents, procedural issues, etc. While these issues are important, the more pressing training need suggested by telephone respondents involves improving officer sensitivity to hate crimes. Telephone respondents believe that addressing the officers' perceptions through training will help officers deal with victims

and interact more positively with minorities. Equally important to these issues of empathy are training in identifying the element of bias. What one officer may consider—because of his own biases— a "harmless prank by kids" could truly be a hate crime. This scope of officer training will be revisited later in this analysis, as it underlies many of the findings in this study.

It is equally important to understand what factors hate crime investigators believe would be least likely to discourage an officer from recording bias motivation in a crime report. The fear of the media or the concern about additional paperwork are identified as least likely to discourage officers from reporting (means of 1.43 & 1.58). Taken together, it appears that hate crime investigators believe that a lack of understanding about hate crimes contributes more to underreporting than more external issues such as extra work or fear of media reactions. Both paperwork and fear of the media were discussed by the telephone respondents, but not nearly with the same intensity or frequency as were training, identification and empathy issues.

One final concern expressed by telephone respondents but not in the mail survey was the lack of information about available resources to provide hate crime training.

Smaller agencies with small budgets seem to be unaware of the training opportunities that exist and of agencies, both federal and in the state, which provide training. These agencies have a limited knowledge of outside resources that could be used to assist them in training their officers on hate crimes.

Table 42
"There is some indication that the following factors have some impact on how agencies report hate crime. If a hate crime occurred in your jurisdiction, how important would the following factors be in DISCOURAGING an officer from recording bias motivation in a crime report?"

4 point Likert scale, 1 (not important) – 4 (very important)

Discouraging Factor	Mean Value	Standard Deviation	N
Fear of the media	1.43	.79	687
Not Serious Enough	2.08	.93	685
Additional Paperwork	1.58	.82	687
Fears it will spark additional violence	1.71	.90	687
Officer may have prejudices	1.81	.97	686
Officer believes some minorities complain unnecessarily	1.89	.93	687
Officer believes hate crime is not as serious as other crimes	1.79	.98	686
Officer believes there is no difference between bias and non-bias crime	2.06 ->	1.04	685
The officer does not believe that the prosecution will follow through on a bias charge	1.88	.97	685
The officer fails to recognize the element of bias	2.56	1.05	684
Officers are too busy and do not have enough time to adequately investigate these crimes	1.79	.96	686
Lack of training for officers in how to identify and investigate hate crimes	2.43	1.11	681

We next asked respondents what factors they believed encouraged officers to properly identify and report a hate crime. When we look at factors that respondents believe would encourage reporting we see a somewhat different result. In addition to increased awareness on the part of officers, the commitment of leadership, the personal commitment of officers, and a policy that encouraged hate crime reporting were the factors most likely to encourage an officer to identify and report a hate crime.

Specifically, our respondents reported that the most effective way to encourage reporting is for departments to mandate reporting from their officers (mean 3.44). Also seen as important factors to encourage reporting are having officers that are trained to understand the differences between bias and non-bias crime (3.32) and officers who believe that is the right thing to do (3.31). In addition, the hate crime investigators who responded to our survey indicated that having management in the agency express that hate crimes are a priority will encourage hate crime reporting. It appears that hate crime investigators believe that two areas need to be addressed to encourage reporting, first organizational factors should be implemented or extended (i.e. having a policy and implementing training); second, leadership of the organization needs to send a clear message that hate crimes are a priority. In addition, officers will benefit from increased training with the goal of improving the officers understanding of hate crimes as well as their role in supporting victims of these crimes.

Table 43

How important are the following things in ENCOURAGING an officer to properly identify and report a hate crime?

Encouraging Factors	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Management within	3.30	.76	695
the Department			
expresses that hate			
crimes are a priority			
There are internal	3.12	.80	694
checks to make sure			
that officers identify			
these crime correctly			
Officers believe that	3.09	.79	694
identifying these		'	,
crimes will help to			
deter similar crimes			
in the future			
The Department	3.44	.75	692
mandates reporting			

these crimes			
Officers are trained in understanding the difference between bias and non-bias offenses	3.32	.77	692
Officers want to send a message to the community that these crimes will not be tolerated	3.26	.82	695
Officers believe that it is the right thing to do morally	3.31	.78	695
Officers believe that it is the right thing to do politically	2.20	.994	691

We performed a factor analysis on these two indices to determine which of the items in each index was associated with the reporting behavior of agencies. First, all eleven of the variables within the 'discouraging factors' index in the investigator survey are highly correlated (see correlation matrix in appendix A). The correlation matrix indicates significant Pearson's values (product moment) below the .001 threshold for all of the variables, indicating that a relationship of this magnitude would occur randomly less than one time in one thousand. Rather than assuming one of the variables is causing the others (which would require regression), it is assumed that all of the variables are being determined in some part by some underlying, unobserved variable<sup>20</sup> (Kim and Mueller, 1974).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> However, the authors have excluded the variable "the officer fails to recognize the element of bias" because, unlike the other variables in this question, this variable is impacted by the other eleven. The officers may not recognize the element of bias because of their own prejudices about minority groups and hate crimes in general. For this reason, we exclude this variable, but will return to it later during the regression analysis. Preliminary factor analysis was run with this variable with very similar findings; the exclusion of this variable does not enhance or impede the statistical model. Theoretically, however, it does not fit in the factor analysis design because it does not meet the assumption of factorial causation.

The extent to which the co-variation of these variables is explained by underlying variables is best obtained through exploratory factor analysis. As a preliminary test of whether this data may be appropriate for factor analysis testing, we have used Bartlett's test of sphericity, allowing us to complete multiple t-tests simultaneously (Norusis, 1994). At the .00000 level, we are able to reject the hypothesis that the correlation matrix created is an identity<sup>21</sup>. We have also used the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin measure of sampling adequacy as an index to compare the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients. Because the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy is .92428, this indicates that factor analysis is appropriate (given other assumptions are also met). This statistic demonstrates that correlations between pairs of variables can be "marvelously" explained by other variables. Overall, however, the most important assumption made here before proceeding with factor analysis is the postulate of factorial causation.

With these preliminary tests done, we will proceed with the process of factor analysis. To enhance interpretability through factor analysis, we have used the Varimax rotation technique, which attempts to minimize the number of variables which have high factor loadings on each factor through an orthogonal design<sup>22</sup> (Norusis, 1994).

Using SPSS, the data can be reduced to two underlying factors with eigenvalues over 1(Kaiser criterion), indicating they explain more than their 'fair share' of the variance. The factorial complexity of these two factors accounts for more than 60% of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The test of sphericity also tells us that the variables have definite linear relationships; in three dimensional space they do not exist as unorganized, unrelated points (when one moves throughout this space, the other variable moves a proportional amount through a different plane of space)

22 many spaces.

The orthogonal design of this two common factor model assumes that: cov(F1F2) = cov(F1U12) + cov(U1U12) = 0

the correlation in this model. These two variables will be explored in the following section.

First, Factor 1 has an Eigenvalue of 5. 52, influencing 38.48% of the explained variance among the eleven observed variables. Several of the variables have high loadings for Factor 1. Specifically, these include, "The Officer may have prejudices regarding that particular race, religion, etc." with a factor loading of .817; "The Officer believes that some minority groups complain unnecessarily" with a factor loading of .781; and "The officer believes that hate crime is not as serious as other crimes" with a factor loading of .855; "The officer believes that there is no difference between bias and non-bias crimes" with a factor loading of .767. These variables collectively indicate that the underlying factor has to do with *an officers intrinsic definition*.

Table 44

Total Variance Explained

Total varia	nce Explained	J							
	Initial			Extraction			Rotation		
	Eigenvalues			Sums of			Sums of		
				Squared			Squared		
				Loadings			Loadings		
Component	Total	% of	Cumulative	Total	% of	Cumulative	Total	% of	Cumulative
		Variance	%		Variance	%		Variance	%
1	5.529	50.267	50.267	5.529	50.267	50.267	4.233	38.484	38.484
2	1.141	10.372	60.638	1.141	10.372	60.638	2.437	22.155	60.638
3	.743	6.751	67.389						
4	.644	5.856	73.245						
5	.575	5.223	78.468						
6	.538	4.893	83.362						
7	.454	4.129	87.491						
8	.421	3.829	91.320						
9	.414	3.760	95.080						
10	.275	2.496	97.576			·			
11	.267	2.424	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 45
Rotated Component Matrix

Rotated Component Matrix		
	Component 1	Component 2
Fear of Media	0.119	0.838
Not serious enough	0.545	0.453
Additional paperwork involved	0.315	0.709
Officer fears labeling the incident will spark further violence	0.275	0.753
Officer may have prejudices about that particular race, religion, etc.	0.817	0.22
Officer believes minorities complain unnecessarily	0.781	0.242
Officer believes hate crime is not as serious as other crimes	0.855	0.171
Officer believes there is no difference between bias and non-bias offenses	0.767	0.218
Officer belives prosecution will not follow through on bias charge	0.627	0.34
Officers are too busy and do not have time to adequately investigate these crimes	0.616	0.361
Lack of training	0.615	0.175

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

There is not much surprise in finding similar factor loadings for "officer may have his/her own prejudices" and "officer believes minorities complain unnecessarily", as the questions are very similar, and were made with concerted effort on the part of the authors to triangulate the data. Similarly, "officer believes that hate crime is not as serious" and "officer believes there is no difference" follow the same logical premise.

Next, the factor loadings for F2, although less powerful overall for the eleven variables, are important for different reasons. Specifically, through the varimax technique, the configuration of the factor loadings for F2 contrast from the an officers

a Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

intrinsic definition (F1) and thus show a very distinct, unique underlying factor. The eigenvalue of F2 for these eleven variables is 1.14, explaining more than 10% of the inter-correlation between these variables. Using a threshold of .7 or greater, we see that high factor loadings exist for "Fear of media/ political attention" with a factor loading of .838, and DO3 "There might be additional paperwork involved" with a factor loading of .709 and "The officer fears that labeling the incident a hate crime would spark further violence in the community" with a factor loading of .753. These linear operations are presented in Diagram C in the appendix. These three variables **represent** exogenous factors which discourage reporting. These variables load low on officers intrinsic definitional influences (factor 1) at .119, .315, and .275, respectively; confirming that factor 2 is separate and distinct from personal prejudices or biases.

Factor analysis was also undertaken to extract any latent variables from question 14 "How important are the following things in encouraging an officer to properly identify and report a hate crime? (Abbreviated "EO" for 'encourage officer)." Because this question is in some ways the *ying* to question 15's *yang*, exploring this variable appears prudent. The correlation matrix for this variable also indicates high co-variance between these variables (see appendix B). The same tests of appropriateness have been completed below, indicating factor analysis is worthwhile to endeavor with these variables.

Table 46

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = .859

Bartlett Test of Sphericity = 1682.3816, Significance = .00000

This analysis yields interesting results. The factor complexity brings two distinct variables as theoretically explaining 59.7% of the inter-correlation among these eight

variables, the first being significantly more powerful, with an eigenvalue of 3.65, and the second with 1.13.

Table 47
Total Variance Explained

	Initial			Extraction			Rotation		<u> </u>
	Eigenvalues			Sums of			Sums of		
				Squared			Squared		
				Loadings			Loadings		
Componen	Total	% of	Cumulativ	Total	% of	Cumulativ	Total	% of	Cumulative
t-		Variance	e %		Variance	e %		Variance	%
1	3.651	45.642	45.642	3.651	45.642	45.642	2.639	32.985	32.985
2	1.125	14.058	59.700	1.125	14.058	59.700	2.137	26.715	59.700
3	.796	9.945	69.645						
4	.585	7.311	76.956						
5	.541	6.761	83.717						
6	.490	6.128	89.846						
7	.441	5.512	95.358	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
8	.371	4.642	100.000						

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 48

Rotated Component Matrix

	Component	
	1	2
Management expresses priority	.733	.228
Internal checks	.786	.156
Off. Believe identification will deter hate crimes	.421	.612
Department mandates	.711	.198
Officers have been trained to distinguish between bias and non-bias crimes	.779	.140
Off. want to send message	.380	.723
Right thing morally	.222	.793
Right thing politically	-1.434E-02	.690

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

High factor loadings occur for variables, "Management has expressed a priority", "There are internal checks.." and "Officers have been trained..." This common factor, then is renamed *overt departmental influences*. There is nothing subtle about these variables,

a Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

High factor loadings occur for variables, "Management has expressed a priority", "There are internal checks.." and "Officers have been trained..." This common factor, then is renamed *overt departmental influences*. There is nothing subtle about these variables, they represent explicit and concerted effort on the part of management. All of these share a direct expression on the part of management to invest time, effort or resources into the issue of hate crime as a unique problem. The second factor loads high on variables, "Officers want to send a message to the community that these crimes will not be tolerated" and "Officers believe it is the right thing to do morally." This factor is thus renamed *right thing to do* model.

Because this survey has been completed by both departments which have submitted reports of hate crime incidents in their jurisdiction and those who have either not submitted or consistently submitted zero, this data allows us to understand if these factors load similarly for different reporting groups. Specifically, those who have submitted one or more reports of hate crime and those who either submit zero or do not report were separated. Comparing these two groups also proves interesting. Once again using the Varimax rotation technique, we found that departments who have submitted a hate crime report load higher than those who report zero or do not report at all on the second factor of *right thing to do model*. For reporters, the second factor explained 14.1% of the co-variance, while it only explained 13.4% for non-submitting and zero reporting departments. For reporting departments, the 'right thing to do morally' variable loads exceptionally high at .79303, indicating that this powerfully impacts a department's reporting process. Non-zero reporting departments also have a high factor loading (.76100) for the belief that it will send a message to the community. Zero reporting and

non-submitting departments have high loadings for the second factor on variables the right thing to do politically or morally, although a more powerful connection is loaded on "right thing to do politically." This may indicate that the second factor leans more toward political influences than altruism for non-submitting and zero reporting departments, as the non-zero reporting departments focused in on. While it is clear from all three factor analyses (all of the three groups inclusive, just non-zero reporters, just non-submitters and zero reporters) that Factor 2 addresses the *right thing to do model*, depending on what type of reporting department indicates how the *right thing to do model* is defined; it may be morally or politically.

#### Perceptions of Factors which Impact Victim Reporting

We asked officers how important they believed several factors were in discouraging a victim from reporting an incident of hate crime. The surveys asked about the following factors: the victim is afraid to contact law enforcement, the victims does not believe that the police will take the crime seriously, the victim is not aware of the bias intent, the victim is afraid to report for fear of family reaction, the victim is embarrassed about the crime, the victim is afraid to report because of community retaliation and language or cultural barriers. The factors which were rated as those most likely to discourage victims from reporting were 'afraid of police contact' (65.6% rated this moderately to very important) and 'victim embarrassed' (63.5%), 'afraid the police won't take it seriously' (62.4%). Least influential were 'victim fears community retaliation' (50.5%) and 'victim unaware of bias' (51.4%). According to the police, we see from these data that the most salient factor is the police/victim interaction. Moreover, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between size of agency or reporting history with any of the victim 'discouragers'. The role of police/victim interaction remains important notwithstanding these factors. Therefore, it appears that by improving the community/law enforcement relationship, the police can simultaneously assuage the victimization process and improve hate crime reporting processes.

This sentiment is reinforced through the qualitative data. When we interviewed advocacy groups around the country about what factors affected a victim's decision whether or not to report an incident to the police, they nearly unanimously answered that these relationships need to be cultivated proactively. Hate crime victims are in most

communities, minorities; and minorities, historically, have had tense relationships with law enforcement. It is therefore not coincidental that hate crime victims reporting to law enforcement is distressingly low. For a multitude of reasons, hate crime victims are a population that is leery to report crimes--bias or otherwise-- to law enforcement agencies. Many hate crime victims may not understand that what happened to them is an offense against the law; others do not speak English well enough to ask for assistance. Either way, police outreach into the communities could counteract the polarizing forces at work in the community. Officers who have not only knowledge of other languages but knowledge of the culture can work to promote healthy relationships with the community. Speaking at community meetings, communicating with people through direct mailings, identifying who the assigned officer is for a particular area are important steps in encouraging victims to contact the police. A representative from one Asian American advocacy group stated that some of the victims she had come into contact with were more comfortable contacting a local reporter from an ethnic newspaper than they were in contacting the police about a recent incident of hate crime. The reason for this is trifold: 1. The reporter speaks the requisite language, 2. He/she has established their position in the community, and 3. The reporter is familiar to the victim. All three of these "reasons to report" are within law enforcement's reach.

#### Victim Discouragers

Correspondingly, we asked officers what factors would be most important in influencing a bias crime victim whether or not to contact law enforcement. "Afraid of police contact" and "Afraid police won't take it seriously" have the highest means, 2.87 and 2.79,

respectively. 65.6% and 62.4% of officers indicated that they believe that this is very or moderately important to the victims. It is important to note that representatives of law enforcement are responding that the important factors that discourage victims from reporting to the police involve the prior relationship between the victims and members of his her community and the police.

Table 49

How important do you believe the following factors are in DISCOURAGING a victim

from reporting a bias crime?

Variable	Level of Importance	Investigator Survey	1+ Chief	Zero-Non Submitting Chief
Afraid of Police Contact	Not important	10.5%	10.2%	17.7%
	Slightly important	23.9%	24.4%	27.4%
	Moderately important	34.0%	34.4%	29.7%
	Very important	31.7%	31.0%	25.2%
Afraid Police wont take seriously	Not important	10.5%	10.0%	19.6%
	Slighlty important	27.1%	22.8%	32.5%
	Moderately important	34.9%	35.4%	27.5%
	Very important	27.5%	31.8%	20.4%
Victim fear of family reaction	Not important	10.2%	8.7%	12.5%
	Slightly important	27.8%	32.5%	25.1%
	Moderately important	34.9%	35.4%	38.8%
	Very important	27.0%	23.4%	23.6%
Victim Embarrassed	Not important	10.1%	5.2%	14.5%
	Slightly important	26.4%	27.3%	24.4%
	Moderately important	39.6%	45.4%	38.9%
	Very important	23.9%	22.0%	22.1%
Fears community retaliation	Not important	20.6%	18.9%	30.3%
	Slightly important	28.9%	28.9%	27.3%
	Moderately important	29.1%	30.4%	26.1%
	Very important	21.4%	21.8%	16.3%

Language and/or cultural barriers	Not important	12.9%	11.0%	23.6%
	Slightly important	28.1%	29.4%	27.0%
	Moderately important	35.3%	35.2%	28.1%
	Very important	23.7%	24.4%	21.3%
Victim unaware of bias	Not important	12.4%	9.7%	13.3%
	Slightly important	36.2%	33.1%	29.9%
	Moderately important	37.5%	42.0%	37.9%
	Very important	14%	15.2%	18.9%

Of these seven variables, four have statistically significant differences between the type of reporting agency and respondent and the level of importance. These four variables are:


(1) Afraid the police won't take them seriously, (2) Victim embarrassed, (3) Fear of community retaliation, and (4) Language/ Cultural barriers. The general pattern in these responses is that investigators from agencies which either report zero or more than one incident seem to parallel the responses of the chiefs from agencies which report one or more incidents. These investigators (excluding those from non-submitting agencies) and chiefs from 1+ reporting agencies tend to place more emphasis on victim concerns in general. Specifically, our data indicate that investigators who come from departments that have reported (zero or one or more) incidents, as well as chiefs from 1+ agencies are more likely to place significant importance on whether a victim believes the police will take their report seriously.

The exception to this involves the dimension of victim embarrassment. All of the investigators, regardless of agency reporting history, placed emphasis of the dimension of victim embarrassment. Between 61% and 65% responded that they felt this was a moderately to very important factor for victims. The research team speculates that this is

because the investigators are more likely to have more recent victim contact, and therefore have encountered victim embarrassment. Conversely, chiefs from non-submitting agencies downplayed the relevance of this factor; almost half (44.5%) reported this was either slightly or not important at all.

Next, officers were uncertain about whether bias victims were more or less likely to report their victimization to law enforcement. Nearly half of the sample (45.5%) were neutral in response to this question. Responses also do not significantly vary by size or area of the country.

# Do you believe bias victims are more or less likely to report their victimization to law enforcement?



Victim likeliness to report crime

n=619

Figure 27

#### Most Difficult Bias Crime Type to Identify

There was great variation on the most difficult type of bias crime to indentify. First, more than half of the respondents did not answer this question (n=408 non responding). Next, of the 296 which did respond, 10.2% felt race/ethnicity was the most difficult bias type, while 12.3% felt sexual orientation was the most difficult. Many respondents indicated a combination of types were most difficult to investigate. In the qualitative remarks, the most cited reason for difficulty in anti-homosexual crimes was due to a victim's fear of being 'outted', (fear that their sexual orientation will become public as a result of their coming forward and reporting the rime to police authorities) and the most cited reason for difficulty in investigating gender related bias crimes was because it was both hard to prove, and that people did not understand the statutes well enough to enforce them. Next, the reason most often cited for difficulty in anti-discrimination cases was because they were so infrequent.

#### Prevalence of Bias Crime

Nearly 80% of the investigators we surveyed felt that the prevalence of bias crime had not increased or decreased within the last three years (n responses=671). However, there does appear to be some relationship between the size of department and whether the officers feel the level of bias crimes is increasing. 21.1% of the respondents from the largest departments (250k +) felt that bias crimes were increasing, compared to 12% or less in any other size department.

Table 50

						Size					
			250+k	100- 249k	50-99k	25-49k	10- 24k	less than 10k	non msa	msaco	Total
Prevalence of Bias crime	Increasing	Count	8	8	8	13	12	5		2	56
		% within size	21.1%	10.1%	6.0%	12.0%	7.9%	4.9%		6.3%	8.3%
<del></del>	Decreasing	Count	10	14	19	13	10	10	1	7	84
		% within size	26.3%	17.7%	14.2%	12.0%	6.6%	9.8%	3.7 %	21.9%	12.5%
	Remains the same	Count	20	57	107	82	129	87	26	23	531
		% within size	52.6%	72.2%	79.9%	75.9%	85.4 %	85.3%	96.3 %	71.9%	79.1%
Total .		Count	38	79	134	108	151	102	27	32	671
		% within size	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	100.0%	100. 0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi Square .001

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following set of recommendations are based on, our analysis of national hate crime reporting patterns, our surveys of law enforcement agencies across the country, and qualitative information from advocacy groups about hate crime reporting. Improving the national documentation of bias crimes requires a broad based strategy that addresses four overarching areas: 1) building trust between members of the minority community and their local police, 2) improving law enforcement's ability to respond to victims who do come forward to report bias crimes, 3) making the national data more "user friendly" for local law enforcement purposes, and 4) using supplemental data to both shed light on the level of unreported hate crime and promote community collaborations.

We believe it is important to preface these strategies by re-emphasizing the centrality of the relationship between the police and various minority communities.

Discussions about improving hate crime reporting should include the interaction between an officer and a victim when an officer initially responds to a bias incident. However, this point in the reporting process is often several steps too late. Our data indicate that the officer's intrinsic beliefs shape the hate crime reporting process as much as any other factor. Affecting this factor involves working within a community and breaking down some of the traditional tensions and stereotypes between police and community.

Bias crimes are perpetrated primarily against members of groups perceived to be minorities.<sup>23</sup> Traditionally, police have had tenuous, even adversarial, relationships with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> There are several notable exceptions to this. Some victims are selected due to perceived minority attribute, which may or may not be real. The second exception involves those people who are victimized due to their association with a minority member or group. For instance, a white man who is dating or

many minority groups. People in these communities are less likely to contact law enforcement for help or intervention because they simply do not trust the police. When contact is made, the interaction is marked by mutual suspicion, and substantive communication is often lacking.

It is our belief that significant improvements to hate crime reporting and national hate crime statistics can not be achieved without addressing the larger issue of building more trusting and healthy relationships between minorities and law enforcement. Once victims are confident that they can report bias crimes and that their allegations will be taken seriously, we will be much closer to an accurate national estimate of hate crimes.

Outside of the police- victim relationship, there are several steps that a department can take to promote accurate bias crime reporting. Having a departmental policy, developing substantive training for several levels of officers, and maintaining second tier supervision will affect hate crime reporting. Therefore, while training, supervision and maintaining a departmental policy about hate crimes is necessary, it is not sufficient for accurate hate crime reporting.

Next, if we expect that local police agencies will continue to participate in the national hate crime data collection program, we must ensure the usefulness of the data to local law enforcement. At present many police agencies see little benefit from participating in the national hate crime reporting program. Departments feel that it takes time and resources to collect and submit the information, and they get little in return for these efforts. In fact, some police officials feel that by sending information to the national program they could be hurting their department by making the jurisdiction look like the

married to an African American woman could be targeted because an offender wants to 'send a message'

"hate crime capital" of the area. This is particularly true in areas where one department is doing a better job of collecting information than other neighboring departments. This fear exists in spite of the fact that there is no evidence that any community has experienced adverse consequences as a result of aggressive anti-hate crime reporting efforts. Below, we have developed several suggestions to make this data more useful to police departments.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation should consider new ways of reporting hate crime data. We now have national data for eight years (1991-1998); some suggestions for new ways to report back the information include reporting prior years information.

Despite the limitations of earlier data, the first two questions that most police officials ask regarding the hate crime figures are "Are our numbers up or down?" and "How are other comparable jurisdictions doing?" The current report makes these questions difficult to answer. Additionally, the current national hate crime data give little guidance about the reason that hate crimes are increasing or decreasing in a given jurisdiction, but these data can provide some historical references about how this years figures compare to past figures. There are serious problems with doing this sort of comparison due to the quality of prior data, however some efforts could be made in this regard.

Finally, the federal government should reach out to local advocacy agencies to encourage them to partner with their local law enforcement agency to address not only hate crime issues, but minority community relations in general. Strategies for creating such partnerships are detailed below.

that inter-racial dating/marriage is wrong.

## I. Police Community Relationships

- □ Enhancing victim- police relations is vital to the improvement of hate crime statistics. If law enforcement officers build relationships with members of such groups, this will begin to bridge the gap between minority members and the police. Advocacy organizations and local human rights agencies can be particularly helpful in this regard.
- Raising public awareness about bias crimes and the services that are available at local law enforcement agencies is a critical component of outreach to the community. This awareness can be brought through face to face interaction with officers, or through public service announcements.<sup>24</sup> Publicizing the name and number of an officer/ unit designated to address hate crime in the community spreads the message that this police agency is committed to addressing hate crimes.
- Data regarding the occurrence of hate crime within the jurisdiction should be shared with community groups at face-to-face community meetings between the police and the community. This will let the community know that the police are aware that these crimes are occurring, and that they take them seriously. This venue will also provide a healthy opportunity for community groups to discuss with police whether the official statistics accurately reflect the incidence of bias crime in their community and why.
- The Office of Community Orientated Policing Services (COPS) should add a hate crimes emphasis to its community policing initiatives. Since the results of the national survey indicated that police chiefs believe that increased outreach into minority communities could increase the reporting of hate crimes and reduce the incidence of this crime, efforts to increase outreach should be intensified. As community outreach is a major goal of the current community policing program advocated by COPS incorporating support to hate crime victims in this outreach effort will provide additional legitimacy to law enforcement efforts and will serve as a vehicle to notify hate crime victims that their victimization will be taken seriously.

# II. Infrastructure and Support

#### A. Departmental Policy

The FBI should continue to encourage the development of agency infrastructures that support the identification, investigation and the reporting of hate crimes. The Federal Government should support the efforts of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to encourage local law enforcement agencies to develop hate crime polices (which includes the reporting of these incidents), to attend available training,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> New Haven employed a model of building community awareness about hate crime reporting. This model includes public service announcements, massive advertising about police resources for hate crime and various other outreach vehicles.

to designate an officer who is responsible for hate crime issues (including reporting) in the department, and to outline a second tier review procedure that provides for supervision of hate crime investigation and reporting.

- □ Local police agencies should set forth formal, step by step procedures for the investigation, recording, and reporting of bias crimes, the verification of the bias motivation, effective strategies for dealing with victim and affected communities, and the reporting of hate crimes to the FBI, UCR Program.
- In jurisdictions where no systematic hate crime training is offered, or no hate crimes are reported the Federal Government should offer such training. Either regional training workshops or 'train-the-trainer' programs (or both) should be offered in areas where existing hate crime training is limited or non-existent.

#### **B.** Specialization

- The FBI should encourage each law enforcement agency to designate a hate crime specialist. These specialists will be encouraged to attend additional hate crime training sessions, to initiate outreach efforts to various groups in the community, and to serve as a departmental liaison on hate crime issues. In most agencies, this person will not be involved in the investigation of hate crime activities full time, however, he/she will provide agencies with an officer who is better prepared to deal with aspects of hate crimes when one does occur.
- The FBI should publish a national list of the hate crime specialists annually so that agencies that have a hate crime in their jurisdiction can reach out to specialists freom their area for assistance with identification, investigation, and reporting. This list should also be made available to advocacy groups and community groups for the same reasons.

#### C. Supervision

In many communities, bias crime investigations are infrequent, for this reason, it may be difficult for an officer to identify the element of bias because he/she simply does not have a great deal of experience with these kinds of cases. Additionally, even in police agencies that have specialized officers, it is generally the line officer who arrives first to the scene. For this reason, shift supervisors should be trained in bias investigations, therefore, when the supervisor reviews an incident report, he/she may identify the element of bias even if the responding officer does not.

#### III. Training

- As we reach the ten year anniversary of the Hate Crime Statistics Act, a renewed national effort should be undertaken to make local law enforcement aware of the advantages of hate crime reporting. This effort should include working with States where hate crime training is already underway to assist the transition to increased use of the national curriculum, or segments of the curriculum that could supplement the curriculum already in use in the State.
- The FBI should identify a set of target jurisdictions for intensive follow-up and training. Many large jurisdictions with a diverse population have failed to report to the hate crime reporting program or have reported that they have had "0" hate crimes. A target list of these agencies should be developed and intensive efforts be targeted toward these jurisdictions.
- Hate crime training should include: the role of departmental policies about bias crimes; local, state, and federal hate crime and civil rights laws; and resource lists for additional information when officers have questions. Hate crime training must also include a discussion about the effects of organizational culture on employee attitudes and behavior, not only relating to investigating hate crime, but also regarding other issues. Bias crime training should help officers to identify their own pre-conceptions of minority groups. This involves a discussion about nationalism, ethnocentrism, discrimination and stereotyping. Hate crime training must also include tools for building relationships with minority groups. Working on these relationships prior to an incident of hate crime is as important- if not more so- than the events immediately following a hate crime incident. Proactively working on these relationships requires tools from community policing strategies, such as developing multi-directional lines of communication, changing the role of officers into active members of community problem solvers, etc.
- Research should be conducted into the most effective hate crime training curricula and techniques. At present we have a broad range of training techniques and curricula being utilized across the country, so efforts to identify those approaches which offer the most promise would be welcome by law enforcement.
- Police agencies should invite advocacy groups to take part in their hate crime training, either as consultants or trainers. Training provides another avenue where police and the community can communicate on the issue of hate crime.

### IV. Improving Data and Reporting

- Our data indicate that an *information disconnect* occurs between the investigating officer and UCR reporting. Many officers stated that they knew of hate crimes that occurred in their jurisdiction but were not reflected in the official report. It is possible that officers note bias motivation in incident report narratives, but the information from such narrative is never documented into the UCR records. A more detailed analysis of the breakdown between hate crimes that are investigated locally and those that are reported nationally should be undertaken.
- To insure that hate crime information is appropriately submitted to the FBI, local agencies should consider methods of 'quality control' to improve accuracy. These quality control methods may include having the chief investigator in the unit review hate crime statistics before they are submitted to the FBI to insure that the officer has translated the official statistics accurately. Next, when municipal agencies report through a consolidated state reporting center (i.e. state police), quality control steps should be taken to insure quality between state and local agencies.
- □ Several modifications could be made to the FBI Hate Crime Reporting Annual Report. This report, while an important element in the overall hate crime reporting process, can become a more useful tool for local departments by providing a small amount of additional information to local law enforcement.
  - □ The report should include some prior hate crime data (the previous three years) for each jurisdiction.
  - Currently, the Report is dominated by zeros from jurisdictions; our proposal involves abridging information from those agencies which have reported zero for three or more years. For example, under each state, those agencies which have participated but not submitted any incidents should be collapsed and listed alphabetically. For those departments which have reported at least one incident of hate crime within the last three years, all the current information is appropriate.
  - □ All Agencies from a particular State should be reported together, presently agencies are grouped by size and type of agency.
  - □ To make the report more accessible, a brief description of notable cases should be included. This could involve a brief description of all hate motivated homicides, for example. This addition would put a face on much of the data that is to follow.
  - □ The annual report should include the total number of law enforcement agencies in each state.

- The annual Hate Crime Statistics Report should contain a list of contact agencies that could provide support to local jurisdictions as well as the contact information if an agency wishes to request training from the FBI.
- The increased use of NIBRS reporting will result in an increase in hate crime reporting. The federal government (through funding and technical assistance) should continue to encourage states and agencies to convert to incident-based reporting; hate crime reporting will be a by-product of this effort. This data set will also give us a better understanding of hate crime incidents with respect to victim injury, property damage, time, location and other variables.
- □ The FBI should convene a working group to discuss the inclusion of gender in the national report. Since the FBI will soon begin to receive gender information from states that include this category in their hate crime reporting, it is important to convene a group to discuss issues of definition and training.
- □ In an effort to supplement the official reports produced by the FBI, local law enforcement should be encouraged to partner with local advocacy groups and human right agencies who may be able to help bring more victims forward to the police. These partnerships should include proactive efforts to reach out to various communities and reduce barriers to reporting.
- In areas where systematic data could be collected by advocacy groups, this data should be analyzed to determine if it could serve as an early warning system for local law enforcement. It has been suggested that a series of incidents reported from a particular neighborhood might be an indicator of rising racial or ethnic tension and might allow local police agencies to intervene in ways that could prevent an escalation of tensions and ultimately prevent hate crimes.

#### V. Additional Research

- Additional Research should be undertaken to identify the correlates of hate crime at the jurisdictional level, as well as the individual level. Studies could identify the role of community diversity, immigration patterns, economic changes, and criminal justice policies have on the incidence of hate crimes.
- Research should be done to identify the patterns of hate crime prosecutions nationally, as well as the sentencing of hate crime offenders. These studies could identify the number of hate crime prosecutions, additional difficulties faced by prosecutors in hate crime cases, and the types of sentences that are employed in hate crime cases.
- Research should be developed to understand the actions of hate crime offenders within the broader context of youth violence. For example, a study could compare

hate crime offenders to other youthful offenders to determine the extent to which they are similar.

- □ As more NIBRS data becomes available, a comparison should be undertaken to examine the level and character of hate crimes in NIBRS jurisdictions. A simple comparison of hate crime data from agencies before and after switching to NIBRS would be very useful.
- Research should be conducted on the role of the internet in promoting hate violence. This study should look at the role the internet as an information source as well as a source of companionship, for hate crime offenders.

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	Lack of training		.269**	000	347	.381**	000	345	.255**	000.	347	.265**	90.	347	.483**	000.
	Officers too busy to	investigate	.333**	000	348	.412**	000	346	.450**	000	348	.383**	000	348	.456**	000
	Officer fails to	identify bias	.204**	000	347	.443**	000	345	.270**	000.	347	.238**	000	347	.475**	000
	Off. Believes	no prose- cution	.336**	000	347	.399**	000.	345	.388**	000	347	.414**	000.	347	.438**	.000
	Officer believes	not difference	.274**	000	348	.422**	000	346	.317**	000.	348	.374**	000	348	.579**	.000
	Off. believes	h.c. not as serious	.281**	000	348	.498**	000.	346	.319**	000	348	.327**	000	348	.703**	000.
	Off. believes	minorities complain	.354**	000.	349	.458**	000:	347	.425**	000	349	.408**	000	349	.735**	000
Factors	Officer may have	prejudices	.246**	000	348	.487**	000	346	.350**	000	348	.382**	000.	348	1.000	•
ouraging	Fears spark	further violence ?	.505**	000	349	.337**	.000	347	.409**	.000	349	1.000		349	.382**	000
relations between Discouraging Factors	Not Additional serious paperwork		.435**	000	349	.436**	000	347	1.000	•	349	.409**	000.	349	.350**	000
ons bet	Not serious	media enougii	.326**	000	348	1.000		348	.436**	000	347	.337**	000.	347	.487**	000.
orrelat	of of		<del></del> :	•	320		000	348	4	90.	349	.505*	000	349	.246*	000
Appendix A: Corr			Pearson Correlatio n	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlatio n	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlatio n	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlatio n	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlatio n	Sig. (2- tailed)
Appen			Fear of media			Not serious enough			Additional Pearson paperwork Correlatio	-		Fears spark further violence?			Officer may have prejudices	

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346	.414**	00.	347	.510**		000	347	.427**		8	<u>8</u>	347	.424**		000	346		000	346	.431**
347	.462**	000	348	.456**		000	348	.433**		000	<b>8</b> 6.	348	.430**		000	347	.401**	000	347	1.000
346	.410**	000	347	.549**		000	347	.494**		000	86.	347	.412**		<b>0</b> 80.	346	1.000		347	.401**
346	.458**	000	347	.560**		000	347	.523**		8	9	347	1.000			347	.412**	000.	346	.430**
347	.596**	000	348	099		000	348	1.000			•	348	.523**		000.	347	.494**	000	347	.433**
347	<b></b> 089.	.000	348	1.000			348	099		1	.000	348	.560**		000	347	.549**	000.	347	.456**
348	1.000		349	.680**		000.	348	.596**		8	999.	348	.458**		000	347	.410**	000	347	.462**
348	.735**	000	348	.703**		000	347	.579		8	000	347	.438**		000	346	.475**	.000	346	.456**
348	.408**	000	349	.327**		000	348	.374**		8	3	348	.414**		000	347	.238**	000	347	.383**
348	.425**	000	349	.319**		000.	348	.317**		8	99.	348	.388**		000	347	.270**	000.	347	.450**
346	.458**	000	347	.498**		00. 00.	346	.422**		٤	3.	346	**666.		000	345	.443**	000:	345	.412**
348	.354*	000	349	.281*		000	348	.274*		5	3	348	.336*		000.	347	204*	8 8	347	.333 <sub>*</sub>
z	Pearson .354* Correlatio * n	Sig. (2- tailed)	Z	atio	=	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlatio	<b>c</b>	Sig. (2-	tailed)	z	Pearson . Correlatio n		Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlatio	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlatio
	Off. Believes minorities complain			Off. Believes	h.c. not as serious			Officer	not	difference			Off. Believes no prosecutio	c			Officer fails to identify bias			Officers


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		348	.431**	000	347
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	000	347	.424**	000	346
	000.	348	.427**	000	347
	000	348	.510**	000	347
	000	348	.414**	000	347
	000	347	.483**	000.	346
	000	348	.265**	000	347
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	000	346	.381**	000	345
*	000	348	.269*	000	347
c	Sig. (2- tailed)			Sig. (2- tailed)	z
too busy to investigate			Lack of Pearson training Correlation	-	

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Appendix B: Correlation Matrix of Encouraging Factors

		5 S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S							
		Management	Management Internal checks	Off. believe Department	Department		Off. want to	Right thing	Right thing
		expresses		i.d will deter	mandates	trained to	send	morally	politically
	Pearson		.499**	.402**	.416**	.402**	.387**	.224**	.175**
expresses priority	Correlation								
	Sig. (2- tailed)	•	000.	000	000	00. 00.	000	000	.001
	z	358	358	358	358	357	358	358	356
Internal checks	Pearson	.499**	1.000	.356**	.395**	.489**	.373**	.242**	.205**
	Correlation								
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	•	000	000.	8.	000.	000	000
	z	358	360	359	360	358	359	360	357
Off. believe i.d will deter hate crime	Pearson Correlation	.402**	.356**	1.000	.235**	.377**	.558**	.427**	.222**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	000	000	**	000	000:	000	000	000.
	Z	358	359	359	359	358	359	359	357
Department mandates	Pearson Correlation	.416**	.395**	.235**	1.000	.474**	.257**	.153**	.202**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	000.	000.	000.		000	000	.004	000.
	Z	358	360	359	360	358	359	360	357
Off. Trained to distinguish	Pearson Correlation	.402**	.489**	.377**	.474**	1.000	.439**	.224**	.138**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	000.	000.	000.	000		000	000	600.
	z	357	358	358	358	358	358	358	356
Off. want to send message	Pearson Correlation	.387**	.373**	.558**	.257**	.439**	1.000	.564**	.319**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	000.	000.	000.	000.	000		000	000.
$\dashv$	z	358	359	329	329	358	359	359	357
Right thing morally	Pearson	.224**	.242**	.427**	.153**	.224**	.564**	1.000	.344**

	•	360	.344**	000:	357	
	000	359	.319**	000	357	
	000	358	.138**	600.	356	
	900	360	.202**	000.	357	
	000	359	.222**	000	357	
	000.	360	.205**	000.	357	
	000.	358	.175**	.001	356	Polict-0) level
Correlation	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	Pearson Correlation	Sig. (2- tailed)	z	t at the 0.01
			Right thing politically Pearson Correlation			Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)



V1 = .5355


V2 = .6189


V5 = .6069

# Respective Communalities of "Right thing to do model":

V6 = .5259

V7 = .6289





# Respective Communalities of "Exogenous factors":

 $V_1 = .7000$ 

V3 = .5123

V4= .5624

**Appendix D: Results from National Training Board Telephone Surveys** 

Normalis (*)
Responses from Telephone Surveys Regarding Obstacles to Reporting Hate Crimes*
Recognition
• subjective nature of the offense requires the officer to determine if an offense is a
hate crime
the difficulty in defining a hate crime
difficulty determining motive
officer fails to recognize
• difficulty distinguishing a hate crime from criminal mischief / crime of opportunity
minority status is sometimes hard to identify
Bias / Officer Perception
• difficulty in getting white, middle class officers to recognize the bias involved in the
commission of a crime
a general tendency not to label hate crimes as such
• community / police sympathy for hate groups
• officer bias
officers may take a 'harmless prank' attitude
<ul> <li>overemphasis of media on crimes against minorities encourage officers to report</li> </ul>
hate crimes when really not driven by bias
officer's negative attitudes toward affirmative action
Training
lack of training
lack of in-service training
lack of training in empathy and understanding of minorities
lack of training on dealing with victims
lack of education for field officers
• agency policies regarding hate crimes may not specifically explain ho to handle hate
crimes within the department
officers may not have an understanding of the legal requirements
• some agencies don't have the time or resources to train on hate crimes
difficulty getting quality instructors
training is often reactive to a certain event
Extra time/paperwork
local agencies don't want to take the time to complete the additional paperwork
hate crimes require state prosecutors to prove an additional element in court
• it becomes a hassle to report hate crimes when it seems nothing is done

no section on the reporting forms to indicate a hate crime clerical issue - one department had a 50% error rate in the coding of a crime as a hate crime in the computer system problems filling out the forms correctly Victims victims may not want to deal with the police because they feel nothing will be done failure of victims to report victim may interpret crime as bias motivated even though bias was not the primary motivation victims fear a negative reaction from the community / police general distrust of police by minorities problems with false reports Miscellaneous local agencies don't want federal involvement in their investigations • FBI discourages the reporting of hate crimes with white or Jewish victims, focusing mainly on as hate crimes as transgressions against racial minorities local agencies don't want the national attention lack of legislation defining / requiring reporting of hate crimes officer harassment by Clan members agencies / cities don't want stigma of having a problem lack of focus on hate crimes lack of an automated system; every time a case is passed on, it has to be recreated into a new system and information may get lost • limited exposure to hate crimes provides little opportunity to gain experience investigating them • problems with / difficult legal definition

school officials are afraid of the negative publicity

State	State Training Board	HC Basic Reguired?	HC In-service Beguired?	Standard Curricula?
		•		
Alabama	Peace Officer Standards and Training Board	No (touched on in legal training)	No	No standard, but specified curricular requirements
Alaska	Alaska Police Standards Council	O.	ON	N.A
Arizona	Peace Officer Standards and Training Board	Yes - 2 hours	No - one time teleconference in 1994	No standard, but specified curricular requirements
	-			
Arkansas	Arkansas Commission on		No	No standard
	Law Enforcement Standards and Training	diversity, report writing, and domestic violence training)		
		-		
California	Commission on Peace	Yes - 4 hours		No standard, but specified curricular
	Officer Standards and			requirements
	Training			
Colorado	Peace Officer Standards	Yes - 4 hours (Ethnic		Standard curricula
	and Training Board	Intimidation		
Connecticut	Peace Officer Standards	No	No	N/A
	and Training Board			
Delaware	State Council on Police	thed on in other	No (touched on in report	No standard, but specified curricular
	Training	training)	(writing)	requirements
DC (not	Metropolitan Police	Yes - 3 hours	No	Standard Curricula
including	Department			
Federal forces)				
Florida	Florida Department of Law	No (touched on in cultural	No	No standard, but specified curricular
	Enforcement Division of	diversity)		requirements
	Criminal Justice Standards			
	and Training Office			
Georgia	Peace Officer Standards	No	No	N/A
	and Training Council			
Hawaii		ON	No	No standard
				To ottalidate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

State	# Training Academies <sup>1</sup>	# Contacted	Academy Curricula	# Cover HCs	Outside Agency?
Alabama	6	ļ	1	0	AL Criminal Justice Information Center
				;	
Alaska	E	-	0	0	
Arizona	16	8	2	7 (Corrections does not)	Department of Public Safety; ADL; Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council
Arkansas	E	5	-	1 (and 1 in cultural diversity)	National Center for Rural Law Enforcement; Arkansas Crime Information Center
California	41	£	2	· c	FBI; State AG; ADL; CA DOJ
Colorado	19	-	0		
Connecticut	5	0	0	0	<b>.</b>
Delaware	5	3	0	1 (and 1 in other training)	1 (and 1 in other training) DOJ; AG's Office; OVA; Community Resource Associates
DC (not including Federal forces)		1	1		DC Bias Crimes Task Force of the MPD
Florida	41	8	1	0	AG's Office; ADL; DOJ
Georgia	21	2	0	2 - in-service	OVC; Education Development Center; Bridging the Gap; DOJ; Federal Prosecutor's Office
Hawaii	4				DOJ; Association of AGs

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

		1			
State	PD Contacted	# Cover HCs	PD Curricula	Total # of Curricula	Published State Report(s) Pertaining to Hate Crimes
Alabama	0	0	0	1 - Hate/Bias	UCR Report
				Crime Reporting	
				Guide	
Alaska	0	0	0	0	UCR Report
Arizona	ıc	2 (2 send to	6	o	Crimo in Arizono: Ethnicity Oring and Immigration
	)	outside facilities	J	-	Office in Anzona, Eunichy, Office, and Immigration
		for training)			
Arkansas	2	0	0	_	
				\	
California	0	0	0	2	Hate Crime in California; LAPD HC report
				5.3	
Colorado	0	0	0	0	CBI State Report
Connecticut	0	0	0	0	Crime in Connecticut
Delaware	0	0	0	. 0	
DC (not	N/A	N/A	N/A	-	Hate/Bias-Belated Crime Benort
g forces)					
Florida	0	0	0	_	Hate Crimes in Florida
Georgia	0	0	0	0	
Hawaii	0	0	0	0	

¹ From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

Hate Crime Survey Response Table JRSA

State	State Training Board	HC Basic Required?	HC In-service Required?	Standard Curricula?
Idaho	Peace Officer Standards and Training Board	No (touched on in racial awareness and sensitivity training)	No	No standard, but specified curricular requirements
Illinois	Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board	Yes	No	No standard, but specified curricular requirements
Indiana				
lowa	lowa Law Enforcement Academy	Yes - 2 hours	No	Yes - Division of Criminal Investigation
Kansas	KS Law Enforcement Training Center	Yes - 1 hour	No (but provided upon request)	No standard, but specified curricular requirements
Kentucky	Kentucky Law Enforcement Council		Yes - every other year (2 hours)	
Louisiana	Louisiana POST Council (Commission on Law Enforcement)	No (touched on in cultural diversity)	No	Standard
Maine	ice		No	Standard
Maryland	Police and Training Commission	Yes (Race, Religious, and Ethnic Crimes)	No	No standard, but specified curricular requirements

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

State	# Training Academies <sup>1</sup>	# Contacted	Academy Curricula	# Cover HCs	Outside Agency?
Idaho	4	·	1	-	DOJ; US AG; ID Department of Law Enforcement; ID Human Rights Commission
Illinois	22	4 basic, 10 in- service	7	4 - both recruit and inservice (1 in cultural diversity)	DOJ; National Coalition Building Institute; IL Criminal Justice Information Authority; ADL; State Attorney's Office
Indiana	4	a	-		IN Civil Rights Commission; AG's Task Force on Church Burning; FBI; DOJ; Chicago Jewish Defense League; Jewish Community Relations Council; ADI.
lowa	1	<del>-</del>	<del>-</del>		Prosecutor's Advisory Council; ADL; DOJ; Human Rights League
Kansas	5	-	0	-	US AG's Hate Crime Task Force; FBI; DOJ
Kentucky	ıs	2	r.	2 - in-service	Kentucky Justice Cabinet; AG's Office; DOJ; International Association of Chiefs of Police; Southern Police Institute; US Attorney's Office; Human Rights Board
Louisiana	20	12		2 (4 - recruit and in- service in cultural diversity)	FBI; US Attorney's Office; Office of the Attorney General; LA Commission on LE; US Attorney's Office; Criminal Justice Institute; Louisiana Community Policing Institute
Maine	-		-		State AG's Office; National Coalition Building Institute; Maine Department of Corrections
Maryland	14	6	6	4 - recruit and in-service (1 covered in Humanities)	4 - recruit and in-service DOJ; International Association of Directors of Covered in Humanities) Law Enforcement Standards and Training; FBI; AG's Office; Montgomeny County Special Investigative Division

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

Hate Crime Survey Response Table JRSA

State PD Contacted 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	# Cover HCs	DD Charitania	Total # of	D.:List 1 Character - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
s 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		r D Cui icuia	Curricula	rubilshed State heport(s) Pertaining to riate Crimes
s 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		0	-	Crime in Idaho Hate Bias Information
a 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1				
a 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			8	Crime In Illinois
s 2 2 3 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1				
s 3 3ky 1		0	_	Hate Crimes in Indiana Resource Manual
s 3 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1				
s 3 ky 1 ma 1	1 (1 covered in	0	0	State UCR Report
s 3 Sky 1 nna 1	legal training			
s 3 ky 1	and community			
s 3 ky 1 ina 1	awareness training)			
ky 1	1 (in-service 0 only)		0	
ına 1			4	
ina 1				
	3 (2 cover in 0		0	Crime in Louisiana
	other training)			
Maine 1 0 (1 c	0 (1 covers 1 diversity)		2	Maine Criminal Justice Data Book; Crime in Maine
Maryland 1 3	0		2	UCR Report; Hate Bias Report

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

State	State Training Board	HC Basic Required?	HC In-service Required?	Standard Curricula?	
Massachusetts					_
Michigan	Commission on Law Enforcement Standards	Yes - around 12 hours	No	No standard, but specified curricular	
Minnesota	Minnesota Board of Peace	Yes - no required length	No	No standard	
	Unicer Standards and Training	-			
Mississippi	Board on Law Enforcement Yes - 6 hours	Yes - 6 hours		No standard	_
	Officer Standards and Training				
Missouri	Department of Public Safety No (touched on in cultural	No (touched on in cultural	No	No standard, but specified curricular	_
	-	diversity)	,	requirements	
			, very		
		-			
Montana	Law Enforcement	Yes - 8 hours	No	Standard	_
	Academy				
Nebraska	Commission on Law	No	No	No standard, but specified curricular	_
	Enforcement and Criminal			requirements	
	Justice				
Nevada	Officer Standards	No	No	No standard	_
	and Training Board				
New Hampshire	New Hampshire New Hampshire Police	No	No	Standard	
	Standards and Training				
New Jersey					
New Mexico					

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

			ACUP	AC.	
State	# Training Academies <sup>1</sup>	# Contacted	Academy Curricula	# Cover HCs	Outside Agency?
Massachusetts	4		·	-	Governor's Task Force on Hate Crimes; Office of the Attorney General; DOJ; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; Boston PD Hate Crimes Unit; Facing History and Ourselves
Michigan	21	2	-	1 - recruit; 1 - in-service	Michigan Alliance Against Hate Crimes; FBI;
Minnesota	17	2	0	2	DOJ; FBI; AG's Office; Criminal Justice Center
Mississippi	9	4	0	2 - recruit and in-service; 1 - in-service (1 in recruit Human Belations)	Renegade; RIP
Missouri	14	9	2	ervice; ecruit ultural	Public Agency Training Council; Adhoc Group Against Crime
				diversity, 1 recruit in cultural diversity and minority relations, and 1	
				recruit in patrol, domestic violence, and report writing training)	•
Montana		-			FBI; DOJ; ADL; Montana Board of Crime Control
Nebraska	4	-	_	1 - recruit	US Attorney General
Nevada	o	e e	_	1 - recruit (1 in cultural diversity and domestic violence)	
New Hampshire	1		0	vice	Attorney General, DOJ
	20				
New Mexico	5				Institute for Social Research

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

Hate Crime Survey Response Table JRSA

Ctato	DO Contacted	Polycopta # Polycopta UC	1	7-4-1 4 -4	
	r D comacien	# COVEL FICS		Curricula	rubilshed State Report(s) Pertaining to hate Crimes
Massachusetts	3	1 - both; 1 -	1	-	City of Boston Crime Report; Crime Data Summary
		recruit; 1 - in-			
		service; 1 -			
		diversity			
Michigan	0	1 - in-service	0	+-	State UCB Report
Minnesota	2	0	0	0	Minnesota Milestones; Changing Perceptions
Mississippi	0	0	0	0	
Missouri	0	0	0	2	
					-
Montana	0	0	0	1	
Nebraska		0	0		State UCR Report
Nevada	0	0	0		
New Hampshire	-	1 - in-service	0	0	
New Jersey					Bias Incident Offense Report
New Mexico					

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

State	State Training Board	HC Basic Required?	HC In-service Required?	Standard Curricula?
New York				
North Carolina	North Carolina Justice Academy	Yes - 16 hours	ON.	Standard
North Dakota	Peace Officer Standards and Training Board	No	No	No standard, but specified curricular requirements
Ohio	Peace Officer Training Academy for recruit / BCI for in-service	Yes - own section in Cultural Differences	No	Standard
Oklahoma	Council on Law  Enforcement Education and and cultural diversity) Training	No (touched on in civil rights No and cultural diversity)	No	No standard, but specified curricular requirements
Oregon			No	
Pennsylvania	Municipal Police Officer Education and Training Commission	Yes - 4 hours	No (elective)	Standard
Rhode Island	Rhode Island Police Training Academy	No (touched on in criminal law)	No	Standard
South Carolina	ademy	ruit - touched on in	No	Standard
South Dakota	South Dakota Training Academy	No	No (elective)	Standard
Tennessee		No	No	
Texas	Texas Commission on Law Enforcement	No - (discussed in Yes - every other year (8 No standard, Multiculturalism and Human hours); given own section in requirements Relations)	Yes - every other year (8 hours); given own section in Cultural Diversity training	No standard, but specified curricular requirements

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

Hate Crime Survey Response Table JRSA

State	# Training Academies <sup>1</sup>	# Contacted	Academy	# Cover HCs	Outside Agency?
			Curricula		
New York	31	3	0	1 - recruit and in-service	New York State Division of Criminal Justice
···				(1 - recruit and in-service	Services
				in cultural diversity)	
North Carolina		2	3	3 - recruit, 1 - recruit and	State Bureau of Investigation; FBI; NOBLE; SBI
				in-service (1 in cultural	
				diversity)	
North Dakota	4	က	0	1 - recruit and in-service,	FBI; State Attorney General's Office; Bureau of
				1 - recruit (1 - in crimes	Criminal Investigation; Southern Police
				against people with	Institute; BJA
				disabilities)	
Ohio	99	2	0	3 - recruit (1 - in-service in	3 - recruit (1 - in-service in Attorney General's Office; Office of Criminal
				cultural diversity)	Justice Services
Oklahoma	4	က	0	1 - in-service (2 - recruit	Council on Violence Prevention; Oklahoma
				_	Association of Chiefs of Police; FBI
				diversity and civil rights)	
Oregon	2	-	0	1 - recruit	
Pennsylvania	25	3	3	2 - recruit (1 voluntary in-	2 - recruit (1 voluntary in- DOJ; State Police Community Services Unit
				service)	•
Rhode Island	-	2	0	0 (2 in criminal law)	Attorney General's Office; Governor's Justice Commission
South Carolina		-	0	(1 in gangs)	FBI; SC Department of Public Safety
South Dakota			0	0	POJ
Tennessee	7	8	0	1 - recruit and in-service;	FIMA; DOJ; FBI; Center for Domestic
					Associates
Texas	62	က	က	1 - in-service (1 in multiculturalism and	
				human relations)	

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

Hate Crime Survey Response Table JRSA

		L			
State	PD Contacted	# Cover HCs	PD Curricula	Total # of Curricula	Published State Report(s) Pertaining to Hate Crimes
New York	0	0	0	0	
North Carolina	2	0	0	၉	Crime in NC
North Dakota	0	0	0	0	
Ohio	0	0	0	0	
Oklahoma	0	0	0	0	
Oregon	0	0	0	0	Oregon Law Enforcement Data Systems Report
Pennsylvania	0	0	0		State UCR report
Rhode Island	-	0	0	0	
South Carolina	2	0	0	0	State UCR report
South Dakota	0	0	0	0	
Tennessee	0	0	0	0	
Texas	0	0	0	0	State UCR Report

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

State	State Training Board	HC Basic Required?	HC In-service Required?	Standard Curricula?
Utah	Peace Officers Standards	No (touched on in gang	No	No standard, but specified curricular
-	and Training Academy	awareness, victimology, and		requirements
		domestic violence)		
Vermont	Vermont Criminal Justice	No (provided on a voluntary	No (provided on a voluntary No (provided on a voluntary Standard	Standard
	Training Council	basis, moving towards	basis)	
		mandatory)		
Virginia	Department of Criminal	No (touched on in criminal	No	No standard, but specified curricular
	Justice Services	law and patrol)		requirements
Washington	Criminal Justice Training	No	No	
	Commission			
West Virginia	West Virginia State Police	Yes - 4 hours	No (provided on a voluntary Standard	Standard
	Academy	:	basis)	
Wisconsin	Training and Standards	Yes - 4 hours	No	No standard, but specified curricular
	Bureau			requirements
			الماري .	
Wyoming	Peace Officers Standards			No standard, but specified curricular
	and Training Board			requirements

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

			5		
State	# Training Academies <sup>1</sup>	# Contacted	Academy	# Cover HCs	Outside Agency?
			Curricula		
Utah	4	3	0	(1 in gangs; 1 in gangs,	
				victimology, and domestic	
				violence)	
Vermont	2	-	0	(1 - recruit and in-service,	(1 - recruit and in-service, DOJ; Attorney General's Office; Victims'
				but voluntary)	Advocacy Group; US Attorney; Vermont Crime
					Information Center
Virginia	31	3	0	1 - recruit and in-service	
				(1 - in-service in criminal	-
				law; 1 - recruit in criminal	
				law)	
Washington	က	2	0	(2 - in criminal law)	FBI; Washington Association of Sheriffs and
					Police Chiefs
West Virginia	-	_	-	1 - recruit and in-service	State Attorney General's Office
Wisconsin	21	8	2	4 - recruit and in-service;	4 - recruit and in-service; FBI; State DOJ; State DOC; AG's Office;
			-	1 - recruit (1 - in	Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance
				investigation training)	-
Wyoming	4	-	0	-	DOJ

¹ From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

Hate Crime Survey Response Table JRSA

State	PD Contacted	PD Contacted # Cover HCs	PD Curricula	Total # of	Published State Report(s) Pertaining to Hate Crimes
				Curricula	
Utah	0	0	0	0	Crime in UT
Vermont	0	0	0	0	
Virginia	0	0	0	0	
Washington	0	. 0	0	0	Crime in Washington State
West Virginia	0	0	0	-	
Wisconsin	0	0	0	2	State Hate Crime Publication; Crime and Arrests in
	-		-		Wisconsin
Wyoming	0	0	0	0	Department of Criminal Justice Report
	_				_

<sup>1</sup> From self-report or from the 1998 National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators

## **Appendix E: Law Enforcement Surveys\*:**

- 1. Investigator Survey
- 2. Chief Survey: Agencies which have reported one or more incidents of hate crime in 1997
- 3. Chief Survey: Non-submitting or zeroreporting agencies

<sup>\*</sup>Please note: These surveys were originally distributed in booklet form on color paper (blue for the investigators, yellow for the chiefs).

## LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIME REPORTING SURVEY

Conducted by:

The Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research, Northeastern University

### **HATE CRIME INVESTIGATOR:**

offenses?

[] No [] Yes

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE. ALL RESPONSES WILL BE <u>STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL</u>.

For our purposes in this questionnaire, we will be using the following definition of

bias/hate crime: Any crime motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias toward a particular race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, gender or disability. 1. WHAT IS THE NAME OF YOUR DEPARTMENT/ AGENCY? (CITY, STATE, JURISDICTION) 2. Does your department have an official policy regarding hate crimes? [] Yes (If possible, please include a copy of the official policy) 3. Approximately how many bias crimes has your department reported each year over the past three years? 1997 \_\_\_\_\_ 1996 \_\_\_\_\_ 1995 4. Do you currently have a specialized officer/unit formally designated to investigate hate/bias crimes? [] No [] Yes If yes, how many officers are assigned to this unit? 4a. Is this officer/unit designated to work full time investigating hate crime

[ ] Other \_\_\_\_\_

## DEPARTMENTAL HATE CRIME REPORTING PROCESS

5. Over the last three years, has there been any significant change in how your
department reports or investigates bias crimes?
[ ] No
[] Yes, in reporting.
[] Yes, in investigating.
[] Yes, both.
5a. If yes, could you briefly explain?
6. What do you believe is true about the prevalence of bias crimes in your community/
urisdiction in the last three years?
[] The number of bias crimes is increasing.
[] The number of bias crimes is decreasing.
[] The number of bias crimes remains the same.

16. 多数不多点

7. Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree w Strongly (Please circle the number)	Disa	agree			ongly Agree
Given similar assault cases, bias assault is generally more serious than non-bias assault.	1	2	3	4	5
Given similar vandalism cases, bias vandalism is generally more serious than non-bias vandalism	1 1.	2	3	4	5

8. Describe the majority of officers' attitudes in	your de	partm	ent tov	vard b	ias crimes:
Strong Bias crimes are just another political issue.	ly Disa	gree 2	3	4	rongly Agree 5
It is an important issue facing the community.	1	2	3	4	5
It requires too much extra paperwork for the officer.	1	2	.3	4	5
Bias crimes are no different than other crimes.	1	2	3	4	5
Officers generally support departmental policy.	1	2	3	4	5

Bias charged language	Not mportant 1	Slightly Important 2	Moderately Important 3	Very Importan 4
The victim claims bias	1	2	3	4
Prior relationship between offender and victing	m 1	2	3	4
Graffiti or bias symbols at crime scene	1	2	3	4
Offender membership in a hate group (skinheads, neo-nazis, etc.)	1	2	3	4
Local advocacy group asserts a bias crime occurred	1	2	3	4

Victim is afraid to contact law enforcement.	Not Important	Slightly Important	Moderately Important	Very Importan
and the semantial and the semantic sema	1	2	3	4
Victim does not believe the police will take the crime seriously.	- 1	2	3	4
Victim is not aware of the bias intent.	1	2	3	4
Victim is afraid to report for fear of family reaction.	. 1	2	3	4
Victim is embarrassed about the crime.	1	2	3	4
Victim is afraid to report because of communi retaliation.	ty 1	2 .	3	4
anguage and/or cultural barriers	1	2	2	4
Other:	1	2	2	4

11. Of the bias crimes your department has reported over the past three years, approximately how often did the victim originally identify the crime as bias motivated?

12. In your community, do you believe most victims of bias crime are more or less likely to report their victimization to law enforcement compared to victims of non-bias offenses?

Much Le	ss Lil	kely		Muci	ı More	Likely
13. Of the bias crime types (race, ethnicity, sexual disability) occurring in your community, which has	orient	ation	3 religi	4	5 nder or	•

13a.	Why?

14. How important are the following things in identify and report a hate crime?	ENCOL	RAGING a	un officer t	O properly
Management within the department has	Not Important	Slightly Important	Moderately Important	Very Important
expressed that hate crimes are a priority.	1	2	3	4
There are internal checks to make sure officers identify these crimes correctly.	s l	2	3	4
Officers believe that identifying these crimes will help deter similar crimes in the future.	1	2	3	. 4
The Department mandates reporting these crim	nes. 1	2	. 3	4
Officers have been trained in understanding the differences between bias and non-bias offenses.	1	2	3	4
Officers want to send a message to the community that these crimes will not be tolerated.	nity 1	2 .	3	4
Officers believe it is the right thing to do moral	ly. 1	2	3	4
Officers believe this is the right thing politically	y. 1	2	3	4
Other:	_ 1	2	3	4

15. There is some indication that the following factors have some impact on how agencies report hate crime. If a hate crime occurred in your jurisdiction, how important would the following factors be in DISCOURAGING an officer from recording bias motivation in a crime report?

(Please circle the number		ucan o	The every or brainfillians, which	And the second s
·	Not Important	Slightly Important	Moderately Important	Very Important
Fear of media/ political attention	1	2	3	4
The officer does not believe the incident is serious enough.	1	2	3	4
There might be additional paperwork involve	d. 1	2	3	4
The officer fears that labeling the incident a hate crime would spark further violence/ crime in community.	1	2	3	4
The officer may have prejudices regarding that particular race, religion, sexual orienta	l ition, etc.	2	3	4
The officer believes that some minority group complain unnecessarily.	s l	2	3	4
The officer believes that hate crime is not as serious as other crimes.	1	2	3	4
The officer believes that there is no difference between bias and non-bias crimes.	1	2	3	4
The officer does not believe the prosecution w follow through on a bias charge.	ill 1	2	3	4
The officer fails to recognize the element of bi	as. 1	2	3	4
Officers are too busy and do not have enough time to adequately investigate these crimes.	1	2	3	4
Lack of training for officers in how to identify and investigate hate crimes.	· 1	2	3	4
Other:	1	- 2	3	4

16. \	When does your department begin treating an incident as a hate/ bias crime?  (Check all that apply)
	[] When the victim asserts bias is involved
	[] When an advocacy group asserts that bias is involved
	[] When the media asserts that bias is involved
	[] Other
	Does your department provide any supervisory review of incidents where bias was ected?
	[] No (Skip to question 18)
	[] Yes. What position is this person?
	[ ] 100. White postuous to the postuous.
	17a. Is this supervision outside of the routine review which occurs for non-bias incidents?
	[] No
	[] Yes. Please check all that apply:
	[] Advisory board review
	[] Captain review process
	[] Sergeant/ Lieutenant review process
	[ ] Other
	17b. Approximately what percentage of the time does this person(s) determine that the incident was not bias related after the initial report indicates bias?
	,
18.	Is the same person who reports other statistics to the Uniform Crime Reports
	responsible for filing hate crime statistics?
	No. What position is the hate crime reporter?
	[] Yes. What position is this person?

### TRAINING INFORMATION

10	Is hate/higg grime training and it is a
IJ.	Is hate/bias crime training provided to officers in your department?
	[] No (China)
	[] No (Skip to question 20)
	[] Yes. By whom? (Ex. State police, local police, FBI, etc.)
	police, I bi, etc.)

Please fill in the following chart:

				ing chart:							
FOR:	AV/ (Yes	No)	E?	HOW OFTEN? (For example: (MONTH/ YEARLY)	TR	AII 1	VINO 2	FUL 32 33	74	5	
New Recruits	Yes	No				1	2			5	<u> </u>
In-Service for all officers	Yes	No	•			1	2	3	4	5	
In-service for specialized officers	Yes	No				1	2	3	4	5	
In-Service for Detectives	Yes	No				1	2	3	4	5	
In-Service for command staff	Yes	No			١	1	2	3	4	5	
Training for Community Members	Yes	No				1	2	3	4	5	

bers			
(Check	all that apply) [] State curricul [] State Attorne [] Specialized had [] FBI (or anoth [] New national	you use in the training um/ State Post y General materials ate crime officers make ner federal level) curriculum hate crime curriculum cloped our own training	e a presentation ulum
]	ow long is the tra ] less than one l ] one to two hou ] more than two ] other	urs	
•	-		

20. Who provides the training on hate constitution (Check all that apply)  [] An outside consultant  [] Community based specialist or  [] Professionals within the state a  [] A hate crime specialist within the state and a light specialist within	advocacy gro cademy staff/ the departmen	state	=			-
21. How could these trainings be more us	seful?					
22. If you had additional resources to expression would be a priority to attend a bias crime to	and your train raining? Very Low p		jecë	and the same	which gro	
Specialized officers	1	2	3	4	5	ority
Command staff	1	2	3	4	5	
Patrol/ Responding officers	1	2	3	4	5	
Detectives	1	2	3	4	5	
Community members	1	2	3	4	5	
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION  23. Your position is: [ ] Chief/ Commissioner					- (20 mm) - (20 mm)	
[] Top administrator (not Chief) [] Mid level manager [] Line officer [] Hate Crime investigator [] Other						
24. How many years have you been in your						

If you have any additional			rting procedures in	your
department, your state or b	by the FBI, please inc	clude them here:		
<del></del>				
`				
	\			

If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact Jennifer Balboni at the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research at 617.373.3310.

## LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIME REPORTING SURVEY

Conducted by:

The Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research, Northeastern University

### **DEAR CHIEF/ COMMISSIONER:**

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE. ALL RESPONSES WILL BE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

For our purposes in this questionnaire, we will be using the following definition of bias/hate crime:

Any crime motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias toward a particular race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, gender or disability.

1.	WHAT IS THE NAME OF YOUR DEPARTMENT/ AGENCY? (CITY/ STATE/ JURISDICTION)
2.	Does your department have a written policy regarding hate crimes? [] No
	[] Yes (If possible, please include a copy of the official policy)
3. pa	Approximately how many bias crimes has your department reported each year over the st three years?  1997 1996 1995
4. hai	Do you currently have a specialized officer/unit formally designated to investigate te/bias crimes?
	[] No
	[] Yes  If yes, how many officers are assigned to this unit?
	4a. Is this officer/unit designated to work full time investigating hate crime offenses?
	[] No
	[] Yes
	[] Other

## DEPARTMENTAL HATE CRIME REPORTING PROCESS

department reports or investigates bias crimes?  [] No  [] Yes, in reporting.  [] Yes, in investigating.  [] Yes, both.  5a. If yes, could you briefly explain these?
6. When would your department begin treating an incident as a hate/bias crime?  (Check all that apply)  [] When the victim asserts that bias is involved  [] When an advocacy group asserts that bias is involved  [] When the media asserts that bias is involved  [] Other
7. What do you believe is true about the prevalence of bias crimes in your community/jurisdiction in the last three years?  [] The number of bias crimes is increasing.  [] The number of bias crimes is decreasing.  [] The number of bias crimes remains the same.

8. In your department, how important are (Please circle the number)	the followin	g uses of b	ias crime da	ata?
How to utilize departmental resources (financial considerations/staff assignmental)	Not Important 1	Slightly Important 2	Moderately Important 3	Very Important 4
For training purposes	1 .	2	3	4 .
For investigative purposes	1	2	3	4
To compare/contrast with previous years	1	2	3	4
To provide to advocacy groups	1	2	3	4
To provide to the media To provide to government authorities	1 1	2 2	3	4

7

9. How concerned have local politicians in your community been about the issue of hate crime in the last three years?

Not concer	rned		Ve.	ry conce	rned
1	2	3	4	5	

10. Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree  Strongly  (Please circle the number)	Dis	agree	Mercal adentification		rongly Agree
Given similar assault cases, bias assault is generally more serious than non-bias assault.	1	2	3	4	5
Given similar vandalism cases, bias vandalism is generally more serious than non-bias vandalism	1	2	3	4	5

fluen	ice		La	rge Influence
1	2	3		5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	1	5
1	2	. 3	4	. ب
1		3		2
	1 1 1 1 1	<ol> <li>1 2</li> <li>1 2</li> <li>1 2</li> <li>1 2</li> </ol>	1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3	1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Strong	ly Disa	gree	Mic November 19		rongly A	area
Bias crimes are just another political issue.	1	2	3	4	5	SI C
It is a serious issue facing the community.	1	2	3	4	5	
It requires too much extra paperwork for the officer.	1	2	3	4	5	
Bias crimes are no different than other crimes.	1	2	3	4	5	
Officers generally support departmental policy.	1	2	3	4	5	

14. How important do you believe the follow from reporting a bias crime?	ing facto	rs are in disco	ouraging a vi	ctim
Victim is afraid to contact law enforcement.	Not Important	Slightly Important 2	Moderately Important 3	•
Victim does not believe the police will take the crime seriously.	1	2	3	4
Victim is not aware of the bias intent.	1	2	3	4
Victim is afraid to report for fear of family reaction.	1	2	3	4
Victim is embarrassed about the crime.	1	2	3	4 .
Victim is afraid to report because of communi retaliation.	ty 1	2	3	4
Language and/or cultural barriers	1	2	3	4
Other:	1	2	3	4
<ul> <li>15. Does your department provide any supervisuspected? <ul> <li>[] No (Skip to question 16)</li> <li>[] Yes. What position is this person?</li> </ul> </li> <li>15a. Is this supervision outside of the princidents? <ul> <li>[] No</li> <li>[] Yes. Please check all that are</li> <li>[] Advisory board revision of the principle of the princi</li></ul></li></ul>	outine re		·	

13. In your department, if a victim reports a hate crime but does not want to participate in

[] An informal report will be filed for internal reference only

an investigation, what will most likely happen?

[] A formal offense report will be taken

responsible to	r iшn What	g nate crin position i	eports other statistics to ne statistics? s the hate crime reporte is this person?				rime	Reports	-	
[ ] No [ ] Yes	as crin (Skip . By w	ne training to questio	FBI, State Police, local		_		nt?			
TRAINING	AVA	ILABLE?	HOW OFTEN?	HOW	USE	FUL	IS	THIS :	7	
FOR:	(Yes/	(No)	(Ex. Monthly/ Yearly, etc.)	TRAIN	UNC	2				
New Recruits								Y USEFUL		
	Yes	No		1	2	3	4	5		
In-Service for all officers	Yes	No		1	2	3	4	5		
In-Service for specialized officers	Yes	No		1	2	3	4	5		
In Service for detectives	Yes	No		1	2	3	4	5		
In-Service for command staff	Yes	No		1	2	3	4	5		
Training for Community Members	Yes	No		1	2	3	4	5		
(Check	all tha	ıt apply)	you use in the training	?		-			•	

/ a.	what materials do you use in the training?
Chec	ck all that apply)
	[] State curriculum/ State Post
	[] State Attorney General materials
	[] Specialized hate crime officers make a presentation
	[] FBI (or another federal level) curriculum
	[] New national hate crime curriculum
	[] We have developed our own training.
	[] Other

17b.	How long is the training on hate crimes?
	[] less than one hour
	[] one to two hours
	[] more than two hours
	[ ] other
	••

18. If you had additional resources to expan would be a priority to attend a bias crime tra	d your traini ining?	ng on	hate c	rime, v	vhich gr	oups
The state of the s	Very Low pr	iority		Ve	ry High p	riority
Specialized officers	1	2	3	4	5	
Command staff	1	2	3	4	5	
Patrol/Responding Officers	1	2	3	4	5	
Detectives	1	2	3	4	5	
Community members	1	2	3	4	5	

## DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

	Y. 147 983
19.	If you are not the chief, what is your position:
	[] Not applicable
	[] Commissioner
	[] Top administrator (not Chief)
	[] Mid level manager
	[] Line officer
	[] Hate Crime investigator
	[] Other
	19a. Please specify your rank:
20.	How many years have you been in your current position?
21.	What type of law enforcement agency do you represent?
	[] Local/municipal
	[ ] State
	[] County
	[] College/University
	[ ] Other
22.	Approximately how many sworn officers are currently in your department?

23. Approximately how large is the population y  [] less than 10,000 [] 100,000-249,999  [] 10,000-24,999 [] 250,000 or more  [] 25,000-49,999  [] 50,000-99,999	
24. What advocacy groups are active in your con (Check all that apply) [] Religious advocacy groups (ex. ADL) [] African American groups (ex. NAACP [] Gay/ Lesbian groups [] Disabilities groups [] None	[] Latino/a groups
25. What type of reporting system does your departure UCR?  (Please check only one box)  [] UCR (Uniform Crime Reports)/ Summ  [] NIBRS (National Incident Based Reporting System, noted)  [] Summary based and NIBRS  [] Other	ary based rting System)
If you have any additional thoughts about hate cri department, your state or by the FBI, please include	
If you have any questions regarding this survey, p Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research at 61	

## LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIME REPORTING SURVEY

### Conducted by:

The Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research, Northeastern University

### **DEAR CHIEF/ COMMISSIONER:**

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE ALL RESPONSES WILL BE <u>STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL</u>.

For our purposes in this questionnaire, we will be using the following definition of

bias/hate crime: Any crime motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias toward a particular race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, gender or disability. NAME OF DEPARTMENT/AGENCY (CITY/ STATE/ JURISDICTION)\_\_\_ 1. Does your department have a written policy regarding hate crimes? [] No [] Yes (If possible, please include a copy of the official policy) 2. Do you currently have a specialized officer/unit formally designated to investigate hate/bias crimes? [] No [] Yes If yes, how many officers are assigned to this unit? 2a. Is this officer/ unit designated to work full time investigating hate crime offenses? [] No [] Yes

### DEPARTMENTAL HATE CRIME REPORTING PROCESS

[] Other \_

3.	If an officer encountered a bias motivated offense, what would happen next?  (Check all that apply)
	[] The officer would consult his/her immediate supervisor to determine whether bias exists.
	[] The officer would refer the case to a special bias unit/officer (if applicable).
	[] The officer would transfer it to a regular (non-specialized) detective.
	[] The officer would consult with a special bias unit/officer/ detective.
	[ ] Other

4. When would your department begin treating an incident as a hate/bias crime?  (Check all that apply)  [] When the victim asserts that bias is involved  [] When an advocacy group asserts that bias is involved  [] When the media asserts that bias is involved  [] Other						
5. Please rate how strongly you agree or dis		the followi sagree		nts. ngly Agree		
(Please circle the numbe		sagi ce	500	ngiy Agree		
Given similar assault cases, bias assault is generally more serious than non-bias assau	lt.	2 3	4	5		
Given similar vandalism cases, bias vandalis is generally more serious than non-bias va		2 3	4	5		
7. Do you believe there are hate/bias crimes your department?  [] No		2 3	4	oncerned 5 eported to		
[] Yes If yes, how important are the follows		?				
	N. 7	C34 - L 41	Madametalar	Vomt		
	Not Important	Slightly Important	Moderately Important			
Victim is afraid to contact law enforcement.	Important	• •				
Victim is afraid to contact law enforcement.  Victim does not believe the police will take the crime seriously.	Important 1	Important	Important	Important		
Victim does not believe the police will take	Important 1	Important 2	Important 3	Important 4		
Victim does not believe the police will take the crime seriously.  Victim is not aware of the bias intent.  Victim is afraid to report for fear of family	Important 1	Important 2 2	Important 3	Important 4		
Victim does not believe the police will take the crime seriously.  Victim is not aware of the bias intent.	Important 1	Important 2 2	Important 3	Important 4		
Victim does not believe the police will take the crime seriously.  Victim is not aware of the bias intent.  Victim is afraid to report for fear of family reaction.	Important  1  1  1  1  1	Important 2 2 2 2	Important 3 3 3	4 4 4 4 4		
Victim does not believe the police will take the crime seriously.  Victim is not aware of the bias intent.  Victim is afraid to report for fear of family reaction.  Victim is embarrassed about the crime.  Victim is afraid to report because of commu	Important  1  1  1  1  1	Important 2 2 2 2 2 2	3 3 3 3 3	4 4 4 4 4		

8. There is some indication that the following factors have some impact on how agencies report hate crime: If a hate crime occurred in your jurisdiction, how important would the following factors be in DISCOURAGING an officer from recording bias motivation in a crime report?

(Please circle the numbe	r)			
•	Not important	Slightly Important	Moderately Important	
Fear of media/political attention.	- 1	2	3	4
The officer does not believe the incident is serious enough.	1	2	3	4
There might be additional paperwork involved	i. 1	2	3	4
The officer fears that labeling the incident a hate crime would spark further violence/crime in community.	1,	2	3	4
The officer may have prejudices regarding that particular race, religion, etc.	1	2	3	4
The officer believes that some minority groups complain unnecessarily.	s 1	2	3	4
The officer believes that hate crime is not as serious as other crimes.	.1	2	3 .	4
The officer believes that there is no difference between bias and non-bias crimes.	1	2	3	4
The officer does not believe the prosecution wi follow through on a bias charge.	11 1	2	3	4
The officer fails to recognize the element of bia	as. 1	2	3	4
Officers are too busy and do not have enough time to adequately investigate these crimes.	1	2	3	4
Lack of training for officers in how to identify and investigate hate crimes.	1	2	3	4
Other:	1	2	3	4

9. In your community, do you believe most victims of bias crime are more or less likely to report their victimization to law enforcement compared to victims of non-bias offenses?							
	Much less li	ikely	2	3	Muc.	h more likely 5	
		•		<i>.</i>	<b>.</b>		
TRAINING INFORMATION							
10. Is training regarding hate crimes pr [] No [] Yes. By whom? (ex. F.B.I, S					partme	nt?	
11. If you had additional resources to e	xpand your t	rainir	ig on	hate c	rime, v	vhich groups	
would be a priority to attend a bias crim	ne training?  Very Low p	riority			Ver	y High priority	
	, er, _e., _e.			2	4		
Specialized officers		1	2	3	4	5	
Command staff		1	2	3	4	5	
Patrol/Responding officers		1	2	3	4	5	
Detectives		1	2	3	4	5	
Community members		1	2	3	4	5	
-							
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION					) ;		
12. If you are not the chief, what is you  [] Not applicable [] Commissioner [] Top administrator (not Chief [] Mid level manager [] Line officer [] Hate Crime investigator [] Other	n)						
12a. Please specify your rank: _							

13. How many years have you been in your current position?

14. What type of law enforcement agency do you represent?  [ ] Local/ municipal  [ ] State  [ ] County  [ ] College/University  [ ] Other
15. Approximately how many sworn officers are currently in your department?
16. Approximately how large is the population your agency serves?  [] less than 10,000 [] 100,000-249,999  [] 10,000-24,999 [] 250,000 or more  [] 25,000-49,999  [] 50,000-99,999
17. What advocacy groups are active in your community?  (Check all that apply)  [] Religious advocacy groups (ex. ADL) [] Latino/a groups  [] African American agencies (ex. NAACP) [] Asian groups  [] Gay/Lesbian groups [] Feminist groups  [] Disabilities groups [] Other
18. What type of reporting system does your department use to report hate crime to UCR?  (Please check only one box)  [] UCR (Uniform Crime Reports)/Summary based  [] NIBRS (National Incident Based Reporting System)  [] An incident based reporting system, not NIBRS  [] Summary based and NIBRS  [] Other
If you have any additional thoughts about hate crime and/or reporting procedures in your department, your state or by the FBI, please include them here:

If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact Jennifer Balboni at the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research at 617.373.3310.